China, Russia and the Moroccan Sahara: Geopolitics-comfort zone is over

During my appearance on the showLe 12/13 from Médias24on Thursday 30/4/2026, Aziz Bouceta and Adil Abdelali, smart as they have proven, on many occasions, asked me a question on my reading of the position of China and Russia on the subject of the Moroccan Sahara question. They wanted to know if we could hope that Russia and China would soon emerge from their neutrality and adopt a clear position in favor of the Autonomy Plan under Moroccan sovereignty in the southern provinces.

On the spot, I gave a response that was worth what it was worth, not trying to be categorical or to exaggerate my optimism about the imminent outcome of this regional conflict around the Moroccan Sahara. I could have been satisfied with the fact that China and Russia abstained during the vote on resolution 2797 of October 31, 2025, establishing the Moroccan Autonomy Plan as the most realistic solution to resolve this conflict.

I remember the anger of the Algerian media (and decision-makers) lamenting that neither Russia nor China used the right of veto to abort the aforementioned resolution. These media belong to another time. Prompted, I watched the show later. I then said to myself that clarifications were necessary to refine my perception and be in tune with the evolution of the file which continues to bounce back and forth.

Then, there was the attack on Smara in the southern provinces perpetrated by the Polisario Front, on May 5, 2026. An attack which caused a massive shock wave. Condemnations coming from several capitals of Europe, Asia and America as well as regional and international organizations. The term “terrorist” is used without any ambiguity in certain statements.

Algeria, sponsor, without a doubt, of this attack – among other state and non-state actors – did not expect it. She knows that continuing to give refuge to a movement now described as terrorist will soon place her in the uncomfortable position of a pariah state.

Algeria will be more so as the procedure relating to the bills submitted to the appropriate committees within the House of Representatives and the American Senate qualifying the Polisario Front as a terrorist movement follows its path.

The attempted coup d’état in Mali using the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA) and the Support Group for Islam and Muslims (Jnim), on April 25, 2026, goes in the same direction. Terrorism and separatism are two sides of the same coin.

Separatism associated with terrorism demystifies a narrative that has long justified violence against civilian populations under the pretext that war for “national liberation” can lead to collateral damage in areas far from the battlefields.

Therefore, the position of Russia and China on the regional conflict around the Sahara deserves to be debated in order to find a tangible explanation. Geopolitical reading is essential in this regard. It may mean that both countries have interests in North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. They must maintain a certain neutrality, let’s say constructive.

Constructive neutrality: a flat-false note in a major scale

Indeed, China intends to confirm a balanced position between Morocco and Algeria. China voted for consensus resolutions aimed at promoting the autonomy initiative proposed by Morocco, particularly in 2021 (resolution 2602). However, in October 2025, as the resolution process took a new turn, China abstained from voting on Resolution 2797.

Furthermore, China does not invite the Polisario Front or pseudo-SADR to the summit of the Forum on Sino-African Cooperation (FOCAC), founded in 2000, despite the pressure exerted by Algeria and South Africa, notably during the FOCAC in Johannesburg in 2015. These countries put forward the pretext that this entity was a member of the African Union. The last FOCAC was held in Beijing in September 2024 and confirmed China’s unequivocal position on the participation criteria, in particular the one which states that only member countries of the United Nations are eligible to participate.

Russia, for its part, abstained from the vote on Resolution 2797, arguing that it was unbalanced and that it was imposed by the United States. It confirms the position it has adopted since 2018. However, Russia does not invite the Polisario or the pseudo-SADR at the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum. Three editions of the Forum were organized respectively in Sochi (October 2019), Saint Petersburg (July 2023) and Cairo (December 2025).

The same observation on the participation criteria: Russia reserves a refusal to accept Algeria, South Africa and the last handful of African countries still recognizing the Polisario or the pseudo-SADR. During the 3rd edition of the Russia-Africa Forum in Cairo, Algiers and Pretoria wanted to force the hand of Moscow and Cairo so that the admission of this artificial entity takes place in a country that is both Arab and African.

Thus, Algiers and Pretoria would later succeed in forcing this entity into the Russia-Arab World Cooperation Forum. This forum is very important. Its launch took place in Moscow in 2009. The 6th edition was organized in Marrakech in December 2023. Algeria did not participate, under the pretext that it had severed its diplomatic relations with Morocco in August. 2021.

All this is not convincing according to independent commentators and politicians to the extent that resolution 2797 put an end to the ambiguities of yesteryear. Not convincing, especially since China and Russia face attempts at separatism, dissidence and destabilization that go back decades.

Some attempts are rooted in the turbulent history of the two countries; others are the work of foreign interests either in the context of the East-West conflict, the Cold War or the reconfiguration of geostrategic spaces.

Without venturing into the justification or challenge of the demands of the dissident movements in the two countries, the neutral observer can only be confused by the ambivalence of the position of Beijing and Moscow with regard to the regional conflict around the Sahara.

The argument that the two capitals are rebelling against the control of the United States on this issue and not necessarily against Morocco seems to be window dressing. On other hot issues, this argument is not – or is timidly – ​​put forward.

Just as the argument according to which Russia and China would seek to maintain a certain balance within the Security Council to leave the door open to initiatives to resolve complex conflicts such as that of the Sahara, lacks panache. Better, the argument is contradicted by their perceptions of other issues directly linked to their vital interests.

Let’s take a closer look. If for Russia, the status of the Russian republics of the North Caucasus gives a precise idea of ​​the regime of autonomy within the Russian Federation, the case of China deserves particular attention. This is all the more imperative as my reading of the background of the Trump-Putin summit in Alaska (August 2025) seems relevant (Hami H., Geopolitics as an exact science, MEDIAS24, August 11, 2025).

This reading is relevant in more than one way. First, China. An event has been passed over in silence and demonstrates that in our country, the media often allow themselves to be drawn into treating preconditioned subjects without being more attentive beyond the path traced by diffuse interests.

This concerns, in this case, the visit to Beijing, on April 10, 2026, of Cheng Li Wan, leader of the Kuomintang-KMT, the Taiwanese opposition party. A historic visit, the first of its kind by a KMT official in three decades. This visit is part of a peace mission to ease the tension between Beijing and Taipei.

It should be remembered that attempts at rapprochement between Beijing and Taipei date back to the consensus of 1992. This consensus is based on the idea of ​​’one China and several versions’. As was to be expected, the Taiwanese government, led by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), a nationalist party which advocates independence, stigmatizes this visit.

Double standards: a pendulum under the weight of excess

Taiwan is a complex story that reflects a never-ending standoff between two entities that neutralize each other by cooperating; something that intrigues foreign observers. The specificity of China (mainland China and regions enjoying a special administrative organization) means that it combines imperturbable ideology and openness to capitalism. He illustrates this in Shanghai and Hong Kong.

Verified observers see in it a political and diplomatic subtlety which commands admiration, whatever the detractors of a country which does not doubt its means and its capacity to achieve strategic parity with the United States and Russia in less than two decades to come.

Hence the deep meaning of the phrase used by President Xi Jinping on the occasion of President Donald Trump’s visit to Beijing on May 14, 2026. He warns that the United States and China do not fall into Thucydides’ trap.

This expression is used by the international relations theorist Graham Allison in 2011 which he devotes in 2017 (G. Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap?). It recalls the struggle for power and domination between a dominant power and an emerging power.

If a direct military confrontation were to occur, the two contenders to maintain or achieve power would end up weakened, as was the case of Sparta and Athens during the Peloponnesian War (431 to 404 BC. Sparta would be the United States and Athens would be China.

Precisely, the Thucydides trap that Graham Allison verified in sixteen cases throughout history spares no contemporary geopolitical space, including North Africa. This time, the concept can be applied to rising intermediate powers who, by dint of wanting to free themselves from the status of proxy, would fall into the trap of insisting on slowing down the rise of the influence of their neighbors.

Just as to stay in the same spirit of historical borrowings, we can refer to Nero (37 AD – 68 AD). This Roman emperor sponsored the fire of Rome and used it as a pretext in the hope of maintaining power internally and creating discord in neighboring geopolitical spaces.

The attack on Smara and the attempted coup d’état in Mali by agents are not far from recalling the suicidal temptation of Nero. The headlong rush observed the day after October 31, 2026 does not only aim to slow down the process of settling the Sahara conflict, but also to keep MIMURSO alive, whose mission will inevitably come to an end in the months to come.

China and Russia would be expected in October 2026 to find out if an evolution was observed in their perceptions of the way in which the Sahara conflict would be resolved in the spirit and letter of resolution 2797. The position of the two countries regarding the future mandate of MINURSO would be closely observed. This mandate must be reviewed so that the Security Council is faithful to the logic of the compromise reached on October 31, 2026.

Now let’s get to the heart of the matter. What is the relationship between China’s position on the Moroccan Sahara and Taiwan? What does the visit of the leader of the Taiwanese opposition to Beijing represent? To answer this trick question, I put forward a series of explanations.

First, on a more general note, I would say that the Alaska summit between Presidents Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin in August 2025 was an opportunity for Russia and the United States to distribute influence in a faltering, zigzagging and heading towards the unknown.

Secondly, China is one of the countries concerned by attempts to construct a new geopolitics with three heads dominating their respective spaces: the United States, Russia and China. President Trump’s visit to Beijing from May 13 to 15, 2026 confirms this analysis.

Western and Asian commentators fear that the United States and China could strike a deal that would endanger the traditional alliances that some countries have with Washington and Beijing. The tripartite war between the United States, Israel and Iran was discussed, but it would not have constituted the main subject of the talks between the two American and Chinese heads of state.

Thirdly, on a more particular note, I would recall that on several occasions, foreign friends have approached me to inquire about the slowness of the issuance of business visas to Taiwanese nationals to visit Morocco. I explained as best I could, to remain politically correct, the ins and outs of this procedure.

The “one China” or “one China” policy is the one adopted by Morocco. The issuance of business visas is subject to specific conditions. Some people still don’t understand this procedure or they don’t want to understand anything.

Fourth, China is against separatism. This is undeniable. The Muslim autonomous region of Xinjiang in northwest China means that Beijing cannot open a breach that would be fatal to a certain extent. Moreover, the administrative organization in China is characterized by the existence of five autonomous regions, including Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Ningxia and Guangxi and naturally Xinjiang.

Just as the Kashmir conflict has given China a hard time since the first Indo-Pakistani war of 1947. China controls the Aksai Tchin region and the Shaksgam valley. India controls Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh, while Pakistan administers Azad Kashmir and Gilgit-Baltistan.

Separatism à la carte: an aberration in a broken compass

Fifth, Taiwan may not be a priority in the standoff between China and the United States. Not only following – I presume – the arrangements concluded in Alaska, but also to seduce Beijing and get it to accept a certain form of strategic parity sooner than Chinese decision-makers envisage.

It is certain that the tripartite war between the United States, Israel and Iran has put a little water in President Trump’s wine. This is a metaphor, as the US president has stated in the past that he has never drunk alcohol in his entire life.

Why is the visit of the leader of the Taiwanese opposition KMT to Beijing unprecedented? To answer this, we must recall certain historical facts. They highlight a sort of clash of nationalist legitimities in China. The victory of Mao Zedong (1893-1976) against Chiang Kai–Chek (1887-1975) was seen by the latter as a usurpation of power – and reunification with mainland China must occur whatever the sacrifices.

Mao Zedong believes that this victory is legitimate because it is the culmination of a long march (1934-1935) which establishes the victory of the Chinese people, also confirmed against the Japanese invasion (1937-1945). Chiang Kaï-Shek settled in Taipei and ruled Taiwan from 1949 until his death in 1975.

Why does China have every interest in leaving the comfort zone? The idea of ​​autonomy proposed by Morocco for the southern provinces would be inspiring for the management of China’s territorial problem. How ? Simple. The idea of ​​the 1992 consensus may be wise. The precedents of Hong Kong and Macao are sufficiently edifying to open the debate on the question of China’s territorial integrity.

Certainly, turning the page, as if nothing had happened, would not be easy. Time management, as decision-makers in Beijing and independence activists in Taiwan know how to do, may not be enough this time. But, as someone would say, “what am I getting involved in?” Well the Chinese precedent concerning, once again, Hong Kong and Macao, can be used for the resolution of similar cases concerning territories under timid sovereignty in Asia, Africa, Europe and Latin America.

Now Russia and the North Caucasus. Intellectual curiosity and strategic imperatives deserve attention to try to understand the confusion shared by many analysts concerning the right of peoples to self-determination, territorial integrity, federation, confederation – and as far as we are concerned –, autonomy in its different forms.

The North Caucasus includes seven autonomous republics within the Russian Federation. The most important republics that have been in the spotlight over the past three decades are Dagestan, Chechnya, Ingushetia and Tatarstan. They were integrated into the Russian Empire following the Caucasian War which lasted forty-four years (1818-1864). The other republics are North Ossetia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia and Stavropol Krai.

Beyond the size of these republics which does not allow them to live independently of the Russian Federation, what must be remembered is the administrative organization imagined by the central power in Moscow.

Autonomy and right to self-determination: the clarity of resolution 2625/1970

The North Caucasus saw the creation, for a short time, of the mountain republic of the North Caucasus (1919-1920). After the victory of the Bolsheviks, this republic changed its name and became the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic of the Mountain. However, independentist desires are not disappearing.

First of all, there is the Chechen war (1994-1996 and 1999-2000 and 2009) which recorded the participation of foreign fighters labeled mujahideen. Then there was the Dagestan war (1999) during which fighters from Chechnya and supported by foreign militias took part. The intervention of Russian troops restored order. However, dissidence remains strong, as evidenced by the tensions noted in 2024.

Two other less publicized wars can be cited in this regard. On the one hand, the war which took place between 2007 and 2015, opposing Ingushetia to Chechnya. It was part of the uprising which followed the Chechen war. The border agreement signed in 2018 between Ingushetia and Chechnya, under which the latter annexed 9% of the latter’s territory, triggered an unprecedented uprising.

On the other hand, the conflict which opposed North Ossetia to Ingushetia in 1992. The case of North Ossetia cannot be dissociated from that of South Ossetia, claimed by Georgia (in the same way as Abkhazia), which declared unilateral independence in 2008. The two republics are recognized only by Russia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Nauru and Syria under the Assad regime.

There is, however, a strong feeling among the populations concerned for the reunification between North Ossetia and South Ossetia. Russia reportedly encouraged such a trend at first, before pausing when destabilization attempts resumed in other strategic regions for Moscow.

Precisely, Russia, which is so confident and so eloquent in terms of its perception of international relations, is giving experienced observers a hard time. So why, to take up the question of Adil Abdelali and Aziz Bouceta, does Moscow not cross the threshold of prevarication and declare that the autonomy plan is a tangible expression of the right of peoples to self-determination and clearly recognizes Moroccan sovereignty over the southern provinces?

A precedent can inspire in this regard. The pretext put forward by the United Kingdom for decades regarding the right of peoples to self-determination was based on the cases of the Falkland Islands and Gibraltar. Both territories always vote to remain part of the United Kingdom whenever a self-determination referendum is held. This was particularly the case in 1967, in 2022 (Gibraltar) and in 1986 and in 2012-2013 (the Falkland Islands). Spain and Argentina claim Gibraltar and the Falkland Islands respectively.

Spain denounces the terms of the Treaty of Utrecht signed in 1713 between France and Great Britain, having ended the War of Succession in Spain and delivered Gibraltar to Great Britain. Madrid takes note of the de facto situation created by Brexit, in particular the 2025-2026 framework agreement between the European Union and the United Kingdom aimed at removing land borders and integrating Gibraltar into the Schengen area.

Argentina relentlessly claims the Falklands. A war took place in 1982 between the latter and the United Kingdom. The dispute over the sovereignty of the islands goes back further. Control of the islands passed from France (1764), Spain and the United Kingdom (1770) respectively. Since 1833, the islands have been controlled by the United Kingdom.

For a long time, the United Kingdom hesitated to publicly recognize the merits of Moroccan territorial claims although it was co-author of the scenarios which preceded the establishment of the protectorate over Morocco in 1912. This is the case with the 1895 agreement signed between Morocco and the United Kingdom recognizing Moroccan sovereignty including in the Sahara or the secret agreement of 1904 between France and Spain sharing their influence in Morocco. This is without mentioning the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 on the partition of Africa or the Algeciras conference of 1906 devoted to Morocco to divide the desires of France and Germany.

It’s never too late to do well. The United Kingdom joins most European countries and recognizes that the Moroccan autonomy plan constitutes a solid and unique basis for the resolution of the regional conflict around the Sahara.

Legalistic in appearance, the United Kingdom’s policy towards the southern provinces until 2025 was in reality, as highlighted above, a strategy for the defense of British interests in the Falkland Islands and Gibraltar. The United Kingdom now adopts a clear position supporting, without any ambiguity, the Autonomy Plan presented by Morocco in 2007. Resolution 2797 of October 31, 2025 confirms the relevance of its choice of reason for the establishment of peace in the Euro-African space.

Analogy is more eloquent than comparison

A diplomat who allegedly attended a heated exchange between the foreign ministers of Spain, the United Kingdom and Russia on the subject (depending on each party to the conflict) of the annexation (or recovery) of Crimea in 2014, says that Sergey Lavrov would have left his speechless interlocutors. He would have advised them respectively to return Ceuta and Melilla to Morocco, and the Falkland Islands to Argentina before lamenting the fate of Crimea.

Of course, Russia does not recognize the pseudo-SADR, but it receives Polisario delegations on the eve of the annual meetings of the United Nations General Assembly. She sometimes abstains and often rises to the occasion. This does not prevent it from signing a fishing agreement with Morocco which includes the southern provinces.

So why not dare and break the ice? Strategic interests with Algeria? Repositioning in the Sahel? Want to make life tough in the United States within the Security Council? All this, no doubt, and more. However, the Russian Federation includes autonomous republics in the North Caucasus. That we sometimes talk about it, as mentioned above, would perhaps be an additional source of concern for Moscow!

The tripartite war between the United States, Israel and Iran acutely raised the issue of the straits and respect for the Convention on the Law of the Sea (1982), in general. The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz has had the lion’s share in the analyzes of maritime affairs specialists, particularly on the question of freedom of navigation. Some people question the interpretation of the clauses of the Convention on the Law of the Sea in times of crisis. If we push the analysis further, we will say that certain countries will benefit more than others.

Recalling my argument that the Alaska summit meeting between Presidents Trump and Putin defined new geopolitical arrangements, I would then say that the Hormoz blockade consolidates China’s perception of security in its sub-region. It is in this spirit that we must understand the meeting between President Xi Jinping and Cheng Li Wan, the leader of the Kuomintang-KMT.

China intends to take advantage of this to mark, once again, its living space. China is not the only one to benefit from this geopolitical breach. Middle Eastern countries will seize this opportunity to redefine new parameters relating to military security and the control of maritime passages.

There is no need to elaborate on President Trump’s visit to Beijing on May 13 and 14, 2026; However, it is clear that the American position on Taiwan is relatively flexible. Taipei would have a lot to worry about in the near future. Taipei is already denouncing the comments of the American president warning the island from investing too much in the project of total independence.

Although Taiwan has made the decision to transfer some semiconductor technology for electric cars and other uses to the United States, the United States is aware that Taipei would only transfer part of this technology. It is his shield against a potential setback from Washington in the future as part of an essential strategic readjustment in Asia.

It is certain that in a few years, tongues will drop, and revelations will be made about what happened between 2020 and 2026 on the global strategic scene. No doubt we would be surprised by the absurdity of certain readings distilled, here and there, on an international system whose mechanisms surprise everyone, including the smartest military planners and strategists.

Comfort zone, gray zone: ambiguity does not mean visibility

So why don’t China and Russia leave the comfort zone regarding the Moroccan Sahara, while they apply autonomy regimes which have the value of sovereignty without this creating emulators? Time management or exaggerated balancing act?

Certainly, both countries proclaim to respect international law and the preeminence of the United Nations in the resolution of international conflicts, nevertheless they cannot, seriously and honestly, ignore the evolution of the UN perception of the right of peoples to self-determination and the need to respect the territorial integrity of sovereign States.

This development came from the divergent interpretation of the resolutions adopted by the United Nations General Assembly, in this case resolution 1514 of December 14, 1960 and resolution 1541 of December 15 1960, to a broader and more logical interpretation enshrined in resolution 2625 of October 24, 1970.

The adoption of resolution 2625 came the day after the handover of Sidi Ifni to Morocco in 1969 in execution of resolution 2072 adopted in 1965 calling on Spain to initiate negotiations with Morocco on the handover of Sidi Ifni and the Spanish Sahara.

Moreover, autonomy as an innovative expression of the right to self-determination is applied in different ways in China, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, Spain, Brazil and Mexico, etc. So why still hesitate after the adoption of resolution 2797, although Beijing and Moscow abstained?

China and Russia are the object of attempts at separatism which they manage as best they can. However, the danger is constant. Far from their countries, they have investments in the Middle East, North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa. These investments are threatened by movements promoting destabilization as an existential approach.

This is the case in the Sahelo-Saharan region. Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso and Chad are popular targets for separatist movements, regardless of the banner under which they fall. The junction between North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa must take place in a climate of peace and security.

The United States and Nigeria announced last Saturday that they had carried out a joint operation which led to the elimination in Bornu of Abu Bilal al-Minouti, deputy leader of the Islamic State group. Abou Bilal had been announced dead in 2024, but this time, the information confirmed by presidents Donald Trump and Bola Ahmed Tinubu seems more credible.

Already, Russia has made it known that it does not intend to sacrifice its presence in certain African countries in the Sahel, despite the messages that were sent to it recently through the attacks against Niger and Mali. Former Wagner or ‘’Africa Corps”, for Russia, it’s the same thing; the Russian presence, Moscow believes, is based on agreements with the governments in place.

China, for its part, is observing the situation more closely. It risks suffering the same fate as it suffered in Venezuela after the overthrow of Nicolás Maduro and the loss of oil supplies from such an important producing country. Losing one’s ascendant interests in Africa, because of exaggerated geopolitical prudence, is in no way justified.

China can capitalize on the results obtained following the visit of President Donald Trump to Beijing, to secure a place in the Atlantic area that matches its ambitions by 2050. It will have a favorable opportunity with the visit of President Vladimir Putin to Beijing on 19 and May 20, 2026 to do so and emerge reassured from the geopolitical turbulence which is shaking an international system in scabrous transition.

The interpretation I put forward relating to the results of the Alaska Summit in August 2025 confirms its relevance. A distribution of roles and zones of influence are becoming clearer. Casually, Africa would be present in the talks between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping – notably the latest developments in North Africa, the Sahel and Central Africa where China and Russia have interests in relation to rare earths and other strategic resources.

Furthermore, the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, the blockage of maritime traffic in the Suez Canal (2021), the regular geopolitical tensions in the Strait of Malacca, the risks incurred in Bab al-Mandab in the Red Sea, the change of hands in the Panama Canal, the maritime altercations in the Black Sea and the posturing around the Bosphorus Strait, etc., pose a major security and strategic problem for world trade.

China’s Silk Road ambitions and Russia’s need for secure access to warm seas would be undermined if the Strait of Gibraltar and security in the Western Mediterranean were to be threatened. Hence the urgent need to preserve this area, an essential passage for international trade, in order to keep it far from sterile geopolitical bargaining.

It should be remembered that a senior officer within the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (IRGC), Brigadier General Mohamed Reza Naqdi, threatened in 2023 to engage in standoff with the United States and the Europeans at the gates of Gibraltar, allegedly in retaliation against the dramatic situation. in Gaza.

This type of threat was also made against Morocco in 2020, following the severance of diplomatic relations (2018) by a former diplomat affiliated with the IRGC. Indeed, the IRGC intends to use the services of proxy movements. Expert observers warn that extremist movements in the region, including the Polisario separatists, in collusion with a branch of the Algerian army, would be the advanced arms of Iran to accomplish such a mission.

It would be up to two countries in the Maghreb-sub-Saharan Africa region to further review their roadmaps. On the one hand, Mauritania, which, although still hesitant, seems to realize where its vital interest lies. Mauritanian decision-makers are showing more firmness on freedom of movement on their borders with Algeria, in particular to curb the maneuvers of elements subservient to terrorist networks.

On the other hand, Senegal must jump on the bandwagon, because the risks of separatism are still alive in Casamance, whose memories date back to 1982. Indeed, military clashes opposed the Senegalese army to the Movement of Democratic Forces of Casamance (MFDC). The signing of a peace agreement in 2025 in Bissau is certainly promising. However, with the resurgence of activism by separatist movements in Niger (March 2026) and Mali (April 2026), such an agreement may blow up at the first opportunity.

Most West African countries are aware that the Atlantic Ocean is poised for accelerated development and growth in the next three decades. From then on, the resolution of endemic conflicts and the burying of the hatchet become imperative. The end of proxy movements and the neutralization of pariah states are part of this promising pacification project.

Proven experts are watching. The Moroccans, too, who are doubling their vigilance. The prism of the Sahara question in Morocco’s international relations applies to everyone. A dynamic is already underway in the southern provinces. It draws its legitimacy and its strength from the adherence of many countries to the settlement process through the unequivocal recognition of Moroccan sovereignty.

Only a handful of recalcitrants and obstructors still raise their heads. Curious fate, they are already facing attempts at dissidence and separatism. There would come a time when they would like the regime of autonomy to be applied in regions of their own countries which already claim total independence – and unless there is a bit of realism and pragmatism, this is inevitably likely to happen.