Large technology companies today exert considerable influence on the global order. Their disproportionate power, in the economic, political, informational and cultural domains, shapes societies and the lives of individuals. Eminent researchers and political analysts have described these technological giants as “new rulers”, exercising unprecedented forms of sovereignty in a world which is no longer unipolar, nor bipolar, nor multipolar, but “technopolar”.
Technology companies pursue their own goals, aiming to maximize profits for the benefit of shareholders, but they have also become key players for governments seeking to stimulate growth and protect their geopolitical interests. As growth depends more and more on technical innovations and these companies provide fundamental technologies for the economic and national security of states, governments are reluctant to limit their power and reassert their control over the digital economy.
The central role of modern technologies in competition between great powers fuels an ever more intense rivalry, of which Artificial Intelligence (AI) constitutes the main battlefield. The Brookings Institution declared in 2020 that “whoever dominates Artificial Intelligence in 2030 would rule the world until 2100”. With this vision widely shared by technology companies and governments, AI has become the outpost of the escalating trade and technology wars between the United States and China. These wars have global repercussions, fueling techno-protectionism and economic nationalism. […]
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ARTICLE OUTLINE
- Excessive power
- The role of states in technology governance
- Qui mène la course à l’IA ?
- The world between cooperation and conflicts
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Anu Bradford is professor of law and international organizations at Columbia Law School. She is the author of The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World et Digital Empires: The Global Battle to Regulate Technologyboth published by Oxford University Press in 2020 and 2023.
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Article published in Foreign policyvol. 91, No. 2, 2026.
