The verdict on operations RL and EF therefore remains suspended. Of the five declared objectives, regime change (regime change) failed ; the dismantling of the nuclear program and that of ballistic capabilities constitute partial successes, the question of the 440 kilograms (kg) of highly enriched uranium still buried under Isphan remaining unresolved; the destruction of the Iranian navy has been substantially achieved; the dismantling of the regional network of Iranian relays failed, with Hezbollah, the Houthis and the Iraqi militias remaining active after the ceasefire. The reopening of the Strait of Hormuz, an objective added out of necessity, was not achieved, with the barrel remaining well above 100 dollars ($) one month after the ceasefire, compared to $70 before the war.
The implications for European air forces are direct and in no way based on the relevance of the Iranian theater to European interests. They arise from the transposition of the parameters of RL and EF to the hypothesis of high intensity against Russia, in a context where American strategic depth can no longer be taken for granted.
Three hard points stand out:
- L’inadéquation des capacités SEAD européennes and ammunition stocks in the face of a much more powerful Russian IADS;
- The difference of one to two orders of magnitude between European inventories and the volumes consumed in 40 days of RL and EF;
- The obsolescence of a model centered on a narrow core of advanced platforms, which must give way to a complete capability assembly – stand-off and stand-in effectors, multi-layer air defense, persistent ISR and industrial base sized to replenish stocks at the rate of their consumption.
No European air force has one today; no European coalition has the cumulative amount either. The cost of this reconstruction will be considerable. The cost of approaching the next decade with an air model calibrated for the expeditionary operations of the 1990s would, in light of RL and EF, be even higher.


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