First lesson: Hungary is turning its back on the policy of the permanent veto. Over the years and his disputes with Brussels, Viktor Orban had made the veto a real negotiating weapon. In a Union where unanimity remains required on issues as essential as foreign policy, sanctions or the entry of new states, this strategy allowed him to exercise an influence out of all proportion to the economic and demographic weight of his country.
The effects of the alternation are immediate. In just a few weeks, the Twenty-Seven managed to open the first group of negotiating chapters with Ukraine and adopt a twentieth package of sanctions against Russia, hitherto blocked by Budapest.
Should we conclude that Hungary has completely fallen into line on the Ukrainian issue? Nothing is less certain. Péter Magyar has already confirmed that his country will not participate in European military assistance efforts in kyiv and that he intends to maintain its supplies of Russian hydrocarbons. Above all, opinion surveys show that a majority of Hungarians remain opposed to rapid accession of Ukraine to the European Union.
During the electoral campaign, the new Prime Minister committed to organizing a referendum when the prospect of accession became concrete. What if the democratic debate on enlargement finally came from Budapest, and then spread to other European capitals?
Second lesson: Budapest is rebalancing its foreign policy. But it doesn’t line up. Those who dreamed of a Péter Magyar breaking with the geopolitical choices of his predecessor have already come away from it.
If the new Prime Minister undeniably reestablishes a relationship with the Commission which was deeply degraded under Viktor Orbán, Hungary is not moving from a multipolar logic to a logic of alignment; it simply recomposes the order of its priorities by giving preference to the European partnership, where Viktor Orbán sought a permanent balance between the West, Russia and China.
“In many ways, Péter Magyar appears like a Central European Giorgia Meloni”
—  Florence Kuntz
Ideological choice or economic realism? Probably both. The standoff with Brussels cost Hungary several billion euros. It deprived the country of a significant part of its public investments, weakened the forint and contributed to making the Hungarian economy less efficient than those of its Central European neighbors.
For Péter Magyar’s voters, the emergency is economic. For Ursula von der Leyen, it is political. The agreement concluded in May to initiate the gradual release of more than 16 billion euros of previously suspended funds responds to these two imperatives. The most sensitive issues – including migration policy – have not disappeared; they were temporarily relegated to the background in order to allow the display of a normalization of relations between Budapest and Brussels.
Third lesson: Hungary will continue to have a unique voice in European arbitrations, and particularly in the short term in the sensitive debate which animates Brussels, namely the relationship with Beijing – modestly renamed during a European summit “imbalances global macroeconomics”.
Viktor Orbán had made Hungary a privileged partner of the new Silk Roads, presenting its geographical position as a “hub» Chinese to the European market.
Among the most emblematic achievements, the Budapest-Belgrade line, Huawei’s research and development center in Budapest and the group’s largest logistics center near the capital, as well as massive investments in electric automobiles: a CATL battery mega-factory, the first BYD automobile factory in Europe, then the installation in Budapest from the European headquarters of the same manufacturer.
Péter Magyar does not question this industrial strategy. On the contrary, he affirms that cooperation with China remains in the interest of his country. On the other hand, he promises to make Chinese investments more conditional on European rules and the development of the Hungarian economy. A narrow path, but one that could bring together converging interests in the battle for the Industrial Acceleration Act.
In many ways, Péter Magyar appears like a Central European Giorgia Meloni: fully inserted into the European game, but determined to defend a demanding conception of national interests, a restrictive migration policy, a conservative agenda and pragmatic diplomacy. Will he, like the President of the Council of Ministers of Italy, be able to convert his national weight into European leadership?
