Trumps Dilemma: The Donroe Doctrine and Peace as Bait

The Silent Strategy of China: Waiting as the Art of War

Paradoxically, some Chinese strategists find themselves in a position where a quick resolution to the conflict does not necessarily interest them. China specialist economist Markus Taube summed it up as: “The longer the United States remains bogged down in this quagmire, and the more unsolved the problem remains, the better it is for China.” Significantly, Beijing rejected a UN resolution calling for the opening of the Strait of Hormuz.

The underlying logic is coldly calculated. Firstly, the war in Iran ties up American resources – military, diplomatic, and financial – that could otherwise be deployed against China. Secondly, the current conflict weakens Trump’s position domestically, thereby reducing his bargaining power with Beijing on trade issues. Thirdly, Russia profits considerably from the conflict by increasing oil exports to China, filling the gaps created by American sanctions. Following the decrease in Iranian and Venezuelan supplies, Moscow has become China’s main oil supplier. This is certainly not China’s first choice, but it offers a reliable alternative.

Fourth and last point: China has invested heavily in electromobility in recent years in order to reduce its long-term strategic dependence on oil. The war against Iran reinforces the political and economic arguments in favor of this transformation. Short-term difficulties are offset by long-term strategic positioning.

The Achilles’ Heel of the American Strategy: When Oil Weapons Are Targeted at the Shooter

Trump’s strategy of using the Strait of Hormuz as an economic lever against China has a fundamental flaw: it harms the United States itself. The rise in oil prices directly impacts American consumers. The national average price of gasoline reached $3.41 per gallon in the weeks following the start of the war. American inflation reached its highest annual level. The political pressure on Trump to lower energy prices again is significant, especially in light of the November 2026 midterm elections.

The idea that closing the Strait of Hormuz would penalize China more than other countries is partially unfounded after a more in-depth analysis. Thanks to its reserves, diversification strategy, and Russia’s influence, China is better positioned than many of its Asian neighbors, and even better than generally expected. Additionally, the surge in oil prices also affects European allies of the United States, who, while benefiting from American LNG exports, are experiencing higher energy costs. As Handelsblatt pointed out in April 2026: “The Ormuz trap marks the beginning of a new geopolitical era; Iran, but also Trump himself, instrumentalize maritime routes for foreign policy purposes.”

A complete closure of the strait would not mathematically allow for the quick replacement of lost oil. Alternative pipelines from the Gulf region – the Saudi East-West pipeline and the ADCOP pipeline from the United Arab Emirates – could jointly compensate for a maximum of 3.5 to 5.5 million barrels per day. Strategic reserves could provide an additional 6 to 7 million barrels per day in the short term. Even if all alternative solutions were activated simultaneously, a daily deficit of over 10 million barrels would remain. This scenario illustrates why, ultimately, each party has deemed a controlled opening of the strait necessary, despite all geopolitical calculations.

Nuclear Poker: The Real Backstage Weapon

At the heart of this conflict lies Iran’s nuclear capacity, which makes the dilemma so concerning for Washington. Before the start of the war, Iran had enriched uranium to 60%, far exceeding the 3.67% limit allowed by the 2015 JCPOA nuclear agreement. The Director General of the IAEA, Mr. Grossi, described this level of enrichment as “quasi-militarily relevant” and estimated that the existing quantity – between 440 and 450 kilograms – was theoretically sufficient to produce more than ten nuclear warheads. As recently as April 2026, the head of the Iranian Atomic Energy Organization bluntly stated that the demands of the United States and Israel to limit the enrichment program were “pious wishes that we will ignore.”

During the negotiations in Islamabad, the two positions were sharply opposed: the United States insisted on a 20-year moratorium on uranium enrichment and the physical transfer of all highly enriched uranium abroad. Iran proposed a three to five-year moratorium and at most mentioned supervised dilution on-site. This difference is not purely theoretical – a 20-year moratorium would prevent Iran from developing a preventive nuclear strike capability within his lifetime. A five-year moratorium, geopolitically speaking, represents little more than a respite.

In late April 2026, Russia proposed its mediation: Moscow offered to take over the storage of Iranian uranium – a technically feasible option, as Russia already had Iranian uranium in storage under the old Vienna agreement. However, Washington showed no interest in this proposal. The reason is likely strategic: storing in Russia does not definitively prevent the nuclear option but simply shifts the problem geographically.

Internal Divisions in Iran: Who Is Actually Negotiating in Tehran?

An often underestimated factor in analyzing the conflict is the power dynamics within Iran. According to an Axios article, the new Iranian leadership is deeply divided on the issue of acceptable concessions regarding nuclear issues. On one side, pragmatic forces around Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, who publicly expressed willingness to negotiate and mentioned “encouraging progress” in Geneva. On the other side, hardliners, represented by the head of the Atomic Energy Agency and some members of the Revolutionary Guards, reject any restrictions on the nuclear program, considering it a national capitulation.

This division explains the often contradictory behavior of Iran – a Foreign Minister announces the opening of the Strait of Hormuz, and less than 24 hours later, the Iranian military cancels this announcement. Trump initially praised on TruthSocial that “the Strait of Hormuz is fully open and operational” and that Iran has committed to “never close the strait again”; then came the denial from Tehran. This wavering and backtracking does not reflect a cynical attempt at deception, but rather real disagreements within the Iranian power structure.

This division complicates the conclusion of reliable agreements. Even if a diplomat in Islamabad or Geneva gives their approval, it is difficult to know if the military – especially the Revolutionary Guards, who de facto control the Strait of Hormuz and the nuclear program – will implement it. Past experience in Iranian-American relations shows that political leaders can be pragmatic while paramilitary structures pursue their own goals.

Contemporary Energy Geopolitics: Slow Paradigm Shifts

The war in Iran and the Hormuz dilemma are not isolated events. They are part of a broader paradigm shift in global energy policy. The era of “safe” energy supplies through established commercial routes is evolving. Maritime routes have become the primary battleground of geopolitical power – they are no longer just conflict zones but active instruments of state foreign policy.

The Handelsblatt newspaper succinctly summarized this change: not only Iran but also Trump himself has turned the blockade of maritime routes into an instrument of foreign policy. Iran closed the strait to oil tankers destined for countries it does not support. In retaliation, the United States imposed a blockade on Iranian ports. Both sides are using energy flows as a weapon, causing collateral damage on a global scale. According to Handelsblatt, six weeks of war with Iran triggered an “energy supply shock of unprecedented magnitude for the global economy since the 1970s.”

In this new context, China’s long-term strategic investments – in electric vehicles, rare earths, and alternative supply chains – constitute a structural advantage. Beijing has realized that its dependence on a single maritime route is a major security vulnerability. The solution lies in diversification: Russian oil via pipelines, African oil, gradual electrification of transport, and national production of renewable energies. Additionally, China has maintained access to Iranian oil supplies through discreet diplomatic channels – Chinese vessels apparently received guarantees of non-attack and, in some cases, were able to bypass the Iranian blockade by paying bribes.

The situation is particularly delicate for Europe. The continent is dependent on LNG imports, the prices of which have skyrocketed due to the Hormuz crisis. A complete normalization of energy markets requires a political solution to the Iranian conflict, yet Europe has practically no direct influence on these negotiations. Traditional European mediators, such as Germany and France, are effectively sidelined.

The Hidden Agenda: Energy Dominance at the Core of Trump’s Doctrine

Trump has never hidden that energy dominance is a central tool of American foreign policy. From the first day of his second term, he declared a national energy emergency and has since pursued the goal of making American oil and gas the global benchmark for energy production. LNG exports increased by over 20% during his presidency. European allies, Japan, and South Korea have already committed to buying American energy.

The connection to the war in Iran is direct: if Iranian and Venezuelan oil disappear from the market – whether due to war damages, sanctions, or deliberate blockades – a void is created. This void can only be filled by supplies controlled by the United States or its allies. Washington directly or indirectly influences oil production from Canada to Guyana to Venezuela – roughly 20% of global production.

However, as mentioned from the outset, this plan has a systemic weakness: Russia is the third party benefiting from it. Moscow has the capacity to provide virtually any resource in commercial quantities and can guarantee supply stability thanks to its geographic location and nuclear umbrella. Every “victory” Washington achieves over one of China’s energy suppliers – Iran, Venezuela, or others – effectively strengthens Russia’s position, as Beijing then turns to the most reliable alternative supplier. This paradox of the Trump doctrine was clearly highlighted by Carnegie researchers as early as March 2026.

Between Agreement and Ongoing Crisis

The coming weeks will likely be crucial. Trump has called a meeting at the White House on Iran for Monday, April 27, 2026, to discuss the deadlock and possible next steps with his team. The latest Iranian proposal is on the table, and Pakistani mediators are ready. The question is whether Washington will take the bait.

Three scenarios are conceivable. In the first scenario, the Trump administration accepts the Iranian proposal in a modified form: a temporary opening of the Strait of Hormuz in exchange for an extension of the ceasefire, with the nuclear issue explicitly reserved for a second round of negotiations. This would alleviate pressure on the global oil market in the short term but weaken America’s long-term negotiation position. In the second scenario, Washington insists on a comprehensive agreement: no opening of the Strait of Hormuz without substantial and simultaneous concessions on nuclear weapons. This risks escalating the situation but does not prematurly compromise its negotiation leverage. In the third scenario, Iran definitively breaks off negotiations and reinstates an active blockade, leading to a new spike in oil prices in the short term and further destabilizing the global economy.

From an economic perspective, the situation is clear: the world has a vital interest in a rapid normalization of maritime traffic through the Strait of Hormuz. Every month of extended partial blockade costs the global economy hundreds of billions of dollars in additional energy costs, logistical expenses, and productivity losses. In March 2026, the IEA decided on an unprecedented 400-million-barrel drawdown from strategic reserves over a 30-day period – an emergency mechanism that does not challenge the fundamentally irreplaceable nature of the Hormuz waterway.

As British geostrategist Nicholas Spykman once put it, the Strait of Hormuz is not a geographical coincidence but the beating heart of the global energy system. Whoever controls this beating heart controls a crucial lever of the world economy. Trump, Tehran, and Beijing are all acutely aware of this fundamental truth – which explains why this ostensibly regional conflict is actually a global chess game aimed at reshaping the economic and political power structures of the 21st century. Iran’s offer to open the Strait of Hormuz and defer the nuclear issue is therefore less an offer of peace than a tactical masterstroke – a maneuver that forces Trump to choose between the price of his principles and the price to be paid.