On January 22, in Toulon, the Minister of the Armed Forces and Veterans has set a course : make the DGA a “combat DGA”. What does this ambition cover?
Patrick Pailloux : The idea is simple. It is about retaining the strengths of the French model, adapting them to the current context. The DNA of the French model, as desired by General de Gaulle and Pierre Messmer, is based on the control of our destiny and on a form of community between military operational personnel, engineers and technicians capable of technologically mastering combat tools, as well as industrialists able to develop the tools according to our needs. This model must only adapt to the constraints of the moment.
What are your priorities for transforming the DGA?
There are four of them. First, gain speed on a certain amount of equipment. Current technology – like software or 3D printing, for example – allows us to move quickly, provided we agree to take risks. For some programs such as drones, jammers and small vehicles, we need to be able to work in extremely short cycles. The idea is therefore to bring together in centers: soldiers, engineers from the DGA and industrialists to work together from design, development, evaluation, to the acquisition of equipment.
Find out more about the General Directorate of Armaments
Then gain mass. This requires increased control over the costs of the materials we purchase, by negotiating with manufacturers and adjusting our expressions of need. Third priority: Europe. It is essential to strengthen cooperation with our European partners so that Europe is able to defend itself. A team of around fifteen people will be set up to coordinate the DGA’s commitment on a European scale and develop partnerships.
Finally, we must maintain control of our technological choices, particularly in the digital field through open architectures that we have chosen. The weapon systems of tomorrow will be connected, interoperable and sovereign systems.
Does this mass research involve reviewing certain standards?
Yes, sometimes. Technological excellence remains essential, but it is no longer always enough. Whether it is the weapon of decision or the weapon of attrition, we must now know how to do both. We created a cell of cost killing responsible for examining our programs to identify room for maneuver: simplifying certain requirements, reducing costs, shortening certain lifespans where relevant. The objective is clear: have more equipment available, more quickly.
What are the DGA’s activities in support of Ukraine and in the context of conflicts in the Near East and Middle East (PMO)?
The DGA is involved in all of France’s activities in the field of defense. France is committed to supporting Ukraine as well as the PMO. Our mission is to assist our armed forces and our allies in their engagements. This is the reason why teams from the DGA were, for example, sent to the United Arab Emirates within the detachments of our armed forces, to identify their needs and the urgent work to be carried out, where applicable directly in the theater of operations. operations.
Do you have a concrete example of DGA activity in connection with our armed forces at the PMO?
In the conflict in Iran, our allies and forces have been confronted with the massive use of very low-cost drones. Against these drones, France obviously has a fighter aviation armed with very efficient missiles, but at a high cost. We then quickly looked for alternative solutions in close connection with the armies, likely to be used locally. We have, for example, validated the use of 30 mm cannons on the Tiger against these drones. We also urgently launched the integration of rockets on our Rafale. Finally, in the days following the start of the conflict, we tested in our centers various drone-killer drone solutions that could be provided to the forces.
Do recent conflicts call certain doctrines into question?
Above all, they force us to constantly learn. The use of drones, jamming and even recent aerial clashes are forcing us to adapt our capabilities. The challenge is to learn lessons, without losing sight of the diversity of possible commitments, in order to best guide planning and investments.
What are the main challenges facing the defense industrial and technological base (DTIB) today?
The first is undoubtedly the increase in pace. For decades, mass production was not on the agenda. Today, it has become central again. We need to produce faster and in much larger volumes. This requires investments, recruitment and appropriate financing. Innovation constitutes the second major challenge. We must be able to constantly adapt our tools to changes on the battlefield.
How is the DGA supporting this rise in power?
BITD’s support is at the heart of our mission. We are strengthening our presence in the region, as close as possible to businesses, particularly small and medium-sized businesses (SMEs) and mid-sized establishments (ETIs). Our large groups know where to find us. The challenge is to reach out to the thousands of businesses that have know-how or ideas, but who do not always have the right contacts. We also seek to mobilize financial players to support the growth of the sector.
Concretely, what will the update of the military programming law (LPM) 2024-2030 change?
The choices made by the Government are the result of work carried out in close coordination with the General Staff of the Armed Forces in order to identify the priorities of our rearmament. The first of these concerns ammunition. Recent conflicts have highlighted the importance of volumes and depth of stocks. From 2026, we will therefore very significantly accelerate orders in this area.
Beyond munitions, this update will also accelerate several capability developments directly resulting from lessons learned from recent conflicts. We can cite fighter aviation, missiles or space, for example. For the DGA, this implies total mobilization. More credits mean more programs to run, more contracts to negotiate and notify, more developments to manage, to ultimately, and this is the essential thing, transform the budgetary effort into concrete operational capacities.
In this context of generalized rearmament, Europe is often presented as a lever. How does it represent an opportunity for France?
All European countries are investing in their defense and seeking to develop their industry. In this context, there is no scenario in which each country would develop all of its capabilities alone. The challenge is therefore to develop cooperation, so that Europe is able to defend itself. This requires more partnerships and the progressive structuring of a European industrial base. It is in this spirit that the DGA has strengthened its internal organization, with a team dedicated to the coordination of European action. An emblematic example is that of the choice of GlobalEyewith Sweden as the successor to AWACS for our surveillance aircraft.
These cooperations are sometimes difficult to implement. How can we work effectively with our partners?
It is indeed always more complicated to do things together than to do things alone. Cooperation involves additional constraints, whether industrial, operational or political. However, they are essential if we want to build a credible Europe of defense. No country can develop all of the systems alone, nor bear the costs.
The right approach is to build these cooperations on solid industrial foundations, supported by a strong political partnership. Our mission is also to help our manufacturers find European partners to develop joint programs.
The French model also relies heavily on arms exports. What role does the DGA play today in this area?
The French model is based on an industry that exports, and this has been a key success factor in recent years, with for example 20 billion euros in orders in 2025. The DGA supports manufacturers in this approach. Today, arms exports increasingly take the form of state-to-state agreements, which implies a strong presence of the state alongside companies.
In a context of increased competition, how does France manage to maintain a competitive offer?
Our main asset is the performance of our equipment. French equipment is used in operations, in numerous theaters, and they concretely demonstrate their effectiveness. It is this operational reality which constitutes our best argument. We offer efficient, available equipment with proven reliability. The challenge is therefore to maintain this level of requirement, while controlling costs, in order to remain competitive in an environment where many players are gaining strength.
What are your priorities in terms of innovation?
They revolve around three main axes. The first is long-term innovation: future combat planes, missiles, engines. These are investments that are prepared over several decades. The second is disruptive innovations, for example artificial intelligence and quantum technology. These are two areas likely to profoundly transform the art of war. Finally, the third is field innovation, driven by start-upSMEs and all those who quickly imagine new solutions, often software.
The Defense Innovation Agency plays a central role here, both as an entry point, as a financier and as a catalyst.
Have drones become a central axis of transformation for the DGA?
Yes, whether air, land or naval. Our challenge is not only to develop them quickly, but also to be able to produce them massively the day it is necessary. This requires simple architectures, robust industrial chains and innovative partnerships – including with players from other sectors, such as the automobile industry.
In this area, the speed of evolution is such that there is no acquired position.
What about artificial intelligence?
France is clearly in the race. The Ministerial Agency for Artificial Intelligence in Defense (AMIAD) was created to accelerate the integration of AI within the ministry. Because artificial intelligence is not a weapon in itself: it irrigates all areas, from command to weapon systems, including management. As far as the DGA is concerned, we must be able to integrate it into our weapons systems. This is why open architectures are so important.
Is quantum at the same level of maturity?
Quantum is still in the making. In the field of sensors, we know that it will profoundly transform certain capabilities. For other applications, such as computing, the future remains uncertain. But if the rupture occurs, it will be massive and we will have to be ready. This is why we are already investing heavily in these technologies.
Did your background prepare you for this role?
It wasn’t a career plan. But I have devoted most of my professional life to two subjects: technology and sovereignty. I believe deeply in France’s capacity to master its destiny. This requires fighters, industrialists, but also engineers and technicians. It is this conviction that guides my action.
What legacy do you want to leave?
I don’t think about inheritance. What I want is to preserve and adapt this extraordinary French model, this alliance between the armies, industry and technology, to the challenges of the 21st century.e century. This is what makes us strong.
