The price of German moral exceptionalism: why its diplomacy failed on a global scale
Punished! How “feminist foreign policy” became a diplomatic own goal
An unprecedented setback for German diplomacy: for the first time in its history, the Federal Republic of Germany suffered a crushing defeat in its candidacy for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council. What appears at first glance to be a surprising defeat against much smaller states like Portugal and Austria turns out, on closer inspection, to be the bitter consequence of four years of divisive foreign policy and imbued with moral connotations, carried out under former minister Annalena Baerbock. Above all, the systematic alienation of the Global South – symbolized by the strange “elephant conflict” with Botswana and the perceived paternalism of a “feminist foreign policy” – has cost Berlin the deciding votes. This in-depth analysis of a historic diplomatic fiasco now forces the new federal government, under the leadership of Chancellor Friedrich Merz, to undertake a fundamental reorientation.
Diplomatic error: how Germany’s supposedly values-driven foreign policy squandered its UN seat
When conviction becomes a handicap – the price to pay for taking a morally exceptional path
On June 4, 2026, Annalena Baerbock, in her capacity as Acting President of the United Nations General Assembly, announced the results of the vote regarding non-permanent seats on the UN Security Council, thus imposing, unintentionally, a assessment of its foreign policy. Portugal obtained 134 votes, Austria 131. Germany, for its part, received only 104, far from the required two-thirds majority of 127 votes. For the first time in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany, a German bid for a non-permanent seat in the most powerful body of the United Nations failed – a historic setback that went far beyond simple electoral failure.
This event reveals structural flaws in German foreign policy over the past four years: a leadership style favoring the proclamation of values to the detriment of the development of networks; a feminist foreign policy doctrine perceived as condescending in the Global South; and a culture of Berlin foreign policy that has systematically underestimated its international impact. What has long been hailed by the German media as a “values-driven foreign policy” has generated deep divisions on the international scene, particularly in Africa’s perception of Germany.
The result of the elections and its geopolitical dimension
The eloquent voting figures reveal a reality which goes far beyond technical campaign errors. Of the 191 UN member states eligible to vote – Afghanistan and Venezuela were not among them – only 104 voted for Germany. This represents 54.4% of valid votes. Portugal, a country of only around ten million inhabitants and whose international influence is much less than that of Germany, received 134 votes, a clear majority within the UN system. Austria, also a small European country, received 131 votes.
How can we explain this striking disparity? Germany obtained its previous seat on the Security Council in 2019/2020, when the foreign policy of the Merkel era was still in force. The candidacy for the 2027/2028 mandate was subsequently actively pursued, but in a turbulent political context. Obtaining international majorities is not built in the year of the vote, but over several years thanks to continuous diplomacy, the development of strategic relations and constant representation within multilateral bodies. This is precisely where the main gap in Baerbock’s legacy lies: mobilizing votes at the multilateral level requires discreet, patient and often no-nonsense relationship management – qualities that only partially corresponded to the former minister’s public and media personality of Foreign Affairs.
German Foreign Minister Johann Wadephul called the defeat a “real disappointment” and acknowledged a “bitter defeat.” Chancellor Friedrich Merz, who aimed to make Germany a major player on the international scene, suffered a significant setback. On the domestic front, it quickly became apparent that the real errors were not attributable to the current federal government, but to the government coalition which was to form the government between 2021 and 2025.
Voices from Africa: from diplomatic restraint to open criticism
The reaction from Africa is particularly remarkable – this continent which, with 54 states, constitutes the largest regional voting bloc within the UN system and can therefore determine the success or failure of each candidate. Official African diplomacy remains silent: no official communication had publicly confirmed criticism midday following the vote This silence is in itself a diplomatic signal.
But, informally, the message was unequivocal. Former Botswana President Mokgweetsi Masisi made his views very clear on the sidelines of a meeting of senior African politicians in Nairobi. He told the Bild newspaper that Baerbock should have focused on his job as a German diplomat instead of dictating to Nigerians where to build their toilets and to Africans how to deal with elephants. The statement is politically explosive: it reveals how African leaders perceived Baerbock’s approach – not as an equal partnership, but as Western paternalism disguised as European environmentalist ideology.
Masisi went even further. He spoke of Germany’s “condescending and disrespectful” behavior in recent years, which has profoundly changed the perception that Botswana and other African states have of Germany. He drew a personal conclusion, rarely expressed with such frankness: he felt more serene and more confident in relations with Germany now that Baerbock was no longer in power. Asked about Botswana’s vote in the secret ballot in New York, he replied: “No comment” – a diplomatic negation that speaks volumes.
Namibia’s former deputy environment minister, Heather Sibungo, also criticized German policies under Baerbock’s government, although her remarks were more concise. His statement, “It was not right,” illustrates the way in which many African politicians comment on bilateral tensions: with restraint in tone, but unequivocally in substance.
The elephant conflict as a parable: symbolic politics versus African reality
To understand the break with Africa, we must return to the so-called elephant conflict – this absurd confrontation which has become the symbol of all the failures of Berlin’s African policy. Botswana is home to around 130,000 wild elephants – a population which, despite the size of the country (around twice that of France), has long represented a ecological and social challenge. Elephants ravage fields, devastate villages and kill people; in just twelve months, 17 people lost their lives during elephant attacks. Botswana therefore reintroduced elephant hunting in order to regulate the population and allocate revenue from hunting licenses to rural development.
The German Greens, led by Environment Minister Steffi Lemke, fiercely opposed it. She wanted to ban the importation of African hunting trophies into Germany, with the best intentions in terms of animal welfare, but without the slightest understanding of African realities. President Masisi reacted with a masterful political maneuver: he proposed giving 20,000 elephants to Germany as a protest. The message was not a simple joke, but a fundamental objection: if European countries want to dictate to African states the management of their resources natural, they must also assume the consequences.
What particularly outraged Namibia was that a country which had suffered so much from German colonialism – the genocide of the Heroes and the Namas being among the darkest pages of German history – was once again suffering the consequences of German environmental policies, perceived as a form of complacency European. Namibia has explicitly accused the German government of neocolonialism. This accusation hit home: Germany, which was demanding postcolonial reparations through the 2021 Namibia Accord, was simultaneously pursuing policies perceived as a new form of cultural domination.
Baerbock had attempted mediation to ease tensions and met Masisi in Berlin. However, the structural tension persisted: a foreign minister whose party adopted a politically toxic position towards its African partners could hardly simultaneously present herself as a convincing defender of African interests. The image that remained was that of a European politician giving moral lessons to Africans.
Feminist foreign policy and its unintended collateral damage
In March 2023, Annalena Baerbock and Development Minister Svenja Schulze jointly presented their guidelines for a feminist foreign and development policy. The idea was ambitious: three guiding principles – rights, representation and resources – were to transform existing development cooperation. By 2025, more than 90% of Ministry of Development funds were to be allocated to projects pursuing gender equality as a primary or secondary objective.
The failure of the project is not due to its objectives, but to its communication and its implementation in the international context. In many countries of the South, and particularly in Africa, feminist foreign policy has been perceived as a new attempt by Western countries to export universal values considered as Conservative governments in Africa and elsewhere around the world explicitly reject concepts such as gender identity and the rights of sexual minorities, and their international promotion provokes resistance that is reflected in their votes.
Furthermore, the desire to transform the balance of power in the countries of the South and to attack colonial mentalities came up against in practice a communication strategy that remained prisoner of these same mentalities. When Berlin dictates to African countries the management of their animal populations while claiming to “decolonize” their power structures, a contradiction appears, a contradiction that African partners unequivocally point out. Former Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel summed it up this way: Baerbock pursues his foreign policy loudly, but success in foreign policy is not achieved through resounding declarations, but through patient diplomacy.
Attitude versus result: the fundamental ambivalence of the Baerbock era
The results of Baerbock’s mandate are a real subject of political debate and deserve a nuanced analysis, beyond partisan reflexes. Among the positives are some undeniable achievements: Baerbock was one of the most consistent voices in Europe supporting the invaded Ukraine. A member of the Green party, unlike Chancellor Scholz, she has not had to make an about-face on foreign policy. She clearly positioned Germany against Putin from the start and consistently advocated for arms supplies and sanctions. In a European diplomatic context marked by ambivalence, this was a remarkable achievement.
On the other hand, negative findings are accumulating. She called Chinese President Xi Jinping a dictator – a statement which, although factually correct, had significant diplomatic consequences, harming Germany’s main trading partner without improving the human rights situation. Her behavior in the Iranian context did not live up to her own expectations: when Iranian women rose up against the mullahs under the slogan “Women, Life, Freedom”, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, usually so determined, remained strangely silent Finally, the most important multilateral project of her mandate – obtaining a seat. in the UN Security Council for Germany – suffers from a crucial lack: a vast network of reliable partner countries.
The result is clear: during previous candidacies, all led by Angela Merkel, Germany had always triumphed. The 2026 defeat does not reflect the performance of a federal government in place for a year, but that of a foreign policy which has squandered its electoral influence for more than four years. Hesse’s Minister of International Affairs, Manfred Pentz, summed it up in a few words: Baerbock ruined everything during his mandate.
The nomination for the presidency of the UN General Assembly: coronation or collateral damage?
Among the most notable political maneuvers of the post-coronavirus era is the appointment of Baerbock as president of the United Nations General Assembly – a position she held from September 2025 to September 2026. This appointment sparked controversy from the start: experienced diplomat Helga Schmid was initially approached for this position. Secretary General of the OSCE, she negotiated the Iranian nuclear agreement and benefited from several decades of multilateral experience. When Baerbock, following her party’s defeat in the federal elections, orchestrated a last-minute maneuver and persuaded the German government to appoint her in his place, the diplomatic world reacted with rare frankness.
Christoph Heusgen, former president of the Munich Security Conference and longtime ambassador to the United Nations, called the decision outrageous and described Baerbock as outdated. Former Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel added that Baerbock would still have a lot to learn from Helga Schmid. In internal UN discussion groups, ambassadors from other countries called Baerbock’s appointment disrespectful and accused Germany of personally enriching itself through a key UN post. One said Baerbock’s appointment would reinforce the impression that powerful states are abusing key UN posts for their own ends. A YouGov poll revealed that 42% of Germans viewed the nomination as negative, and 15% as somewhat negative; only 12% and 16%, respectively, considered it positive.
As president of the General Assembly, Baerbock found herself faced with a fundamentally different role: not confrontation, not polarization, but moderation, the mobilization of the majorities and silence in the face of attacks by the powerful against the UN. She herself described this function as a challenge requiring silence and immobility. Paradox: a politician whose strength lay in public confrontation and unwavering commitment accessed a position which precisely defined these qualities as weaknesses. The fact that the General Assembly, under his presidency, did not contribute to Germany’s election to the UN Security Council, but on the contrary sealed its failure, perfectly illustrates this structural gap.
