Why the EU broke ties with Russia – and what the cost was
To fully understand Laschet’s criticism, we must take into account the historical context. Following the Russian attack on Ukraine in February 2022, the EU largely froze diplomatic contacts with Russia. This decision was morally justifiable and politically coherent: the EU did not wish to legitimize an aggressor through normal diplomatic relations. However, it had a high strategic cost: Europe effectively withdrew from the conflict.
While Europe was breaking off relations with Moscow, the United States, under the Trump presidency, was developing a new architecture of direct negotiation. Special envoys, such as Steve Witkoff – a real estate developer close to Trump – became key players in Ukrainian diplomacy. European leaders developed positions jointly with Zelensky, which were then transmitted to Moscow by these American negotiators. This system worked like a game of Arabic telephone: a European position formulated in kyiv could arrive in Moscow distorted or weakened. Europe’s influence on the content and direction of the negotiations was structurally limited.
The EU itself has tried to regain its influence. The EU’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs, Kaja Kallas, said in February 2026 that while the United States was not demanding concessions from the Russians, it was up to the Europeans to do so; Moscow and Washington had to understand that Europeans were essential to lasting peace. The President of the Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, has repeatedly stressed that nothing concerning Europe would be decided without her. However, these assurances clashed with reality: the Europeans were initially absent from the crucial direct negotiations between the American and Russian representatives – notably in Geneva in November 2025. They then tried to influence the American framework and to modify the most problematic points, but this is reactive diplomacy, not proactive.
Survey results: What citizens want and what they experience
The shortcomings described now have a considerable impact on public perception. A representative survey carried out by infratest dimap on behalf of the Charlemagne Prize Foundation and presented at the Charlemagne Prize Forum in Aachen on May 13, 2026 reveals a striking gap. While in 2024, 72% of Germans were convinced that the EU offered protection and stability in times of uncertainty, this figure fell to only 48% in 2026. The decline was particularly marked in East Germany: only 38% of Germans Easterners consider the EU as a protective factor, compared to 50% in West Germany.
At the same time, the desire for a strong Europe remains intact: 82% of Germans believe that Germany needs a strong European Union to face major powers like Russia, China and the United States. Laschet commented on this contradiction, saying that citizens want a strong European Union, but apparently do not feel its effects sufficiently on a daily basis and in times of crisis. This tension between desire and reality is politically explosive: it fuels populists and nationalists who claim that Europe is the problem, not the solution.
These data are economically significant. Confidence in European institutions is not just a simple barometer of public opinion; it influences the willingness of citizens to support European projects, to accept transfers and to renounce national competences. If this confidence diminishes, the political basis for further integration becomes fragile. An EU perceived as powerless finds it more difficult to provide the necessary room for maneuver to avoid impotence – a classic vicious circle.
Draghi’s cry of alarm: economic force as the basis of all other power
In this context, the choice of Mario Draghi as winner of the 2026 Charlemagne Prize is far from fortuitous. The management of the Charlemagne Prize deliberately sent a signal, as Laschet himself explained: this distinction signified to the Commission that the pace of the European Union was not that of the world in which Europe had to evolve. In 2024, Draghi published a monumental report on European competitiveness, seen as a wake-up call and a concrete roadmap for reforms. The observation was clear: Europe is lagging behind in many areas, particularly compared to the United States and China; its weaknesses are accentuated.
The management of the Charlemagne Prize shared this observation: the situation was dramatic and Europe risked becoming a pawn in the hands of other powers. In Aachen, Draghi stressed that Europe was currently too dependent on others; one reason was that the European single market was not yet fully operational, with national subsidies undermining equal opportunities. The solution, he asserted, lay in reforms aimed at creating a truly integrated economic area: the more Europe reformed, the less it would have to go into debt.
This economic dimension is crucial. Diplomatic and military power rests sustainably on economic strength. A Europe left behind by the United States and China in the technological race, unable to overcome its energy dependence and whose capital market remains fragmented, will also lose its influence in matters of foreign policy. The Draghi report, which calls for further integration of capital markets, a common industrial policy and investments in key strategic technologies, therefore constitutes not only an economic policy document, but also a geopolitical document. The capacity for economic action is the sine qua non condition for the credibility of foreign policy; without it, European foreign policy remains a moral appeal devoid of any real power.
Merz and the call for Europe as a power
When awarding the Charlemagne Prize, Chancellor Friedrich Merz presented a coherent vision combining economic and security requirements. “Europe aspires to become a power capable of withstanding the storms of this new era,” he declared in Aachen. In particular, he called for an in-depth modernization of the EU budget, focused on military and economic power, a rationalized structure and investments in competitiveness and defense. At the same time, he clearly rejected any new common debt: Germany cannot take this path, if only for constitutional reasons.
Merz thus brought about a paradigm shift in German European policy: from an approach where Germany had to be as reserved as possible and maintain European unity through financial redistribution, to a position where it confidently defined interests Europeans and mobilized the necessary resources to defend them. Europe’s sovereignty, he asserted, could only be guaranteed by a strong economic and security policy, which implied a reorientation of the EU budget. On this point, Merz fully shared Laschet’s call for stronger diplomacy and Wadephul’s reform program aimed at abolishing the principle of unanimity: all three represented an attempt to remedy Europe’s self-imposed impotence.
What is structurally lacking in Europe’s foreign policy
An honest diagnosis must highlight institutional deficiencies. Within the EU, responsibilities for foreign policy are divided between various institutions: the European External Action Service (EEAS), the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, the Council European Union, the European Commission and the Council of the European Union. This fragmentation generates a lack of clarity in the definition of responsibilities, interinstitutional rivalries and incoherent external communication. This is why Wadephul called for a consolidation of responsibilities for foreign policy in Brussels. Furthermore, there is no European Security Council capable of making strategic decisions quickly and in complete confidentiality.
Another structural problem is the EU’s tendency to react rather than anticipate crises. After the 2022 invasion, the EU cut off all contact with Russia without developing an alternative diplomatic strategy. She reacted to the 28-point plan of the United States and Russia instead of setting her own framework. She formulates positions vis-à-vis Zelensky, but lets American negotiators represent them. In all these cases, Europe behaves as a follower, and not as an actor. This is not due to a lack of skills or resources, but rather to an absence of institutional mechanisms allowing rapid strategic and diplomatic action.
Europe’s strategic autonomy – a concept that Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has made a central objective of her mandate – remains an ideal until the necessary structural conditions are met. These include: own military capabilities, capable of operating independently of American infrastructure; rapid decision-making mechanisms in matters of foreign policy; a unified external representation; and the political will to adopt positions, even delicate ones, in the face of one’s rivals.
The crucial question: is Laschet’s criticism justified?
Laschet’s diagnosis is generally correct, but deserves to be qualified. It would be unfair to deprive the EU of any diplomatic initiative. The Commission implemented 20 rounds of sanctions against Russia, which, taking into account the principle of unanimity and the pro-Russian position of some member states, constitutes a considerable political success. Ursula von der Leyen and John Kallas took a clear public position and defined red lines for an acceptable peace. The EU mobilized more than 193 billion euros – a sum that could not have been raised without strong institutional will.
Where Laschet’s criticism proves relevant is on the question of direct diplomacy with Russia. The decision to sever all channels of communication with Moscow may have been morally consistent, but it proved to be strategically shortsighted. Without direct communication channels, the EU cannot directly present its positions, nor send signals, nor explore room for maneuver. It is constantly dependent on intermediaries, whether the United States or other third countries. This is not a sovereign foreign policy, but rather of a dependence born of adherence to principles Kaja Kallas herself seemed to recognize this gap when she declared that if the United States did not demand concessions from Russia, it was up to the Europeans to do so – but without a direct channel of communication, this demand remains. abstract.
Political scientist Johannes Varwick also put forward a disturbing counterargument: European interference in Ukrainian diplomacy could actually prolong the war rather than shorten it. This opinion, although unpopular, is nonetheless significant. She emphasizes that Europe’s problem lies not only in a lack of assertiveness, but also in a lack of clarity about its true aspirations and the compromises it is prepared to make. A diplomatically strong Europe must not only formulate clear demands, but also be capable of negotiating intelligent compromises – which requires a willingness to negotiate hitherto obscured by the demand for full application of European principles.
Three ways to get out of self-exclusion
The analysis reveals three complementary avenues of reform which must be pursued cumulatively, and not alternatively.
The first path consists of institutional reform: abandoning the principle of unanimity in matters of foreign and security policy for the benefit of qualified majorities, consolidating responsibilities in matters of foreign policy and strengthening the Service European Union for External Action so that it becomes an effective entity. This reform is urgent, but politically the most difficult to implement because it requires unanimity to abolish unanimity.
The second path is that of differentiated integration: a core of willing states progresses on questions of foreign policy and security without being held back by obstructionist members. This more pragmatic approach is based on existing conventional frameworks. However, it carries the risk of a permanent division of the EU into an inner circle and an outer circle.
The third path is that of economic strengthening: completion of the single market, deepening of the capital markets union, reduction of national subsidies, joint acquisitions of arms and securing supply chains for strategic raw materials. This path is the most ambitious, but also, in a certain way, the most fundamental: without economic power, European foreign policy remains wishful thinking. The Draghi report offers the most detailed and convincing plan.
Laschet’s expression “self-devaluation” is perhaps the most accurate in the current European debate. It highlights the fact that the weakness of European foreign policy is not the result of chance, nor the result of hostile external powers, but rather the consequence of its own decisions, structures and omissions. Europe has devalued itself – through institutional blockage, the breakdown of diplomatic channels and the priority given to moralizing rather than negotiation. The good news: what is self-inflicted can also be repaired. The bad news: time is running out.
