By Antonis Ntavanellos
Emmanuel Macron’s visit to Athens on April 24 and 25 was greeted with great fanfare by the right-wing government and the mainstream press.
During this visit, the Greek-French “defense” pact signed in Paris in 2021 [sous le gouvernement de Kyriakos Mitsotakis] has been renewed for the next five years. Indeed, as both Mitsotakis and Macron have declared, “automatic mechanisms” have been integrated into the terms of the agreement, which gives it “unlimited” validity. The agreement includes a “mutual defense” clause which commits France to come to the aid of Greece with military assistance if the latter is attacked or subjected to bellicose pressure. Macron left no room for doubt in his public statement: “If you feel that your sovereign rights are threatened, strengthen yourself… If you ever need us, we will be there.” He concluded by chanting a slogan popular in Greek bourgeois politics in the late 1970s: “Alliance Greece-France”.
The most substantive part of the meeting focused on arms contracts and the war economy. The Greek government had already purchased [contrat signé en 2021] France will receive 24 Rafale combat aircraft and 4 FDI-Belhara frigates, at a cost of nearly 10 billion euros. Current negotiations include new orders for 2+2 French submarines (Barracuda from Naval Group) and, mainly, additional missile and electronic systems for Rafale aircraft and Belhara frigates. Macron was accompanied to Athens by dozens of representatives of French companies [1]mainly from the arms sector. They had the opportunity to speak directly with the “coordinators” of the approximately 400 Greek companies which launched into the arms sector, after Mitsotakis had assured that at least 25% of the resources of the Greek government’s ten-year military spending program would be allocated to the private sector, with the aim of strengthening the national defense industry. According to the Greek press, large companies (such as the shipyards of Salamis, Elefsina and the Metlen company which collaborates with Naval Group) will soon be part of the supply and production chains of giants such as Naval Group, Dassault and others.
The agenda of Macron’s visit included a proposal for Greek participation in the French nuclear program. Discussions on this topic have remained highly “confidential”, both in media reports and in official public statements, as the vast majority of Greek public opinion remains hostile or skeptical of nuclear energy. It also included a proposal for a joint Franco-Greek initiative concerning “the security of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz”, if and once conflicts in the Gulf have ceased. In this scenario, France would of course make its contribution with its armed forces and Greek shipowners would provide their expertise on the way business is conducted in this unstable region…
In his public speech in Athens, Macron defended “European strategic autonomy” and made several scathing remarks about Trump’s policies. In this sensitive area marked by the growing divergence between the great powers of Euro-Atlanticism, Mitsotakis is trying to keep one foot in all camps.
Thanks to its arms programs, Greece ensures that it maintains “cordial” relations with all the major European powers. Recently, the Greek government ordered four additional FREMM (multi-mission) class frigates from the Italian Fincantieri shipyard. A high-level German government delegation visited Athens in early May to discuss arms contracts and the participation of Greek companies in programs to modernize the production of Leopard tanks, for which the Greek army has proven itself in the past to be a good customer [2].
There is, however, no doubt that, in the military and geopolitical domain, the Greek state’s absolute priority is its relationship with the United States. The Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement (MDCA-Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement) between Greece and the United States granted the latter unlimited and completely “unrestricted” access to military installations on Greek territory. This results in the massive expansion and growth of US military bases in the country. Today, the port of Souda, on Crete, is considered the largest United States naval base in the Mediterranean. The port of Alexandroupoli, in the north of the country, is the “gateway” of the NATO land corridor to the Black Sea and Ukraine. It is also the main transshipment port for liquefied natural gas (LNG) which, via the “vertical corridor” of onshore gas pipelines (Vertical Gas Corridor-VGC), will be transported to Ukraine, as well as to the markets of the Eastern Balkans and Central Europe. In the center of the country, in Thessaly, the bases of Larissa and Stefanoviki serve as a rear base for the “rapid deployment” forces that the United States maintains in the region through NATO.
In return, the Greek government ensured a privileged relationship with the United States in relation to Turkey, as well as Greece’s participation in the production program for advanced F-35 combat aircraft. The progressive delivery of the first F-35s over the next two years, alongside the French Rafale, should give the Greek Air Force the “military advantage” so coveted in the region.
With Trump’s second term in office, Kimberly Guilfoyle arrived in Athens as US ambassador. He is an unspeakable personality who made himself known as a star of talk shows in Fox News and who was, for a time, engaged to Trump’s son (Donald Trump Jr.). However, this controversial character leads an extremely ambitious and particularly demanding policy. It claims the port of Elefsina, near Athens, as a military and commercial “hub” for the exclusive use of the United States, the port of Volos to complement the bases of Larissa and Stefanoviki, the port of Kavala to support a major expansion of Alexandroupoli, as well as an expansion without limit of American “operations” in Crete. Little by little, Kimberly Guilfoyle raised the question of the cancellation of the contracts for the privatization of the ports of Piraeus and Thessaloniki, which, during the years of crisis, had been sold to the Chinese company Cosco and the Savvidis family (considered to be linked to Russian interests). The main target of his pressure was of course focused on Piraeus and the Chinese company Cosco.
The Mitsotakis government initially announced that it would honor the international agreements it had signed and that the Piraeus-Cosco issue was “not subject to debate.”
In practice, however, things get complicated. It was recently announced that a US-made X-ray system would be installed in Piraeus to thoroughly inspect the contents of all containers transiting this major port via Cosco. Kimberly Guilfoyle attended the system’s installation ceremony as the keynote speaker (!) and said that it was part of US security policy, and that the US viewed it as an integral part of the Greek-American MDCA agreement. Managing Chinese reactions – coming from a “player” of significant size such as Cosco – was left as a problem and a “headache” for Mitsotakis.
The intensity of American policy is not limited to the demand to curb Greece’s “flexibility” in its relations with the Eurasian powers. It also extends to the opposition of the United States to projects aimed at strengthening “European strategic autonomy”. One interpretation of the press silence that accompanied discussions between Macron and Mitsotakis regarding Greek participation in the French nuclear program is that the Greek government sought to avoid the possibility of negative feedback from the US embassy in Athens.
To better understand the close link between the policies of the Greek government and the priorities of the United States, we must take into account the depth that Greek-Israeli relations have reached. In recent years, the diplomatic and military “axis” of the “3+1” framework (Greece-Cyprus-Israel + the United States) has taken over the role once played by NATO’s infamous southeast flank as as an “arc of contention” against the rivals of the Euro-Atlantic powers in the Eastern Mediterranean. Two major changes emerged with the advent of this new context: 1° the relative marginalization of Turkey, as “punishment” for the flexibility of Erdogan’s multifaceted foreign policy; 2° a qualitative revaluation of the role of Israel, including within Greece and Cyprus.
In recent years, Israel has conducted frequent military exercises in Greece (with scenarios simulating a military attack against Iran). Much of the training of pilots for the Greek Air Force was entrusted to Israel. Israeli arms, software and intelligence companies participate in the Greek defense industry through major investments and the provision of their expertise. Recently, the Mitsotakis government approved a vast anti-missile and anti-drone defense program for the Aegean Sea, dubbed “Achilles Shield”. In practice, this amounts to an extension of the Israeli Iron Dome into the Aegean Sea. There is no doubt that the command center of this system will be located in Tel Aviv, just as there is no doubt that Netanyahu exercises hegemony over the Greece-Cyprus-Israel “axis”.
The specific objective of the Greek state in this reactionary orientation is to obtain an “advantage” over Turkey in the competition between the two parties for domination of the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean.
This “game” is certainly understood on the other side of the Aegean Sea. The Turkish press reacted to Macron’s visit to Athens and the statements that followed, agreeing on the analysis that “we are trying to encircle Turkey.” No one should forget that Turkey is a large country, with a much larger population and economy than Greece, with a powerful army and a now strong defense industry. Therefore, no one can underestimate its ability to fight back.
The danger did not go unnoticed in Athens. The “serious” newspaper of the establishment That Vima described it, attributing these words to an experienced Greek diplomat: “Perhaps Turkey has been under more pressure than it can bear…” Until a few years ago, Athens held the decision-making reins between “tension” and “accommodation” with Turkey. It is now clear that it is the Netanyahu government in Tel Aviv that holds them. And the possibility that Israel decides to “exploit” Greek-Turkish differences to serve its own interests by modifying the balance of state powers in the Middle East, in the broad sense, could lead to uncontrollable clashes, catastrophic for all the peoples of the region.
Rivalries between local and regional powers, against a backdrop of intensifying global tensions, are becoming extremely dangerous. Those of us who fight for the rights and freedoms of workers and social rights, those of us who stand in solidarity with the Palestinian people, must intensify our action against the arms race and against the strengthening of ties with the great contemporary powers. We must fight against the policies outlined in the various “war pacts”, such as those recently concluded between Greece, France and the United States. (Article received May 8, 2026; translation-editing writing Against)
Antonis Ntavanellos: DEA facilitator and newspaper manager Ergatiki Aristera.
[1] The World of April 25, 2026 indicated: “Today, some 200 French companies, employing 17,000 employees, are established in the country, and French investments, worth 2 billion euros in 2025 (out of 12 billion euros in total), have jumped by more than 50% over the last five years, according to the Franco-Greek Chamber of Commerce.” (Ed.)
[2] The German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul a déclaré: «Greece is for us a strategic pillar in south-eastern Europe, a close friend and partner within the European Union and theI’LL TAKE. My visit today to Athens is a clear signal: Germany and Greece are getting even closer – for a Europe that protects its interests, defends its values and is capable of acting in an increasingly harsh world.”
However, according to the Greek site efsyn.gr, the German minister complained about the limits of cooperation in terms of armaments between Greece and Germany. The purpose of the visit was to compensate for this delay. So, efsyn.gr indicates: “Greece-German relations in the arms sector are entering a new, more complex phase, where diplomacy, geopolitical interests and economic choices intersect. Despite the positive declarations from both parties, the balance remains fragile, with Berlin seeking to play a more important role in Greek arms programs and Athens evaluating its decisions against broader strategic criteria.” (Ed.)
