In a world where contemporary power relations are often read through analytical grids forged by history and strategic thought, references to the great authors and paradigms of international relations remain essential.
History and nothing but history! The archives and nothing but the archives! Manuscripts and nothing but manuscripts! No matter how much we want to project ourselves into the future to escape the present by making a clean slate of the past, there is nothing we can do. We are caught up in the past and challenged by the present. It is to the honor of certain leaders to refer to the history of international relations to help practitioners and the public to see more clearly – and to make amends.
Thucydides, who wrote about the Peloponnesian War (431 to 404 BC) between Athens and Sparta, became known to the general public through the popularization of the expression “Thucydide’s wound” thanks to Graham Allison, American political scientist and international relations theorist (2011 and 2017).
Recently, during the visit of American President Donald Trump to Beijing (May 13 and 14, 2026), Chinese President Xi Jinping intelligently made reference to the Greek philosopher Thucydides to invite him not to fall into the stratagem of the zero-sum game.
Thucydides’ trap concerns the balance of power between an emerging power and a power in full possession of its means, but which feels less comfortable in comparison with its former peak.
This reference to Thucydides offers me the opportunity to return to the relevance of the diplomatic messages sometimes launched by political figures by citing emblematic figures of philosophical thought and diplomacy who have marked the history of humanity.
The idea is to question the contribution of certain political scientists and international relations theorists to the sustainability of old ideas which fit perfectly with contemporary geopolitics and which attract the attention of academic and media circles.
Allusions that dispel the illusion
In this regard, four political scientists and international relations theorists have had more luck seeing their names retained by the Arab and Islamic media and decision-making centers within the Arab and Muslim periphery, particularly since 1990.
This is the case with Francis Fukuyama (paradigm of the end of the story), by Samuel Huntington (paradigm of clash of civilizations), de Joseph Nye (paradigm you power paradox) and Graham Allison (paradigm of Thucydide’s wound a paradigm you bureaucratic model).
The classification of these eminent and prolific authors is difficult to do. It would even be unfair and a crime of lèse-majesté to even think about it, as their contributions are worth gold in terms of analytical depth and prospective quality.
For the most daring of readers, the reference to Henry Kissinger would be un must. His work “Diplomacy” is a gigantic work in which borrowings from history give a precise idea of the ramblings of which the decision-makers of the great powers are sometimes victims (Kissinger H. Diplomacy. 1994).
However, there are others that the Arab and Islamic media almost never cite, because they remain in the shadow of political diatribes. This is the case with James N. Rosenau (paradigm of Linkage Politics), Robert Jervis (paradigms of The perception and of the fake perception), Stanley Hoffmann (paradigm you Gulliver empêtré), Kenneth Waltz (paradigm du transnationalisme) to name only these authors.
We can thus claim that the importance of academicians is seasonal and depends on international political news. They are sometimes invited on television sets or in renowned think tanks to share their expertise on international affairs. Some wear the badge of diplomatic advisors on specific files and occupy positions within the Democratic and Republican administrations.
It was therefore enough for the Chinese head of state to refer to Thucydides for the media to discover that Thucydides’ trap was used by the American political scientist Graham Allison, in a study on 16 conflicts which have marked political history of the world.
However, Graham Alison is a reference in terms of international relations theory. He is best known for his study of the bureaucratic model and its impact on the decision-making system in the United States through the paradigm of the rational actor.
Graham Allison is commented on in certain circles in Europe. He was also distinguished by his emphasis on the conflict dimension in interpersonal relationships and organizational behavior within the decision-making system. He applied his paradigm to the missile crisis of October 1962, which, within 48 hours, was on the verge of provoking a third world war (Essence of the Decision, 1971).
The Arab media are following the trend by cutting out President Xi Jinping’s reference to Thucydides to make it a kind of innovation that ignores the almost organic relationship between the academic world and the political world in many countries, notably in the United States.
However, other American academicians have borrowed historical metaphors to shed light on the foreign policy of states. Stanley Hoffmann can, once again, be mentioned in this regard. He was inspired by the character of Gulliver in Jonathan Swift’s novel entitled ‘‘Gulliver’s Trouble”, published in 1726, to study the limits of American power in a troubled world (Gulliver’s Trouble or the Setting of American Foreign Policy, 1968).
Messages that transcend the times
Already, Stanley Hoffmann raises the question of the erosion of American power. The dichotomous perception of the impact of the Cold War already challenges the tranquility of the actors behind the Yalta conference (1945). It calls into question the geopolitical reading of the post-Bay of Pigs crisis (1962) and the already costly repercussions of the Cold War.
The erosion of American power frightens academicians who have held high positions within the American administration. This is the case of Zbigniew BrzeziÅ„ski. He published a book entitled “The Choice, Global Domination or Global Leadership” in 2004.
The main idea behind this finely documented production describes the dilemma of the United States between the solitary choice of power translated into a hegemonic perception international politics and acceptance of a multipolar reality.
This reality requires relative concessions and affects the hierarchy and influence that the United States has enjoyed since the First World War. Brzeziński suggests adopting a flexible approach that accepts multilateralism while shaping it so that the United States does not lose out.
Although the judgment appears harsh, I cannot restrain myself from decrying the way in which certain Arab and Muslim researchers have been treated for having defied popular discourse relating to the fissure between the academic world and the political world. Amine Maalouf, Ghassan Salamé, Abdelbaki Hermassi, El Mahdi El Mandjra, Abdellah Saaf, etc. are part of it.
This fissure is worrying to the extent that scientific production if not frightens political decision-makers, or at least irritates them. Often, the latter do not accept being called to order or challenged on decisions that do not take the necessary perspective to be in tune with the times.
During the years 1960-1990, the reference to Greek, Persian, Hindu and Chinese mythology, etc., was very popular in literary and philosophical studies. The reference was justified by the fact that it was part of the Arab intellectual renaissance.
Later, the adjective Islamic was added. Hence the vagueness that encompassed the Arab-Muslim academic scene for at least six decades. Because the pioneers of this renaissance were of the Christian faith. The contribution of thinkers of the Islamic faith was also beneficial, but it was drowned out in diatribes focusing on form and neglecting substance.
Paradigms are not wall decorations
Publications sponsored by research centers attached to certain universities in Egypt and Lebanon associated with Western universities, notably American or British, have enabled a group of researchers to shed light on the march towards renaissance and to challenge their colleagues fooled by scholastic, often mimetic production.
Coming back to the researchers who are in the spotlight, I can cite Joseph Nye. His paradigm on soft power is taken up again and again. Nye explores how state actors can even succeed in a troubled political world. The paradigm was first used in 1989 (Joseph S. Nye Jr., Soft Power, The Means to Success in World Politics).
He is challenged by the paradigm smart power which combines military and economic constraint and soft power which favors diplomatic persuasion and cultural influence.  However, Joseph Nye is best known for having contributed, in association with Robert Keohane, to the publication of a masterpiece on complex interdependence dans un système international en transition (Power and Interdependence, World Politics in Transition, 1977).
Nye comes back later and asks a surgical question about the paradox of American power. He questions the place and role of the United States in the world following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (Joseph S. Nye Jr., The Paradox of American Power, 2002).
Nye believes that there has been no state as powerful as the United States since the Roman Empire; However, alone, the latter can do nothing in the face of issues relating to terrorism, environmental degradation and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Nye proposes a road map to allow the United States to continue its leadership in the world and reduce its sensitivity and vulnerability, two concepts that he already studied in 1976.
Questioning previously uncontested narratives therefore becomes a necessity. The importance of context and timing is fundamental and requires regular and orderly reconsideration.
The paradigm of deconstruction proposed in 1967 by Jacques Derrida on the critical analysis of Western thought is very edifying, particularly in its aspect of questioning the logocentrism and of the instability of the senses.
Concepts are the emanation of an individual perception of each decision-maker, even if they are the most rational in comparison to other decision-makers. The language is eloquently translated by gesture. There is personal interest in any choice of expressions, even those that give the impression of being innocent and unifying. The ultimate objective is to avoid direct confrontation while waiting for a better tomorrow.
The genius in Xi Jinping’s proposal through the reference to Thucydides lies in the fact that he played on the perception that a personality like Donald Trump has of the art of transactions. Curious analysis? Not at all. The objective is distilled in the stratagems of Sun Tzu, used more by businessmen than by personalities new to politics.
Without doubt, we find an answer in Kissinger, one of the architects of the normalization of relations between the United States and China, sanctioned by the historic visit of President Richard Nixon to Beijing in 1972.
In “Diplomacy”his monumental work, Kissinger gives a precise idea of his perception of history. He responds indirectly to Stanley Hoffmann and pinpoints his use of the paradigm relating to Gulliver’s concerns.
A multipolar system gets cold
Kissinger explains the United States’ political philosophy toward China. America is going there from a position of strength, but aspires to a calm dialogue that does not deviate from traditional Chinese thinking.
The introduction to the text Diplomacy could not be clearer. We read his argument on the rise of power and fall of empires. He cites in turn the Western powers which have dominated the world.
The beginning and end of civilizations is a cycle that recalls the law of nature. According to Kissinger, each century sees the emergence of a country which has “the power, the will and the intellectual and moral catalyst” to draw the contours of “an international system which corresponds {and translates} its own values”.
It follows, again according to Kissinger, that we have witnessed the emergence of concepts of the nation state and of l’intérêt national worn by France in the 17th century. Then, the concept of balance of power Was supported by Great Britain in the 18th century.
Just as Metternich’s Austria introduced the concept of concert of Europe in the 19th century before Bismarck dislocated it to plunge Europe into a dramatic game of political power. In the 20th century, the United States favored the concept of timid pragmatism according to circumstances and the imperatives of immediate interests.
However, the most surprising thing is the imperial temptation that emerges from Kissinger’s words. They recall Nye’s allusion to the Roman Empire as the only ancient power to which the United States can be compared. Perhaps this reference would not be innocent. She would hear reminded Janusthis Roman deity who has two faces, one who gazes at the past and the other who watches for the future by masterfully managing transitions.
And if Trump played too Janus to answer Jinping who played Sun Tzu? Indeed, Xi Jinping would have had another specific idea by referring to Thucydides? Would it indirectly translate traditional Chinese strategic thought, whose best-known master today was Sun Tzu (c. 544 BC – c. 496 BC), which is described in 36 stratagems? This thought favors evasion, trickery and understanding (or harmony) to save time and play on the mentality and weariness of the opponent.
It must be remembered that American foreign policy is characterized by its oscillation between interventionism, wait-and-see attitude and isolationism. Attitudes which have marked the diplomatic behavior of the United States since their independence in 1776.
Imperial temptation and concern for permanent stabilization
These three behaviors are eloquently explained by Henry Kissinger in his masterpiece “Diplomacy” already mentioned. There we discover a description of the apogee and the decline of the powers. These paradigms therefore deserve more careful consideration in light of the latest developments on the global strategic scene.
Des scènes de déjà -vu are obvious. There is nothing sensational, however the reflection is trapped this time by ready-made readings. I’m not going to fall into the trap of redundancy.
So, I take as a launching shot the reference made by Chinese President Xi Jinping to Thucydides’ Trap on the occasion of American President Donald Trump’s visit to Beijing.
The deliberate or random passing of arms by the Chinese and American heads of state makes me think of two strategists who marked their era: one Indian and the other Russian. And this is not an aberration, India and Russia are among the actors participating in the transformations that the international system is experiencing.
On the one hand, Kautilya (350 BC Р283 BC), this Indian strategist, is not to be outdone. He is compared for the purposes of analysis to Sun Tzu, Machiavelli and Bismarck in terms of political realism and the art of saving compromise. Kautilya displays his strategic thinking in his book Arthash̢stra where he sets out, among other things, six pillars of his diplomatic vision which he put at the service of Emperor Chandragupta.
On the other hand, there is the Russian Alexander Svetchine. He became famous for combining military strategy and the art of politics. The operative type is a concept that he formulated in his work “Strategy” published in 1927.
The combination of the art of defense and attack to succeed in total war was his trademark as an outstanding strategist. This did not spare him and was executed in 1938 as part of, it is believed, the policy of neutralization implemented by Joseph Stalin.
In Memoirs of a King (1993), Éric Laurent asked King Hassan II what profession he would have liked to pursue if he were not king, he replied that he would have liked to be a historian. The Moroccan monarch’s fascination with history led him to admire Machiavelli, from whom he was inspired in making certain strategic decisions.
He would also have been inspired by Sun Tzu, particularly in his circumvention strategy, to draw up the broad outlines of the organization of the Green March.
History is full of lessons and it is no surprise that François Mitterrand liked to repeat the maxim “Leave time to time”, the origin of which goes back to Miguel de Cervantes in Don Quixote “Give time to time”.
Observation and time management
Mitterrand would also have had time to digest Alain Peyrefitte’s premonition, ‘’When China awakens, the world will tremble (1971)”, an essay published in the midst of the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) orchestrated by Mao Zedong. And China woke up. Peyrefitte devoted an essay to him with the same title in 1996.
History and nothing but History, therefore! I cannot forget in this column an academician whom I appreciate very much. James N. Rosenau, whose contribution to systems studies and foreign policy is immense.
In his book “Distant Proximities” (2003), he expresses his astonishment at the coexistence of parallel processes of integration and disintegration of an international system in full transition.
Rosenau could have changed his optimistic perception of international relations in the aftermath of the attacks of September 11, 2001, but he would have refrained from falling into the trap of pessimism. The gap of divergences is transformed into an opportunity for rapprochement.
Now how can we draw inspiration from all these academicians and military strategists to explain the strategic and diplomatic chessboards in boiling mode? Once again, History is the answer. But also, the projection on the future of the international system which must emerge from the uncertainties aggravated by a transition which can no longer last indefinitely.
So much so that the hasty analyzes which fill television sets and fill podcasts in Western Europe and the Middle East on the imminent erosion of the great powers must be put into perspective. This is the case with the overestimation of the role of the BRICS which would emerge strengthened from the current geopolitical situation.
It is the same for certain custom-made paradigms such as the Westernization or the désorientalisation of the Middle East. The underlying idea of these analyzes would be the defeat of the United States and the victory of Iran.
To strengthen their argument, they conclude that Russia also lost the war against Ukraine. They do not realize that this categorical statement weakens their argument on the future influence of the BRICS within which Russia plays a leading role.
These promoters were hardly not lamenting the new status of the Western allies who would feel like the ultimate orphans of the Cold War. They overlook the fact that history – just history – would allow serious analysts to avoid subscribing to haste.
The strategic break imagined (and desired by sore losers) has not yet occurred. Â Thucydides, Tzu, Janus, Kautilya and Gulliver are keeping watch.
