- • The targeted cutoff of Russian Starlink terminals by kyiv in early February 2026 disrupted the command and intelligence of Russian forces across the entire front.
- • Deprived of high-speed connectivity, the Russian army returns to radios and couriers, triggering a short-lived Ukrainian offensive window.
- • The episode confirms that spatial sovereignty and network resilience are becoming military issues as decisive as fire or mobility.
Starlink: an addiction turned weapon
The Ukrainian conflict established SpaceX’s Starlink system as a structuring element of modern warfare.
Since the delivery of the first terminals in 2022, this constellation (today with more than ten thousand satellites in low orbit) has become much more than a commercial service: it constitutes the central architecture of the Ukrainian command.
The Ukrainian Armed Forces (FAU) have integrated it at two critical levels: the chain of command and control (C2), allowing decentralized coordination despite the destruction of land infrastructure, and the ISTAR function (Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance), the throughput in time real Starlink ensuring the transmission of video streams from drones to firing stations and headquarters.
The superiority of Starlink over Russian geostationary communications quickly led the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (FAFR) to acquire it clandestinely, via traffic through third countries.
This use, reported as early as 2024 by Ukrainian military intelligence, intensified in the fall of 2025 to the point of becoming a geopolitical issue.
Several European governments, including Poland, have publicly called out SpaceX. It is in this context that Ukrainian Defense Minister Mykhailo Fedorov obtained the blocking of the network on Ukrainian territory.
The operation was carried out with careful preparation. On February 2, 2026, a general verification campaign for active terminals in Ukraine was launched, backed by a “white list” mechanism making it possible to discriminate between legitimate terminals.
At the same time, the 256th Cyber Assault Division launched a two-part operation: distribution of fake Telegram channels offering paid activation to appear on the list, and a phishing campaign targeting Russian terminals, which made it possible to collect geolocation data on approximately 2,400 FAFR terminals, transmitted to the Security Service Ukrainian (SBU) for targeting purposes.
On February 4, the deactivation of non-Ukrainian terminals took effect. According to Minister Fedorov, the number of video streams within the Russian forces is then divided by eleven, and Starlink traffic in the conflict zone drops by around 30%.
Deprived of their main surveillance and guidance tool, Russian forces find themselves largely blind.
Their command, highly centralized and dependent on continuous digital links, is deeply disorganized.
They must return to traditional radio communications, more exposed to jamming and interceptions, on which the FAU immediately concentrates its electronic warfare actions and its strikes on command posts.
Between February 5 and 20, 2026, Ukrainian counter-offensives in around ten sectors allowed a reconquest of around 300 km², including almost 200 km² in the first week alone (the largest territorial gain since June 2023).
A breakthrough of 16 km in 24 hours was documented on February 12 in the Pokrovsk and Houliapole sectors.
However, the gains remain limited given the disorganization of the FAFR, the absence of Ukrainian reserves not having made it possible to fully exploit the window opened by the cut.
Russian responses and the dynamics of the conflict
Faced with this capacity shortage, the FAFR deployed several palliatives, none of which compensated Starlink in the short term.
On the ground, the units used physical communications (motorized couriers) as well as Russian geostationary satellites (Yamal and Express constellations), whose throughput and latency performances are much lower than those of a low orbit network.
In the Kherson region, some units attempted to acquire SIM cards from Ukrainian mobile operators.
On February 11, Moscow also blocked Telegram and WhatsApp on its territory via Roskomnadzor, a counterproductive decision which worsened the tactical communication difficulties of its own troops.
Other devices have been tested: the Barazh-1 drone balloon, designed as a 5G relay, and the solar-powered Argus stratospheric drone (announced autonomy of 40 days at 25 km altitude), the operational performance of which remains to be demonstrated.
The Spirit-30 portable terminal, deployed in large numbers, constitutes the most concrete response, although several examples have already been destroyed by Ukrainian drones shortly after their deployment.
In the medium term, the low-orbit constellation Rassvet (16 satellites put into orbit on March 23, 2026) could offer partial, although intermittent, compensation. The announced objective of 900 satellites by 2035 seems difficult to meet given the accumulated delays.
On the rest of the front, the Ukrainian objective was asserted around the disruption of Russian logistical flows: more than 200 tankers were hit according to OSINT sources, relying mainly on the Hornet drone (range of 150 to 200 km, approximately $6,000 per unit), whose guidance by visual correlation by artificial intelligence gives it resistance to electronic jamming.
The FAU also aims to deploy more than 25,000 ground robots by the summer of 2026, covering mine laying, logistical transport and combat support.
In terms of attrition, the Ukrainian objective is to inflict 50,000 monthly losses on the FAFR (the current rate is estimated at 35,000, partially offset by Russian recruitment of around 30,000 men per month).
A Russian summer offensive is mentioned, but no warning signs have been observed at this stage.
Strategic issues: sovereignty and resilience
The Starlink outage episode illustrates a reality that the Ukrainian conflict has made unavoidable: high-speed connectivity is now an operational component in its own right, in the same way as fire or mobility.
Dependence on a foreign private actor constitutes a proven strategic vulnerability.
The European IRIS2 constellation, expected by 2028 as part of the GOVSATCOM program, aims precisely to reduce this dependence on American capabilities.
“The interest of Starlink is that you have a very strong decentralization of information, since you can retrieve it with antennas everywhere on the ground. HAS”
— Serge Plégal, associate researcher at the Foundation for Strategic Research
In the meantime, the OneWeb constellation (the only operational non-American constellation, 640 satellites in low orbit) represents a partial alternative, although with lower performance and a limited number of terminals available in Ukraine.
Communications resilience also requires the hybridity of networks: combination of 4G/5G, LiFi/WiFi links, wired communications and couriers, so that no single outage paralyzes the entire system.
On a doctrinal level, Russian units showed particular fragility in the face of disconnection, accustomed as they were to strong centralization and the continuity of digital links.
Command by intention, which allows a unit to act autonomously in the event of a network breakdown, constitutes a resilience factor whose absence cost the FAFR dearly in February 2026.
This sequence confirms that a communications disruption, even a major one, only opens a temporary window of opportunity: it must be exploited quickly and with the necessary reserves to produce lasting effects.
