Locked in its narrative of the “special operation in Ukraine” provided to its population, Russia struggles to recruit troops to go to battle. While no official figures are released, independent Russian media and open source data suggest that at least 300,000 soldiers have died since the beginning of the war, with over a million being wounded.
With a worrying acceleration in recent months, as Ukrainian authorities estimate over 85,000 Russian army deaths between January and March 2026, while only recruiting about 80,000 soldiers during the same period. A clear deficit that they are trying to fill through various means, including pressure.
Money, a more convincing argument
The recruitment campaign is based on the lure of financial gain, with bonuses far exceeding average income – 200,000 rubles per month (2,200 euros) – 4 to 6 times higher than the average salary in some regions. These bonuses were increased in March 2026 to around 1.47 million rubles.
However, the argument is no longer sufficient to risk one’s life in a conflict portrayed by propaganda as an “operation to restore order in Ukraine” or “denazification,” as pointed out by Françoise Daucé, director of studies at the School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences (EHESS).
Putting pressure on the vulnerable
The losses suffered challenge Russia’s ability to continue its military operations. The country must resort to increasingly significant financial and coercive measures to attract soldiers, notes researcher Johanna Mähring, associated with the Interdisciplinary Center for Strategic Issues (CIENS) and the Ecole Normale Supérieure in Paris.
They target the most vulnerable, focusing on specific groups, especially “vulnerable populations, such as individuals subject to criminal investigation or indebted,” as specified by the researcher. Since the beginning of the large-scale invasion in Ukraine, the Russian army has been forced to recruit from prisons to feed the front lines.
Students and employees also targeted
These campaigns target “entire male populations,” promoting patriotism and social mobility linked to engagement in the armed forces, explains Johanna Mähring. Mostly in regions far from power centers and economically less affluent. Once again, financial pressure is at the core of the strategy.
For instance, students in provincial universities, far from St. Petersburg or Moscow, are summoned to join the war effort. Under the watch of regional authorities, institutions entice students with the possibility of completing their studies. “The major universities are supposed to ensure that at least 2% of students sign contracts with the Ministry of Defense,” adds Johanna Mähring.
A similar approach is implemented in companies, which are expected to provide “a list of mobilizable employees,” and those who refuse may face dismissal. “A form of wage and economic pressure,” summarizes Françoise Daucé. The challenge is that neither universities nor companies want to see their workforce head to Ukraine. “But they depend on local or regional authorities,” adds the director of studies.
Even deceiving foreigners
When there are no solutions at home, people look to neighbors, in the countries of the former USSR, in Central Asia in particular, or even further. By late 2025, it was reported that a contingent of 5,000 North Koreans had landed in Russia within a few months. Assistance provided by Vladimir Putin’s ally, Kim Jong-un, since at least 2024.
There are also Indians and Nepalese, attracted by the 2,000 euros monthly salary or misled by promises of safe positions, only to end up on the front lines, as depicted in the documentary “India. The Unwilling of the Russian Army,” by Abhijeet Pandey. Recently, the Kenyan Prime Minister and Foreign Minister formally requested Moscow to stop enrolling its nationals. More than 1,000 of them have reportedly already been “deceived by corrupt and cruel agents to go to Russia,” according to Kenyan authorities.
All our articles on the war in Ukraine
Altogether, excluding North Koreans, about 20,000 foreigners are participating in Russia-led war. However, while boosting the ranks, “the integration of foreigners into armed forces poses challenges that limit their utility in the ‘cannon fodder’ aspect during waves of assault against Ukrainian defenses,” Johanna Mähring points out. And even to fulfill this thankless role, “the number of foreigners remains inadequate,” she notes. The option of general mobilization remains unfavorable for the Kremlin, which avoids risking its official stance of refusing to use the word “war.”
