The contemporary history of the Arab world is punctuated by failed attempts at political unity, driven by the great ideologies of the 20th century. Nasserian pan-Arabism, embodied by the United Arab Republic (1958–1961), encountered the ravages of a pure and simple annexation of Syria by Egypt; Baathism in its Syrian and Iraqi version failed to overcome the logic of the States competing security concerns. The federal projects initiated by Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi – from Egypt to Tunisia via Sudan, Syria and Chad – have dissolved into ideological words and the absence of institutional compromise, contrary to these failures. The United Arab Emirates constitute the only sustainable and functional model of Arab federalism.
We are in 1968, London announces the end of its military commitments “East of the Suez Canal” by the end of 1971, thus putting an end to a century and a half of protectorate within the Truce Coast, a nerve point to be secured on the route to India. Faced with this security vacuum, the Emir of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahyan (1918-2004), in power for two years, sought a viable formula to compensate for the risk of absorption by Iran or Saudi Arabia. To do this, he entered into an agreement with the Emir of Dubai, Sheikh Rashid bin Saeed Al Maktoum (1912-1990), in power since 1958, a founding compromise based on complementarity. The idea is to build a union “by consent” with Abu Dhabi, where oil was discovered in 1958, as a political and financial pillar, and Dubai as a commercial partner. Initially, discussions focused on a federation including the Trucial States with Bahrain and Qatar, which chose to declare their independence in August and September 1971. The legal break with London was recorded on December 1, 1971 and the following day, the six emirates (Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Quwain and Fujairah) gathered in Dubai sign a provisional Constitution and proclaim the federal state. Zayed is elected president of the federation and Rashid, vice-president. A strong sign, the Emirates are not disappearing, they retain a strong autonomy, while structures are being put in place at the federal level (presidency, council of leaders, ministries). Compromise trumped absorption. Located on the northeastern tip of the Arabian Peninsula, Ras al-Khaimah joined them on February 10, 1972, becoming the seventh emirate of the federation.
Fédération sans fusion
Zayed’s bet proved to be a winner, because he succeeded in proposing a contractual federation without merger, a federation compatible with dynastic sovereignties and the reality of local interests, at the precise moment when the British withdrawal made the union necessary. The sovereignty of the Emirates is maintained internally. Abu Dhabi refuses to transform the federation into a centralizing nation-state and, above all, begins a pragmatic distribution of roles. The locomotive of the UAE and guardian of revenues, Abu Dhabi concentrates political and military power. The emirate is the richest in oil and gas, respectively 95% and 92%, its sovereign funds, its state apparatus make it the strategic and energy heart of the country.
In 2008, the excessive debt of Dubai, the commercial and financial heart, pushed the spendthrift emirate to ask big brother Abu Dhabi to replenish its coffers in exchange for maintaining the status quo
Dubai distinguished itself very early, and even before oil, by the vision of its emirs. After the collapse of the pearl trade, dethroned by Japan which invented the cultured pearl, room was made for that of gold by clandestinely re-exporting it to India. Today, Dubai, with its free zones, its international airport, its Emirates airline founded in 1993, its tourism, its services, is the commercial and financial heart of the federation, a major node in global commercial connectivity.
Complementary, the other five emirates are more modest and less endowed with hydrocarbons, hence their structuring around niches.
Thalassocracy and flow control
A true logistics thalassocracy, the UAE transforms the control of flows into a lever of power: hub ports (Jebel Ali, Khalifa Port), free zones and multimodal platforms structure corridors linking the Gulf – Red Sea – Indian Ocean. In this model, the port is not only an infrastructure, but a political instrument: it captures value chains, attracts maritime lines, and gives the State a capacity for negotiation and projection (access, standards, dependencies). The figures give the measure: the Jebel Ali port alone handled 15.5 million TEUs in 2024, while DP World announces 88.3 million TEUs across its entire global network in 2024 – proof that the UAE port power goes well beyond the national framework. On the Abu Dhabi side, Khalifa Port is part of in an increase in capacity (the AD Ports group mentions 11.8 million TEU of annual capacity in total, including 9.6 million for Khalifa. This logistical domination is finally linked to a strategy of securing the roads (straits, Red Sea, Indian Ocean): when tensions disrupt Bab el-Mandeb and the sea). Red, the advantage goes to states capable of absorbing, rerouting and protecting flows. And the UAE is backed by a record foreign trade economy, with AED 3,000 billion in non-oil trade in 2024.
Gold and trading constitute a central strategic lever in the United Arab Emirates, at the heart of an economy of flows and intermediation. In the first half of 2024, non-oil exports will reach around AED 249 billion (€57.3 billion), of which almost 48% comes from gold, confirming the structuring role of the precious metal in the trade balance. Added to this are massive re-exports – approximately AED 302 billion (€69.5 billion) over the same period – which illustrate the UAE’s function as a hub. The originality of the model lies in the control of the entire chain: import of raw gold (Africa, Asia), refining and transformation, financing and insurance, then re-export to India, China or Europe. Far from a simple trade, gold thus becomes an instrument of economic, financial and geopolitical power. reinforcing the centrality of the UAE in global trading circuits.
Africa as strategic depth
For the United Arab Emirates, Africa is not a simple zone of economic expansion, but a real strategic depth, at the crossroads of logistics, resources and security of flows. By establishing a foothold in key ports and multimodal corridors, Abu Dhabi and Dubai lock down vital routes linking the Gulf to the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, while ensuring privileged access to African and Asian markets. Through DP World, the UAE controls or operates key port platforms, such as Berbera in Somaliland (30-year concession since 2016), Maputo in Mozambique – gateway to the corridors of southern Africa whose concession has been extended until 2058 – or even Dakar-Ndayane in Senegal, set to become one of the major hubs in West Africa. Added to these positions are those of AD Ports Group, notably on the Egyptian coast of the Red Sea with Safaga, where a long-term concession and an investment program of 200 million dollars strengthen the UAE’s capacity to absorb, secure and reroute flows in times of maritime crisis.
This logistical influence is closely linked to a strategy on critical resources and transition metals, based less on raw extraction than on the control of value chains. The example of the UAE company International Resources Holding (IRH) is emblematic: in Zambia, it took 51% of Mopani Copper Mines for a commitment of around $1.1 billion, thus securing direct access to copper. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, IRH owns 56% of Alphamin, operator of the Bisie tin mine, a strategic mineral for global electronics.
Finally, this African projection responds to an equally strategic constraint: food security. Structurally dependent on imports, the UAE has chosen to outsource part of its agricultural production to areas with high land potential. Groups like Al Dahra exemplify this strategy in Egypt, where they farm around 22,000 acres of land in the East Owaynat and Toshka regions.
An enclave liberalism
In the Emirates, the social contract is based on promises of enrichment and social elevation. The state guarantees absolute security in exchange for political loyalty and respect for common rules. It guarantees its nationals a high level of material well-being and protection via public and parapublic jobs, massive social transfers and priority access to public services while the majority of expatriates are subject to another regime.
Emirati liberalism translates into openness to capital and talents from around the world thanks to low taxes, a business-friendly philosophy, and quality infrastructure.
Thanks also to a pragmatic religious tolerance, as evidenced by the freedom of worship guaranteed to Christians and Jews in Abu Dhabi and Dubai… far, even very far, from the situation encountered by expatriates in Saudi Arabia and Qatar, where Wahhabi ideology regulates the daily life. It is also the free zones of Dubai and Abu Dhabi which constitute a central pillar of the Emirati economic model. The Emirates have reinvented the concept of trading posts, making their territories places of production and exchange.
Abu Dhabi, the Sparta of the Arabian Gulf
So, how has the UAE transformed minimalist federalism into an instrument of global power, and what are the structural limits – demographic, regional and environmental – of this model of expansion? This institutional choice – often under-analyzed – constitutes the silent foundation of Emirati success. It allowed a group of long-poor emirates, living off fishing, coastal trade and pearling, to project themselves in a few decades to the top of the regional and global economic hierarchy. And thus go from rags to millions. But this success is neither linear nor free of contradictions. UAE power today rests on four levers. First, a commercial thalassocracy, through its ports, its roads and its hubs. Then, an economy of intermediation thanks to the gold trade, re-exports, finance, targeted security projection (notably in Africa and Yemen) and, finally, multi-aligned diplomacy.
A platform state, the United Arab Emirates benefits from the visionary policy of the sheikhs of Abu Dhabi and Dubai, a mixture of project-based governance, flexible commercial law, advantageous taxation and the capacity to rapidly adapt to globalization. A micro-state that has become a macro-actor, the federation acts as a global trade hub coupled with a thalassocracy that now has a real capacity for projection despite the more than modest size of its indigenous population. But the federation is nevertheless constrained by an extremely unbalanced demographics, a structural dependence on human, food and energy flows and an unstable regional environment, marked by growing rivalry with Saudi Arabia, particularly in Yemen.
Military power and diplomacy: a projection without imperialism
The United Arab Emirates have chosen a selective military power, based not on mass, but on technology, interoperability and informational control. Their army, small in size (between 65,000 and 70,000 soldiers), favors drones, ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance) capabilities, cyber and special forces, which allows them rapid, targeted and politically controlled interventions.
This efficiency is based on close integration with Western partners, in particular the United States and France, both in terms of equipment and doctrines.
This military posture is inseparable from a multi-aligned, pragmatic and uninhibited diplomacy, which allows Abu Dhabi to dialogue simultaneously with Washington, Moscow, Beijing, Tehran or Tel Aviv. Normalization agreements, regional mediations and the controlled use of soft power reflect a rare capacity to transform military power into diplomatic capital, without falling into a classic imperial logic.
External and environmental limits of a power model
Despite its success, the UAE model remains exposed to strong structural constraints. The regional environment is unstable: tensions around strategic straits, persistent insecurity in the Red Sea, rivalry with Iran, war in Yemen. So many factors that weaken a state that is deeply dependent on maritime, energy and commercial flows. Added to this is acute water and climatic stress: the desalination of water, vital for the survival of the country, represents a high energy cost and a major strategic vulnerability in the event of conflict or sabotage. So the UAE is investing in redundancy (multiple factories) and especially in strategic reserves of several weeks rather than counting on a hypothetical autonomy of each factory.
Finally, the energy transition opens up an ambivalent opportunity. The UAE is investing heavily in renewable energy and civil nuclear power, seeking to position itself in the post-carbon world; but this transition also calls into question the foundations of a model built on fossil fuel rents and global flows. Emirati power thus appears to be efficient, but conditional, capable of anticipation and adaptation, but structurally dependent on regional stability and the global maritime order.
A very low demographic
These are undoubtedly the best kept figures: out of a total population estimated in 2024 at 11.3 million inhabitants, the proportion of Emirati nationals would oscillate between 10 and 12%. Some informed observers put forward a figure below the symbolic threshold of one million. A study showed that around 50% of marriages in the UAE population are consanguineous in the current generation, compared to 39% in the previous generation, which is not without generating serious consequences in terms of public health policy. Added to this is a low birth rate. Fertility fluctuates between 1.4 and 1.6 children per woman, reinforcing the vulnerability of a population very dependent on labor immigration.
For the moment, the building is holding, but a negative balance and the non-renewal of generations are not without consequences on the development strategy of the Emirati army. In the future, this means that if the senior officers remain, for reasons of political and tribal loyalty, mainly composed of nationals, it will not be the same for the non-commissioned officers, recruited from non-nationals on a contractual basis.
