Home World In Barcelona, the global left: trying to reinvent democracy

In Barcelona, the global left: trying to reinvent democracy

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The summit “In Defense of Democracy” held in Barcelona this weekend on April 17th and 18th, brought together not only Pedro Sánchez, Lula, Claudia Sheinbaum, and Gustavo Petro against the rise of radical right-wing forces. It primarily revealed a deeper intellectual shift: in a world where authoritarianism advances not only through coups but also through social fatigue, cultural and identity insecurity, and a sense of state powerlessness, defending democracy is no longer enough; it now requires a material promise, efficiency, and a narrative.

At first glance, the Barcelona gathering may seem like a typical progressive liturgy: over 6,000 activists and leaders from more than 40 countries, calls for multilateralism, social justice, taxing the wealthy, and resistance against the far right. But the fact that this vocabulary is now central signifies something more serious: liberal democracy is no longer viewed as a natural historical horizon, but as a vulnerable regime that needs political, legal, and symbolic protection. Pedro Sánchez explicitly stated that democracy should not be taken for granted, while Lula, Sheinbaum, and others presented the moment as a global battle against authoritarianism and disinformation. This analysis aligns with a broader perspective: according to the 2026 V-Dem report, nearly a quarter of the world’s countries are undergoing autocratization, with six of the ten new cases located in Europe and North America. The institute even suggests that the United States has regressed to a democratic level comparable to that of 1965.

Beyond the discussions at the conference, the real question is whether a democratic system can lead to elected autocracies, as is currently witnessed in the United States.

The true problem lies not only with the far right but also with the social void in the center.

The most interesting aspect of the Barcelona summit is not the identified enemy but the implicit acknowledgment of progressive weaknesses. Organizers emphasized the need to reconnect with the working classes at a time when the cost of living dominates electoral concerns. This statement is crucial, reflecting an increasingly prevalent intuition in studies on the European democratic crisis: democracy is undermined less by an illiberal ideological offensive than by governments’ inability to guarantee economic security, public choice transparency, and a sense of collective control. Populist surge in recent years stems from both cultural shocks and material precarity. Another study by Chatham House advocates for a “repolticization” of economic policies so that citizens once again feel that budgetary, monetary, and social decisions result from democratic choices rather than technocratic mechanisms. This is where the Barcelona summit becomes intellectually more intriguing than it initially appears: it suggests that rhetorical anti-fascism is no longer sufficient, and a democracy that fails to provide protection or perspective ends up nurturing its adversaries. Institutional defense of the regime is only strong if it is supported by a social coalition that still finds the system useful.

Europe is entering the era of “strategic democracy.”

This analysis can surpass immediate news. The old concept of “militant democracy,” the idea that a free regime must actively defend itself against those seeking to destroy it, is reclaiming centrality in contemporary legal and political debates. Recent works note that this logic can take a “hard” form through the prohibition or neutralization of anti-democratic actors, as well as a more “strategic” form based on institutional architecture, media, political financing, and civic resilience. Europe is precisely shifting towards this latter logic. Carnegie observes that by 2025, European support for democracy has refocused on protecting democratic norms within the internal boundaries of the continent, marking a departure from the time when Brussels primarily saw itself as an exporter of standards. The ESPAS foresight document echoes this trend: the European democratic decline is more gradual than abrupt. Viewed from this perspective, Barcelona is not just a left-wing summit; it is an intellectual transition laboratory. The question now becomes not only how to defeat the far right but also how to govern fragmented societies without sliding into authoritarianism. This is the dilemma of our time. For Europe, the consequence is significant: to remain a normative power, it must demonstrate that democracy can still protect, decide, and endure without compromising its principles. Otherwise, the word “democracy” will remain inspiring in international discourse but slowly lose credibility in the daily lives of voters.