One hundred days after the launch of American and Israeli strikes against Iran, on February 28, 2026, the conflict entered a paradoxical phase: the war is no longer total, but an agreement remains out of reach.
On the military level, Washington can claim undeniable successes. Much of Iran’s military infrastructure was hit, several senior regime officials were eliminated and Tehran’s offensive capabilities were seriously weakened. However, the political objective remains unachieved. Iran retains part of its arsenal, continues the reconstruction of its strategic sites and still refuses to give in on nuclear and ballistic issues.
In Tehran, the regime survived the initial shock. Certainly, the economy is bloodless: galloping inflation, damaged infrastructure, currency under pressure and losses estimated at several hundred billion dollars. But power has not wavered. On the contrary, the Iranian leadership is trying to transform its resilience into political victory against the United States.
The real heart of the conflict now lies elsewhere: in the Strait of Hormuz. This global energy artery has become the central issue in the standoff between Washington and Tehran. The negotiations relate as much to freedom of navigation as to sanctions, frozen Iranian assets and the future of the nuclear program.
The truce concluded on April 8, under Pakistani mediation, made it possible to avoid a major regional escalation, but it is regularly violated. Incidents are increasing: drones shot down, strikes against radar installations, missile fire towards Washington’s Arab allies and persistent tensions in Lebanon.
One hundred days after the start of hostilities, neither power can truly proclaim itself victorious. The United States has won several battles without obtaining the strategic capitulation of Iran. Iran, for its part, survived without succeeding in breaking the economic and military stranglehold that surrounds it. The war turned into a test of diplomatic endurance. And, at this stage, the biggest winner remains uncertainty.
