Threats, ultimatums, contradictory statements: Washington and Tehran negotiate in extreme distrust. As new talks approach in Pakistan, diplomacy seems less about seeking an agreement and more about testing the limits of the adversary.
One of the most defining relationships in international relations is the one between the United States and Iran. It is not just a simple strategic disagreement or a temporary episode. It forms the framework within which exchanges take place, to the point where every negotiation attempt turns into a parallel confrontation.
The current sequence provides a clear illustration of this dynamic. On one side, Washington announces the imminent deployment of a delegation to Pakistan to restart discussions. On the other side, Tehran casts doubt on its participation, suggesting the absence of a “project” for a new round of negotiations and questioning American “seriousness”. This initial asymmetry is enough to create an atmosphere of uncertainty even before the talks begin.
This pattern of announcements and counter-announcements is not just background noise in diplomacy; it has become one of the central instruments. Each statement aims to produce a strategic effect: reassure its own camp, deter the adversary, test the red lines. But in doing so, it also makes any negotiation more fragile by solidifying public positions.
The issue of the Strait of Hormuz epitomizes this tension. A vital passage for the global economy, it has become a leverage point for mutual pressure. Iran asserts its “strict control” over the passage, while the United States increases its presence in the Gulf of Oman. The two powers face off without direct confrontation, but by multiplying coercive gestures. Each imposes its own blockade, each disputes the other’s. In this context, negotiation is no longer just about avoiding escalation; it becomes an extension of it through other means.
This atmosphere is further complicated by the coexistence of incompatible registers. On one side, announced discussions, dispatched delegations, accepted mediations. On the other, actions that undermine their credibility: seizure of an Iranian cargo by the US Navy, maintaining the blockade. Each concrete gesture weakens the diplomatic discourse that accompanies it.
Pakistan’s role fits precisely into this middle ground. Islamabad is neither a simple indirect mediator nor the framework for a fully embraced dialogue. It becomes a space for possible negotiation, yet politically precarious. Both parties can meet there without fully acknowledging that they are negotiating. This configuration allows for an open channel while limiting the political costs of direct dialogue.
A diplomacy under constant threat
However, this solution remains precarious. It does not resolve the central contradiction: the two adversaries agree to talk, yet act as if they trust each other. This tension is evident in the content of the discussions. On nuclear issues, Washington asserts that Iran should surrender its highly enriched uranium. Tehran vehemently denies it. On the ceasefire, each accuses the other of violations. On Hormuz, the positions remain irreconcilable.
Diplomacy has become a space for narrative confrontation. It is now about not just negotiating terms, but about imposing a certain interpretation of the facts. Each side produces its own version, contradicts the other’s, and seeks to frame the agreement, if it exists, in a particular context.
This dynamic is part of a longer history of ruptures and accumulated distrust. The US withdrawal from the 2015 nuclear agreement profoundly affected Iran’s perception of Western commitment. Meanwhile, the US remains convinced that Tehran is using negotiations to safeguard its strategic maneuvering room. This reciprocal mistrust is not only political; it has become structural.
In these conditions, negotiations no longer rely on a minimum trust assumption but on a logic of mutual constraint. Each party advances seeking to limit the gains of the other while maximizing its own. If an agreement is reached, it will not be the result of reconciliation, but of a temporary balance.
The question then becomes about its viability. Can a relationship where every gesture is perceived as a maneuver, every commitment as reversible, every opening as suspect be stabilized? Experience shows that agreements can be reached in such contexts. However, their durability depends on their ability to survive crises, political changes, and divergent interpretations.
In the case of US-Iran relations, this durability appears uncertain. Diplomacy moves forward, but does so in an environment saturated with threats, contradictory signals, and constant calculations. If peace emerges, it will not be built on trust but on an unstable balance always at risk of tipping.
In other words, the question may no longer be about whether an agreement is possible. It is about determining how long it can hold in a system where distrust is no longer an obstacle to diplomacy but a prerequisite.
