In Iran, a regime change has taken place

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On March 24, in the Oval Office, almost a month after the start of the war, Donald Trump affirmed that the United States had already obtained “regime change” in Iran.

The American president walked back his statements, affirming in mid-June that regime change had never interested him (I never cared about regime change). But behind these contradictory, typically Trumpian assertions, there is perhaps a deeper truth: the Iranian regime emerged from the war transformed, even if it remained in place.

At least this is the analysis provided by a young Iranian intellectual, who lived through the entire war in Iran before recently joining France, and who nevertheless has no particular sympathy for Donald Trump. Shirin, whose first name has been changed, this internationally renowned artist will soon return to Tehran, believes that the American strikes have decapitated the ideological heart of the regime. If Ali Khamenei’s son was indeed designated to succeed his father, real power is now exercised by the Revolutionary Guards, whose approach is above all pragmatic and security in his eyes, Iran is thus experiencing a form of regime change without overthrow of the regime: a. internal transformation of power, which is also a generational change.

According to her, the new leaders are not so much ideological as pragmatic and display a resolutely nationalist posture. Any political opposition will continue to be bloodily repressed, as was already the case with the mass uprisings in January, during which thousands of people died. On the other hand, faced with societal demands, the Revolutionary Guards would demonstrate unprecedented pragmatism. Thus, since January, most women have circulated without veils in Tehran, and men and women have often worn light clothing without being disturbed by the Revolutionary Guard Corps, the Pasdaran.

She adds: “I myself went to the airport in a short-sleeved T-shirt without being worried, not even by the police. I think there will be no going back when it comes to the status of women. The 2025 protests have shown that the vast majority of Iranian men and women no longer wish to return to the repression imposed by the mullahs.” This story is consistent with that of many Iranians, who have left Tehran to seek shelter in other regions and who say that, at numerous checkpoints, members of the Revolutionary Guards, as well as their foreign deputies, were very polite and respectful, which also seemed unthinkable to them before the war.

According to Shirin, since the ceasefire, civil society has experienced real excitement in the fields of art, culture and entertainment. Concerts are multiplying in Tehran and the cafes are full, despite an extremely difficult economic situation: “Iranians want to live at 2,000 kilometers an hour. The Revolutionary Guards are tolerating all this because perhaps they are seeking to establish a new social contract. They have shown that they are capable of effectively defending Iran against the United States, against Israel and against the risk of total chaos, while effectively administering the country.”

Although inflation is high and prices have quadrupled, the supply of medicines and foodstuffs has been assured, and postal, hospital and banking services have continued to operate. Shirin sums up: “The State has remained standing.” The revolutionary guardian wants to demonstrate that he knows how to administer effectively, unlike the ideologues.

Large sections of civil society also expressed their support for the country’s defense by forming human chains around hospitals and power stations.

Several Iran specialists draw the same observation. Thus, according to Narges Bajoghli and Vali Nasr, “What is now proposed is a nationalist-technocratic compromise, in which the legitimacy of the state rests on its capacity to defend and rebuild the country. The terms of this new contract are national and no longer Islamic. State media now produce content that normalizes the image of women with and without hijabs side by side, presents Iranian identity as primarily cultural rather than strictly religious, and seeks to reconnect with segments of society that had most overwhelmingly rejected the Islamic Republic, particularly the youth and the urban middle classes.

But to maintain the support of these population groups, the new leaders in Tehran must above all obtain the expected results thanks to their radicalism in foreign policy, in particular by breaking certain taboos, such as the closure of the Strait of Hormuz or attacks against the Arab states of Persian Gulf. They must now obtain the release of their assets and the lifting of sanctions.

This is particularly what awaits young people, who represent a little more than half of the population aged under 35 in an Iran now numbering nearly 100 million inhabitants. Largely urban, it constitutes a determining factor in the social and political evolution of the country and above all wants concrete results from the agreement concluded with the Trump administration and real economic progress. “Iranian youth are in the starting line. She is hungry for economic and technological progress, and she is extremely well educated.” Under these conditions, she could temporarily put aside her political demands, if Iran progresses in this direction.

This is a paradox. Iranian society is deeply political. As Shirin says, “even drinking a glass of water is a political act,” but she can, for now, agree to procrastinate.

The big question for the Iranians remains that of the form that this new governance will take. Narges Bajoghli and Vali Nasr add: “It is not a question of liberalization; on the contrary, the regime continues to severely repress all political dissent. But he now recognizes that he needs a much broader social base than that which Islamic ideology alone can provide. Gradually, the Islamic Republic resembles less of a theocracy and more of a right-wing nationalist authoritarian state. » Islamic ideology is still present, but it is now subordinated to the imperative of national cohesion. The criterion for political loyalty is no longer: “Are you Islamic enough?”, but rather: “Are you Iranian enough?” The mosque is still there, but the dominant political symbol, found today on necklaces and pins worn by young and old alike, is now the map of the country.”

To imagine what this transformation might look like, we often cite Mohammed bin Salman’s Saudi Arabia, where total political control is exchanged for relatively high societal liberalization. However, Iran’s new leaders are seasoned military personnel who also wish to become major regional military players.

Other parallels can be established: Kemalist Turkey, even if the Revolutionary Guards will certainly not wish to go this far in secularization; Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, where ideology disappeared for a time; or Pakistan, another Islamic republic in which traditional elites and the army share or fiercely compete for power.

These parallels, however, remain limited and only allow us to outline a few avenues for reflection. Iran will undoubtedly follow its own trajectory under a government dominated by the Revolutionary Guards.

For many Iranians, however, it seems clear that the regime will continue to evolve as its new strongmen seek to preserve and expand their regional power, not only in the Persian Gulf, but also in Western Asia. To achieve this, they will have to preserve a minimum of the new national cohesion that seems to be emerging from the war.

Some Iranians warn against jumping to conclusions that political Islam, Wilayat-e-Faqih (the guardianship of the jurist-theologian of the ayatollahs) would be definitively dead.

On June 19, Iranian singer Parastoo Ahmadi was sentenced to 74 lashes for singing without a hijab on YouTube in 2024 in Qom, the religious capital and main theological center of Iran. This judgment can still be appealed.

Is this decision a reaffirmation of the power of the religious establishment, which thus demonstrates its influence, or did the Revolutionary Guards want to show that they retain a certain attachment to the religious authority which has until now dominated the system?