A necessary change of model
For nearly 30 years, French football has built its economic model around domestic broadcasting rights and a key player, Canal Plus. Clubs have long relied on sufficient funds to sustain themselves without actively seeking to diversify their revenue sources. Gradually, the encrypted channel expressed its desire to “share” the role of the main funder of football. While co-broadcasting the championship with Orange and then beIN SPORTS was accepted, the first strategic error remains the (lost) bet on Mediapro and the COVID crisis.
Abruptly, the decline in domestic rights caused a structural fragility. Clubs without wealthy shareholders are now forced to undergo an economic transformation. The more fortunate or successful ones are transitioning from a “TV-dependence” to a “UEFA-dependence.” This was the case for Stade Brestois last year and will be for RC Lens next season. There is a paradigm shift underway that could significantly transform the economic hierarchy of French football.
The end of the “all eggs in one basket” model
Anticipating theoretical revenues of €1.15 billion for the 2020-2021 season, French clubs purchased and offered significant salaries. However, with less than €500 million from beIN SPORTS, Amazon, or DAZN, there was an urgency to find solutions. This explains the wave of investments, often from abroad, and the development of multiproperty.
“The devil you know is better than the devil you don’t,” this saying should have guided the leaders of our professional football. Instead of improving the DAZN contract (which guaranteed €400 million per year), they decided to turn away from the “Netflix of sports” to launch Ligue 1+. This was the second strategic mistake because owning an OTT platform can be a good idea as a complement. However, for this distribution solution to generate a net income comparable to the €500 million (DAZN + beIN SPORTS), it would need to exceed 3 million subscribers, more than the (historical) multisport channels. Despite a good start, the number of LFP channel subscribers currently hovers around 1.2 million. Net revenues to be shared this season are expected to be around €200 million.
The observation is clear: with 70 million inhabitants, the French market theoretically can support a €1 billion-valued championship, but in a context of rupture with its historical broadcaster, it requires 2 to 3 times less.
Europe becomes the new financial oxygen
In this situation, UEFA competitions have become essential for the financial balance of participating clubs. The 2025/26 journey of our seven representatives already allowed them to recover €310 million. European qualification is no longer just a sporting or image objective: it becomes an economic imperative. These clubs are transitioning from a domestic TV-dependence to a UEFA-dependence. This evolution profoundly changes the strategic priorities of clubs and partly explains the tensions in Lyon, Marseille, or Monaco.
PSG, a symptom more than a problem?
The domination of Paris Saint-Germain often attracts criticism. However, the presence of an ultra-dominant club is not unusual in Europe. In Germany, FC Bayern Munich has overwhelmingly dominated the Bundesliga for over a decade. In Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, 2 or 3 historical giants dominate without experiencing relegation or financial difficulties. So far, France has been an exception. Clubs like Stade de Reims, AS Saint-Etienne, Girondins de Bordeaux, Marseille, or AS Monaco were able to maintain European competitiveness for two decades without relegation or financial struggles.
The true issue in our championship is rather the structural irregularity of PSG’s competitors. Despite having a budget comparable to clubs like Borussia Dortmund, Lyon and Marseille have struggled to maintain sporting competitiveness.
Towards a more sustainable model?
This crisis could accelerate a long-overdue transformation. Ligue 1 is gradually moving closer to Portuguese or Dutch models: increased use of youth training, smart trading, “data scouting,” and importantly, participation in secondary European competitions. While France likely lags 10 to 15 years behind some European neighbors who have restructured their model after similar difficulties.
French football is entering a major economic transition. TV rights will remain inadequate for a while. The economic gap between UEFA-qualified clubs and the others may widen. In this context, the question is not just about the value of Ligue 1 today, but about the economic model it wants to build for tomorrow.
In this context, should a League 3 with 18 other professional clubs be created, or should Ligue 2 expand to 22 or 24 clubs, as in England? To promote training, should reserve teams be allowed to move higher in the divisions, as in Spain? As for domestic TV rights, should there be a free-to-air match every weekend?
