Behind the display of a historic budgetary effort, the update of the Military Programming Law reveals a more contrasting reality. Between late catch-up, constrained ambitions, and strategic misalignment, France is preparing its armies… but perhaps too slowly in the face of rising threats.
A sincere LPM but without strategic margin
In their analysis published by the IFRI, Stéphane Audrand and Élie Tenenbaum first emphasize an essential point: the update of the Military Programming Law (LPM) 2024-2030 marks a break in the budgetary sincerity of the French defense effort. After decades of chronic underfunding, the allocated means finally allow funding of the existing army model.
The addition of 36 billion euros corrects an initial imbalance. The 400 billion voted in 2023 appeared insufficient to achieve the set capacity objectives. This update is primarily to “pay for” a defined army model, rather than to transform it.
This choice reflects a priority given to coherence over mass. It is about repairing a military tool weakened by years of underinvestment, notably by reinforcing ammunition stocks, logistical capacities, or support equipment. Recent conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East have highlighted the critical importance of these elements.
However, this catch-up absorbs most of the new credits. As the authors point out, this dynamic leaves very little room to evolve the overall format of the armies. In other words, France consolidates its model without truly adapting it to new threats.
An outdated army model in the face of strategic realities
One of the authors’ most striking findings concerns the mismatch between the French military model and contemporary warfare scenarios. The army format largely inherits choices made in the 1990s, after the Cold War.
This model, designed for crisis management operations and coalition engagements, appears out of step with the perspective of high-intensity conflict in Europe today. The 2025 French National Strategic Review explicitly mentions the risk of a major war after 2030.
In the land domain, France’s ability to deploy an army corps remains limited. There are numerous gaps, especially in artillery, air defense, or logistics. In the air, despite a fleet of 187 combat aircraft, the ability to sustain against a top-tier adversary remains uncertain, due to attrition and availability constraints.
The navy, on the other hand, remains structured around the carrier strike group, limiting its ability to manage multiple crises simultaneously, especially in overseas territories. Overall, several critical segments, such as anti-drone warfare or precision munitions, appear undersized compared to standards seen in recent conflicts.
This mismatch is compounded by a timing issue. The real power projection horizon is set for 2035, five years after the identified strategic deadline for a major conflict risk. As the authors summarize, the French armies could be “ready five years too late.”
A real but insufficient budgetary effort on a European scale
The update of the LPM is part of an undeniable budget trajectory. Defense spending has doubled in ten years, from 32 to 64 billion euros. This effort marks a break from previous decades.
But this increase must be put into perspective. In proportion to GDP, defense spending only increases from 1.8% to 2.5%, a limited progression. Moreover, inflation, program costs, and capacity catch-up absorb a large part of the additional credits.
Above all, France is no longer ahead in Europe. While it was above the average ten years ago, it is now within the norm or even lagging behind some partners. Germany, for instance, aims for a budget of 160 billion euros in the long term, a significantly higher level than France’s.
This differential raises questions about France’s strategic positioning. The risk, according to Stéphane Audrand and Élie Tenenbaum, is not a sudden detachment but a gradual marginalization. France could remain strong in certain areas of excellence, such as nuclear deterrence or special forces, while losing the ability to influence a high-intensity conflict on a European scale.
A real but incomplete awareness
One of the major contributions of this update lies in its legislative aspect. The authors highlight unprecedented provisions aimed at preparing French society for a major crisis. The introduction of a “state of national security alert” or measures concerning economic mobilization demonstrate an awareness of the stakes.
These mechanisms aim to adapt the country to long, hybrid, and multi-domain conflicts, far removed from Cold War scenarios. They involve increased mobilization of economic actors, critical infrastructure, and the population.
However, this political ambition contrasts with capacity limitations. The strategic framework evolves faster than military means. This desynchronization is one of the most critical points of the analysis.
In conclusion, the authors provide a nuanced diagnosis. The update of the LPM is probably the best possible in the current context, but it remains insufficient in the face of the magnitude of challenges. It marks a step in the reinforcement of the French armies, without fully meeting the requirements of a rapidly deteriorating strategic environment.
