Home War Defense: The European Union and the risk of a new Maginot line

Defense: The European Union and the risk of a new Maginot line

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  • While the new Gulf War confirms the obsolescence of purely defensive strategies, European rearmament remains prisoner of a shield logic – anti-drone shield, air shield, space shield – to the detriment of any real offensive capability.

  • Recent conflicts – Ukraine, India-Pakistan, United States against Iran – show that no defensive system allows us to gain the upper hand: to reverse the course of a war, we must be able to strike blows deep into the enemy’s system.

  • In Europe, only France and the United Kingdom have complete operational and industrial control in this offensive segment – ​​an advantage that Paris must transform into a European locomotive, before 2030 becomes the horizon for direct confrontation with Russia.

Par Baudouin d’Amayé

“To be feared, you must be powerful.” Emmanuel Macron’s wishes to the armies still resonate, while the new Gulf War shows once again that strategies favoring the shield over the sword have gone out of fashion. If European rearmament is still marked by a defensive logic, France, strong in its operational and industrial experience in the offensive segment, could influence this dynamic.

The conflicts in recent months follow one another and are similar. Russia against Ukraine, India against Pakistan, the United States and Israel against Iran, all show the same reality described bluntly by the Chief of Defense Staff Fabien Mandon before the Defense Committee of the National Assembly on April 9: “ We are observing an uninhibited use of force on the part of large states in proportions that we did not imagine, particularly in the Near and Middle East at the moment. In this environment, to be listened to, you have to be strong. A nation that is not strong no longer carries weight in the international debate. »

Same story at the political level, through the voice of the Minister Delegate to the Minister of the Armed Forces and Veterans Affairs, Alice Rufo, drawing the conclusion from the feedback during the Paris Defense and Strategy Forum at the end of March: “ Recent conflicts show the need to have capabilities enabling action in the depth of the opposing system. »

Europe must evolve its software

At the European level, awareness does not appear as rapid. Even the very recent one “ missile tour “, with European capitals, which Andrius Kubilius, the European Commissioner for Defense and Space, has just completed, was essentially marked by defensive concerns. Nothing surprising since on the home page of the EU White Paper 2030, it is mainly about “anti-drone defense”, air “shield”, and space “shield”. Concretely, Brussels’ most elaborate plans relate primarily to the defensive field, such as the European Drone Defense Initiative and the Eastern Flank Watch, combining sophisticated detection devices and interception capabilities in all altitude ranges. Necessary condition of a defense policy, but in no way sufficient, neglecting the other dimensions of an adequate response, with the risk of a “Maginot line” effect. The lessons of Ukraine or the Gulf teach us that no defensive system allows us to gain the upper hand, especially if the available stocks give the advantage to the attacker against the defender. To reverse the course of the war, we must be able to strike blows, over a period of time that can be counted in months or years.

No defensive system allows you to gain the upper hand, especially if the available stocks give the advantage to the attacker against the defender. To turn the tide of war, we must be able to strike blows.

This posture of the EU therefore marginalizes programs dedicated to the offensive, and, in a way, relegates them to bilateral or multilateral cooperation between states, as in the framework of the ELSA (European Long-Range Strike Approach) program which has so far only produced relatively modest projects, such as drones. fired from the ground OWE 500+. Able to be mass produced for saturation effects, they remain limited in terms of penetration of the most sophisticated systems, far behind enemy lines.

The most recent lessons show that this is where the qualitative and quantitative effort must be focused, so as to build up stocks intended to last over time. The United States’ air campaign on Iran’s key sites proves it: reserves are decreasing very quickly, and even American industrial capacities cannot keep up. American stocks would have fallen by 30 to 40% on average in a few weeks, with peaks of -43% for AGM-158 JASSM missiles, according to the Washington Post. Not only will the United States probably turn off the “export” tap to preserve its strategic stocks, but they are even starting to refuse their European allies to deploy American “deep strike” capabilities on their soil, as Berlin has just learned its costs. Hence the urgent need to think “Made in Europe”. And France has a real card to play in this area.

Operational and industrial mastery

In Europe, only Paris and London have both BITDs competent in this segment and complete operational experience in implementation, which could serve as a reference for countries wishing to move upmarket in this area. The two partners have led joint programs that have proven themselves in combat, such as SCALP. With the support of Italy, France and Great Britain are also entering the development phase for two new multirole cruise missiles – the Stratus LO (low observability) and the Stratus RS (rapid strike) – which should be operational in 2030. But France can also count on unique assets such as the MdCN (naval cruise missile) fired from submarines and frigates like the FDI sold to Greece and offered to Sweden and Portugal, and whose production should resume shortly. But also the LCM (Land Cruise Missile, ground-to-surface version of the MdCN) which will be tested. from 2028 and could constitute the only European alternative to the American Tomahawk before 2030, a time marker of a possible direct confrontation with Russia in the longer term, there is talk of a ballistic missile with a hypersonic warhead (with a range of 2500km) which could be. operational at the end of the next decade Paris enjoys essential technological independence here because its equipment is not subject – like the F-35 fighters or American missiles – to the ITAR system which gives Washington a form of control over equipment comprising American components.

Faced with American constraints, and the urgency of the moment, multiple European partners could be interested. This is particularly the case for Poland, the day after the Gdansk summit which saw Emmanuel Macron and Donald Tusk further consolidate the strategic partnership concluded in Nancy last year. If nothing has filtered out on this sensitive subject, relaunching Elsa around a cruise missile program carried out jointly with Paris is likely to reposition Warsaw favorably in its recent rebalancing towards European suppliers.

France, European locomotive?

Paris also makes no secret of wanting to position itself on the European scene: Patrick Pailloux, boss of the DGA, is in the process of forming a cell of experts to put all its weight behind the envelope of 131 billion euros of European funding, planned in the next multiannual financial framework of the Brussels Commission. An approach which, if it clearly advances French interests, can benefit the entire EU from French excellence in this area.

“France’s long-range weapons and deep strike program is the most ambitious in Europe†— Fabian Hoffman, defense policy expert.

As Fabian Hoffman notes; defense policy expert author of the blog “missile matters”: “France’s long-range weapons and deep strike program is the most ambitious in Europe,” and to specify “on paper”due to insufficient resources to complete all the projects launched. To bring to maturity the most decisive among them for common defense, it is a question for French political and industrial leaders of continuing the educational efforts begun and of proposing industrial conditions profitable to all.