Three small states apply the law and their consistent policy and find themselves accused. The great powers, on the other hand, allow for all kinds of nuances. Each to their own principles?
The refusal by Mauritius, Seychelles, and Madagascar to allow the overflight of their airspace by an aircraft linked to Taiwan has triggered a wave of criticism in certain Western capitals. The vocabulary used—“abuse,” “pressure,” “intimidation”—reveals less a legal analysis than a political reflex.
Because from a legal perspective, there is hardly any debate. The Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation is unequivocal—each state exercises full and complete sovereignty over its airspace. Article 1 confirms this principle, and Article 3 states that an aircraft of one state cannot overfly foreign territory without prior authorization. Overflight is not a right. It is a permission.
It is therefore paradoxical to describe the exercise of this sovereignty as “abuse.” Why, then, all this commotion? Because the issue is not just about the skies. It is distinctly political.
The Republic of China (Taiwan) is only recognized by a handful of states—barely a dozen, including Eswatini in Africa. Yet it also maintains remarkably dense relations with countries that officially do not recognize it.
Some may call it assumed ambiguity, others organized ambivalence.
Mauritius, for its part, made a clear choice back in 1972, under the government of Sir Seewoosagur Ramgoolam: to recognize Beijing in the People’s Republic of China as the sole legitimate government. This choice has remained consistent in principle. Though there have been minor shifts at times—often due more to lack of insight than deliberate policy changes—they have been quickly corrected. The crux remains: a foreign policy marked by consistency, clarity, and respect for commitments.
In this context, allowing an overflight to an official Taiwanese aircraft is more than just a technical gesture. It could have been interpreted as a form of de facto recognition. To refuse is to stay true to a line. To grant it would have been altering it.
The choice was therefore less political than it seems: it was logical. Yet, the criticisms abound. The United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom express their “concern.” One speaks of “abuse” of the international aviation system, while denouncing the “pressures” exerted on Taiwan by Beijing.
The contradiction is hard to ignore. For these same actors all recognize the policy of One China, the People’s Republic, which is a permanent member of the UN Security Council. And at the same time, they maintain sustained, sometimes quasi-diplomatic relations with Taiwan. The US provides military assistance. The UK maintains a representation in disguise. The EU initiates cooperation efforts.
What they consider “strategic nuance” is seen by others as grounds for suspicion. Double standards!
Even more troubling is the repeated invocation of “pressures” on Taiwan. A legitimate concern, no doubt. Yet it must be placed in a broader context. Decades of sanctions on Cuba, or the denial of visas to foreign representatives attending UN meetings in New York, are examples of other forms of constraint—less openly discussed, but very real. It is well established in diplomatic circles that the great powers, without exception, also resort to various forms of pressure to align smaller or more vulnerable states with their positions.
For principles to be credible, they cannot be selective.
Attributing the decisions of Mauritius, Seychelles, and Madagascar to external influence is a convenient shortcut. It implicitly denies their ability to decide for themselves. As if the sovereignty of smaller states is inherently suspect.
This reading is not only contestable but revealing. These countries may lack the military or economic power of major nations. But they possess what, in the long run, underpins all international credibility: consistency and coherence. The refusal to allow overflights is an expression of this.
Meanwhile, the major capitals continue their exchanges with Beijing. Ursula von der Leyen of the EU Commission recently visited, as did UK Prime Minister Keir Starmer, and Donald Trump is expected there soon—his trip slightly delayed due to current Middle East priorities. Economic interests, on the other hand, show little hesitation.
Realism, evidently, has its constants. For small states, this realism takes another path—the clarity of positions and the mastery of balances.
Refusing an overflight is not an act of hostility; it is an act of coherence. The conclusion is all the more forceful: Sovereignty is not variable geometry. When invoked by some and contested by others, it ceases to be a principle and becomes an instrument.
