The June 7 elections risk taking place without one of the rare opportunities to force Kosovar politics to seriously address the country’s future on the international stage. Instead of a substantive debate on foreign policy, the parties treat this area as a simple pretext for the campaign, and not as an axis of state construction. This is a major gap, as Kosovo and the region enter a period of rapid change in the international order, with direct consequences for their security, development and identity.
At a time when American commitment in Europe is no longer a given and the European Union is struggling to act with speed and determination, Kosovo cannot base its strategy on obsolete assumptions. A small state that does not correctly grasp the evolution of the situation risks remaining a prisoner of it. And a political class that does not understand this change risks depriving the country of any compass to navigate the international scene, precisely when it needs it most.
The question the parties are avoiding is simple, but crucial: What foreign policy do they propose for Kosovo and have they clearly outlined its national interests that will guide their foreign policy decisions? Do they view this area as a long-term state instrument, or simply as a pretext for electoral declarations? Do they have a vision of how Kosovo should defend its interests in a more complex and less predictable world, or are they content with the usual formulas of Euro-Atlantic integration and calls for an eternal alliance with the United States, as if that alone could solve all the challenges that Kosovo faces on the international scene?
For a small state like Kosovo, foreign policy cannot be reduced to simple questions of ceremonial and protocol. It constitutes an instrument of security, development and survival on the international scene. It determines whether the country remains an actor in its own right or whether it becomes a space where decisions are made by others, without its consent. If, in the past, it was enough to rely on the friendship of key allies and a clear Euro-Atlantic perspective, today it is essential to qualify this logic with a more realistic analysis of reality. The war in Ukraine, the return of aggressive Russian imperialism, the destabilizing actions of malicious actors in the region and the rise of political forces hostile to enlargement in some Western countries have considerably increased the unpredictability of the situation for states like Kosovo.
In this context, how do the parties assess the strategic risk linked to the changes occurring in Washington, Brussels and the main European capitals? Did they foresee a situation where international support would no longer be automatic, but conditioned by the increasingly divergent interests of the great powers? And above all, how will they defend Kosovo if the international situation becomes less favorable? These are not hypothetical questions. These are questions that a future government might be forced to answer with concrete decisions, not vague statements.
Since its declaration of independence, the objectives of Kosovo’s foreign policy have been clear: obtain new recognition, join international organizations and ensure its integration into the EU, NATO and, ultimately, the UN. However, achieving these objectives has become more difficult due to changes in the international system and the obstructive attitude of Serbia and its supporters, which continues to destabilize the region. Kosovo can no longer view this situation as just a temporary setback; it is now an integral part of the problem.
At this stage, the questions the parties should ask themselves should be simple: What are the real priorities of the relationship with Serbia? Do they consider the normalization dialogue as a simple technical crisis management process, or as a process that must necessarily lead to mutual recognition? Do they have innovative ideas to evolve the framework of this relationship, or will they persist in the same logic of incessantly maintaining the status quo? What is their political strategy to curb Serbia’s harmful influence in the region? Without clear answers to these questions, any statement regarding this “dialogue” remains in vain.
Kosovo therefore needs a more dynamic, more in-depth foreign policy and less dependent on the vagaries of domestic policy. It is not enough to repeat the usual formulas of Euro-Atlantic integration. Sustainable bilateral relations must be established with states that really weigh in the Euro-Atlantic order and in the region. Likewise, the instruments of state action must be strengthened, from the expansion of the diplomatic network to the professionalization and increase in the capacities of the diplomatic service. A serious foreign policy does not rely solely on political will; it requires people, expertise, continuity and institutional rigor.
When it comes to foreign policy, a small state cannot be content with having friends; he needs partners who offer him space, protection and influence. In this regard, the Baltic, Nordic and Central European countries, such as Poland, are important partners due to their principled positions towards Russia and its destabilizing policy in Europe, particularly in the Balkans. Kosovo should also deepen its multidimensional cooperation with the United Kingdom, Turkey, Croatia, Italy, Greece and Hungary, as NATO member states directly concerned with the stability of the Balkans. It is not a question of protocol, but of building diplomatic capital at a time when each vote, each recognition and each support takes on strategic importance.
But here too, the question remains and the parties do not answer: Which of these partnerships are considered priorities and why? Do they know with which countries Kosovo can gain influence, security and room for maneuver? Or will its foreign policy continue to rely on sporadic visits, official declarations and protocol photos, as if diplomacy were a question of image and not of national interest?
Cooperation with Albania remains particularly important. Relations between Kosovo and Albania must finally move beyond the stage of symbolic proximity and enter a phase of strategic coordination in terms of foreign policy, defense and security. In an unstable regional context, close coordination between the two brother states is not a political luxury, but a necessity. If Tirana and Pristina do not strengthen their coordination on the international scene, each will remain weaker than it could be.
Do the parties have a clear platform for this coordination? Will they truly treat Albania as a strategic partner at the state level, or only as an emotional reference in political and patriotic speeches? What concrete agreements are they aiming for in terms of diplomacy, defense, economy and security? Without answers to these questions, even the most natural connection will not translate into real influence.
Kosovo must also maintain and deepen its relations with other countries in the region which are of particular importance for its stability: Croatia, Turkey, North Macedonia, Montenegro and Bulgaria. At the same time, greater efforts must be made to develop formal relations with Greece and Bosnia-Herzegovina. These are not secondary issues. They are an integral part of Kosovo’s strategy in the region and contribute to strengthening its position in the face of internal and external challenges which mainly emanate from Belgrade.
This is precisely where the main problem in Kosovar politics lies: the parties have not clearly defined their priorities, the partnerships they consider strategic, nor the model of relations they will adopt if they come to power. Certain political and institutional figures have so minimized the importance of this definition that each state is described as an “unfailing ally” of Kosovo, while in reality, beyond declarations of intent, no concrete action has been taken. was undertaken to deepen bilateral relations. Which party can today say with certainty what it will do in terms of foreign policy during the first twelve months of its mandate, beyond protocol visits? Which of them has a plan to establish diplomatic continuity and not just react to crises?
Kosovo has long suffered from a personalized foreign policy, where international relations have often been instrumentalized for domestic political purposes rather than to build the institutional heritage and memory of the state. This approach constituted and still constitutes a strategic failure with lasting consequences, accompanied in particular by periods of lack of institutional coordination within the triangle Presidency-Prime Minister-Ministry of Foreign Affairs. A state that fails to ensure the continuity of its diplomacy loses credibility; without it, he has no influence. And without influence, there is no protection of national interests.
In this sense, Kosovo’s foreign policy should be based on several clear principles: security, diversification of partners, cooperation with allies, deepening regional ties and building a reputation as a reliable partner. A small state gains influence on the international scene thanks to a serious and predictable approach and its ability to maintain the trust of its partners. If Kosovo wants to be respected, it must act accordingly: with clarity, discipline and measurable objectives.
Are political parties ready to accept this reality? Or will they continue to relegate foreign policy to the background, confining it to empty declarations and protocol meetings? Will they dare to assert their limits, the alliances that they consider essential and the errors that should not be reproduced? These questions are essential during campaign periods, because voters need to know what they support when they vote for a party.
Kosovo cannot allow its foreign policy to be hostage to improvisation, slogans and its exploitation for internal political purposes. In an uncertain international context, it needs a diplomacy that thinks in the long term, acts rigorously and builds alliances in the service of the State, and not the passing or personal interests of current leaders. The question is not just whether parties have foreign policy rhetoric, but whether they have a real foreign policy.
