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Withdrawal or reinforcement in Poland: Trump is making a fool of the Europeans – Heidi.news

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At the great political and military casino of the White House, what number did the roulette stop on? In the end: 5000.

This is the number of “additional” American soldiers that Donald Trump said, Thursday, May 21, he wanted to deploy in Poland. And yet, ten days earlier, the chief of staff of the Polish armed forces received information by email that the United States was renouncing a rotation of 4,000 men.

These contradictory announcements come in a regional context under high tension: Russia and Belarus have just launched major joint nuclear maneuvers on NATO’s borders. More than 65,000 military personnel, ballistic missiles and tactical nuclear capabilities have been mobilized in what Moscow presented as a response to the “European warmongers”.

The White House did not specify whether the 5,000 GIs were in addition to the 4,000 already planned, or if they replaced them. Regardless, the announcement was greeted with great relief. “Of course, I welcome this announcementâ€Mark Rutte. “All’s well that ends well”said Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sirkoski.

Good reasons to be worried

The American presence in Poland serves above all as a deterrent. It means that in the event of a Russian attack, Washington would be immediately involved. In other words, these several thousand American soldiers remain the main barrier on the eastern flank of Europe and NATO.

The initial news of the withdrawal of 4,000 men had sowed panic in the country which is the most faithful ally of the United States in Europe, the only one in the entire Union where a clear majority of the population, according to a survey of May 13, wants the installation of American military bases.

And for good reason: Poland, on the front line against Russia, has several vulnerabilities:

  • A border with the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, one of the most militarized territories in Europe;

  • Another border with Belarus, an essential rear base for the Russian invasion of Ukraine. On Thursday, Kyiv claimed to have become aware of five scenarios developed by Russia to extend the war to the north.

  • Between the two, the Suwalki Corridor, leading from Poland to Lithuania, is NATO’s most vulnerable point in Europe and a major geostrategic axis for Russia. A joint Russian-Belarusian offensive on this 65 km strip of land would cut off in a few hours the only passage between the Baltic States and the rest of Europe.

Les Européens déstabilisés

In this climate of high tension, the American waltz-hesitation establishes a balance of power which profoundly destabilizes the Europeans. An alliance is based on stability, predictability and trust. However, Donald Trump, on the contrary, is lining up threats of disengagement and criticism against NATO.

His Secretary of State Marco Rubio said it in his own way, during a NATO meeting on Friday in Helsingborg, Sweden: “There will be, in the long term, fewer American troops (…) None of this is surprising even if, of course, I understand perfectly that this could create a certain nervousness”at-il déclaré.

In fact, Europeans no longer know what to expect. A lasting withdrawal of the United States or a return of American leadership? Budgetary pressure or simple transactional logic?

Trump fractures Polish debates

The American back and forth is now causing significant political fractures among Washington’s allies. In Poland, each statement by Donald Trump on NATO or American troops immediately becomes a subject of internal confrontation.

When the Pentagon mentioned the suspension of the deployment of an armored brigade, the PIS (far-right Eurosceptic party) accused Prime Minister Donald Tusk of having weakened the strategic relationship with the United States. Conversely, those close to the Polish government criticize the conservatives for having too personalized the alliance with Washington around Donald Trump and the Republicans.

This polarization goes far beyond Poland. Across Europe, Trump’s return is rekindling a strategic fault line, between countries that want to preserve the American umbrella at all costs and those that believe that European military autonomy becomes essential in the face of Washington’s unpredictability.

Terrible addiction in the United States

The war in Ukraine has also reinforced this paradox. On the one hand, the Europeans are becoming aware of their strategic vulnerability. On the other hand, the conflict confirmed that the United States remains the only power capable of quickly coordinating a large-scale military response on the continent. The continent’s defense architecture remains deeply dependent on Washington, for key capabilities:

  • Strategic intelligence;

  • Heavy logistics;

  • Military transport;

  • Anti-missile defense;

  • Satellite capacities;

  • And above all nuclear deterrence.

Irony of history: the American hot-cold intervened while Warsaw received, on Friday, its first three F-35 stealth fighter planes ordered from the United States – a first on the eastern flank of NATO. Twenty-nine additional aircraft are expected by 2029, under a contract at 4.6 billion dollars concluded in 2020.

The Polish fear of abandonment

This is something to reassure the Poles a little, whose strategic culture remains marked by several traumas:

  • The 18th century partitions of the Republic of Two Nations (Poland and Lithuania) by Prussia, Austria and Russia;

  • The double invasion of 1939, by Nazi Germany and the USSR

  • The division of the world in 1945 at Yalta between Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt, which devolved central and eastern Europe to the USSR

  • The communist period of the People’s Republic of Poland (from 1945 to 1989), marked by subjugation to Moscow and the repression of numerous movements of revolt or strikes.

Among the Polish elite, a conviction remains: when the great powers negotiate with Moscow, it is Poland that will be sacrificed. Today, Warsaw is NATO’s exemplary ally. Tomorrow, it could once again become a simple adjustment variable in American policy.