The Houthis, Iran’s spearhead in the war for Yemen

It all begins in northern Yemen, in the mountainous province of Saada, on the border with Saudi Arabia. It was there that Hussein Badr al-Din al-Houthi founded, at the turn of the 2000s, a movement to revive Zaidi Islam, a branch of minority Shiism within Islam, but historically rooted in the Yemeni highlands. The movement, initially cultural and religious, quickly radicalized under the combined effect of the feeling of economic marginalization of the populations of the north and the repression of the Sanaa government. Hussein al-Houthi was killed in 2004 by the forces of President Ali Abdallah Saleh during the first of six wars between the movement and central power between 2004 and 2010. Far from extinguishing the rebellion, his death made him a martyr, and leadership passed to his brother Abdul-Malik al-Houthi, who still leads the movement today.

The real turning point came in 2011, when the Arab Spring destabilized the Saleh regime. The Houthis, renamed Ansarallah, “the Supporters of God”, are taking advantage of the political vacuum to extend their influence well beyond Saada. In 2014, after having concluded an alliance of circumstance as improbable as it was revealing with their former enemy Saleh, they entered Sanaa without real resistance and took control of the capital. President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi fled to Aden, then went into exile in Riyadh. Yemen is falling into a civil war which has still not found a lasting resolution.

Iran, discreet godfather and strategist

The relationship between the Houthis and Tehran is often wrongly presented as that of a simple puppet and its manipulator. The reality is more complex, but Iranian involvement is undeniable and growing. If the origins of the movement are authentically Yemeni, Iran has gradually invested Ansarallah as an essential link in what it itself calls the “Axis of Resistance”, this arc of pro-Iranian forces which extends from Lebanon, with Hezbollah, to Iraq, Syria and Yemen.

Tehran’s support is first manifested by massive arms deliveries, transported clandestinely by sea despite a UN embargo

Ballistic missiles, combat drones, electronic warfare technologies: the Houthi arsenal has become considerably sophisticated over the years, to the point of regularly striking Saudi territory and, since 2023, ships in the Red Sea. Iranian Revolutionary Guards provide military training and transfer of know-how, particularly in the field of Shahed missiles and drones, a Yemeni version of which is now produced locally. Iran also provides financial and diplomatic support, covering the Houthis in international forums.

This alliance responds to a clear geopolitical logic for Tehran: by holding Saudi Arabia in check in Yemen, Iran opens a second front on the southern flank of its regional rival, forces Riyadh to mobilize considerable military and financial resources, and has a permanent lever of pressure on the maritime routes of the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb.

The Arab coalition: the Saudi gear

It was in March 2015 that Saudi Arabia decided to intervene militarily in Yemen, at the head of a coalition of Sunni Arab countries. The operation, called “Decisive Storm” then “Restoring Hope”, is presented by Riyadh as a response to the call from Hadi’s legitimate government and as a strategic necessity: to leave the Houthis alone armed with Iran, settling on its southern border would be unacceptable. The coalition engages in an intensive air campaign, a naval blockade and support for government forces on the ground.

Ten years later, the results of the Saudi intervention are negative. Despite tens of thousands of airstrikes, the Houthis have not been defeated. They still control Sanaa, Al-Hodeida, the country’s main port, and most of Yemen’s north and west. The coalition, however, was held responsible for strikes that caused significant civilian damage, fueling international criticism. In 2019, the Houthis demonstrated their capacity for harm by directly striking the oil installations of Abqaiq and Khurais, in Saudi Arabia, an attack claimed jointly with pro-Iranian Iraqi militias, which shook world markets. Faced with stagnation, Riyadh has engaged in talks with Tehran and indirect discussions with the Houthis since 2023, seeking a way out of the crisis which preserves most of its interests.

The Emirates, a separate strategy

The United Arab Emirates, founding members of the coalition, very early on followed their own logic within the alliance. Less concerned about the land border with Yemen, unlike Riyadh, they focused their efforts on the south of the country and the coasts, areas of strategic importance for their maritime and commercial interests. Abu Dhabi financed, trained and armed the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a separatist movement which aspires to restore the independence of South Yemen, dissolved during the unification of 1990. The area of influence of the STC today constitutes a state within a state, managing its own forces of security and its administrations.

This policy created deep tensions with Hadi’s government supported by Riyadh, with the two allies sometimes finding themselves in direct opposition on the ground.

In 2019, CTS forces and government troops clashed in Aden. The UAE has gradually reduced its direct military presence from 2019, while maintaining its influence through the STC and securing strategic footholds on the Yemeni coast and in the Gulf of Aden, as part of a broader vision of controlling maritime routes from the Indian Ocean.

The Red Sea, a new theater of global war

Since October 2023 and the outbreak of war in Gaza, the Houthis have opened a spectacular new front by attacking commercial ships in the Red Sea, in the name of solidarity with the Palestinians. The movement has claimed dozens of attacks against container ships, oil tankers and military ships, using ballistic missiles, cruise missiles and maritime or aerial drones. The Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, through which approximately 15% of global maritime trade and 8% of oil transported by sea pass, has become a danger zone.

The economic consequences were immediate: most major shipowners diverted their ships via the Cape of Good Hope, lengthening the routes by ten to fourteen days and considerably increasing freight costs. The US and UK responded by launching Operation Prosperity Guardian, then striking Houthi military infrastructure in Yemen. These strikes, although they degraded certain capabilities, did not put an end to the attacks. Under the Trump presidency, American bombings took on a new scale in the spring of 2025, targeting Houthi positions in depth, without decisive results on the operational capacity of the movement.

The Houthis have thus succeeded, at the cost of an asymmetrical strategy and assumed risk-taking, in projecting themselves onto the world stage and influencing the international economy from one of the poorest countries on the planet. This demonstration of force, which serves Iranian interests as much as their own internal legitimacy, illustrates the transformation of Ansarallah: from a tribal rebellion in the mountains of north Yemen into a non-state armed actor capable of disrupting regional and global balances.