The two previous RevCons in 2015 and 2022 had ended without a consensus document. Current geopolitical tensions, including the ongoing war in Ukraine, the United States and Israel’s war against Iran, and the growth of nuclear arsenals worldwide, suggest a new impasse, or at least a public exposure to the inability of the parties to the Treaty to agree on the need to uphold its three main pillars: nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy.
Failure of nuclear disarmament For the past decade, the number of nuclear weapons in the world has been increasing, reversing the trend since the end of the Cold War. China increased from about 250 nuclear warheads in 2020 to over 600 in 2026. Russia and the United States, previously bound by the New START treaty, which expired in February 2026, could also increase their arsenals in the medium term, while the UK announced a decision to raise its threshold to 260 warheads as of 2021. Similarly, France has chosen to increase its stockpile, citing progress in adversaries’ missile defenses, while deciding not to disclose its size, estimated at around 290 warheads in 2026.
States possessing nuclear weapons (NP) reiterated in their preparatory documents for RevCon their goal of verifiable nuclear disarmament, provided that their own security is not affected, seeking to remain in line with the spirit of Article VI of the NPT, which commits NPT states to “good faith disarmament.” In his speech on March 2, 2026, the French president emphasized that the increase in the French nuclear arsenal was not an arms race and would remain strictly proportional. However, it is unclear if this argument is heard by some non-nuclear states (NNWS), who are critical of the NWS’ disrespect for the Treaty, and more broadly of these states’ “irresponsible” behavior. The aggressive nuclear rhetoric used by Russia towards Ukraine and NATO is a prime example, as well as Donald Trump’s statements about a possible resumption of nuclear tests in the United States, and his refusal to engage in discussions with Russia for the renewal of New START.
Furthermore, American behavior could change Moscow’s image compared to the 2022 RevCon, where Russia was widely criticized for its invasion of Ukraine. In parallel, China will continue to uphold its doctrine of no-first-use as a response to the increase in its arsenal, aiming to position itself as a responsible nuclear state.
Increased risk of nuclear proliferation While no NNWS have acquired nuclear weapons since North Korea in 2003, the international context seems conducive to proliferation. Despite several negotiation cycles since the 2022 RevCon, no agreement has been reached to date to constrain the Iranian nuclear program. The two wars waged by the United States and Israel in June 2025 and spring 2026 faced with stalled discussions, could ultimately have a counterproductive effect. Urgent nuclear security concerns arise, such as IAEA access to bombed sites and the future of fissile material produced in Iran in recent years. In addition, in light of the failures of its conventional deterrence strategy, Iran may be inclined towards crossing the nuclear threshold. Lastly, American actions reinforce Russia’s narrative of “double standards,” accusing Washington of violating international law without real nuclear proliferation threats in Iran, further weakening NWS unity.
Perception of nuclear weapons as the ultimate security guarantee also fuels the debate on “allied proliferation” in response to the Russian, Chinese, and North Korean threats, alongside diminishing credibility of American extended deterrence. Voices in South Korea or Poland are increasingly advocating for the development of a national nuclear arsenal. While some American officials have supported such proliferation among allied countries in the past for strategic reasons, the challenges of discouraging an NATO member or US partner from crossing the nuclear threshold are significant.
New challenges in civilian nuclear energy The third pillar of the NPT, providing NNWS with access to civilian nuclear energy, faces numerous challenges. The sharing of nuclear propulsion technology from NWS to NNWS could resurface due to the agreement, currently vague, between the US and South Korea to help Seoul build nuclear-powered submarines. Although the NPT does not formally prohibit this practice, as long as it is supervised by the IAEA, China may seek to reopen this debate given their critical view of such developments by US allies.
Moreover, the development of new nuclear reactor technologies such as small modular reactors, along with safety, security, and non-proliferation concerns, pose new challenges for the IAEA and the third pillar of the NPT. If such reactors were to be used in military bases, as envisioned by Russia and the United States, it would prompt discussions on characterizing such infrastructures, akin to discussions on targeting nuclear facilities in Ukraine by Moscow. Furthermore, NWS have often been slow to provide assistance for the development of civilian nuclear energy in so-called “global South” states, fueling a sense of nuclear “injustice” fueled by perceptions of irresponsible nuclear behavior by NWS.
The quest for common ground This review conference promises to be highly politicized, especially among NWS, whose P5 format (France, China, United States, United States, United States, United Kingdom, and Russia) is supposed to drive the NPT. Strategic risk reduction, once a point of convergence among NWS, is threatened by strategic competition: while some measures between the US and Russia remain in place, it appears challenging to translate them to the P5 level. NGOs’ objectives for the RevCon, such as adopting a NWS declaration on refusing to integrate artificial intelligence into nuclear weapons command and control systems or discussing arsenal failsafe protocols, are unlikely to succeed due to tensions among NWS. Even the repetition of a joint declaration against nuclear war, as in January 2022, seems unattainable.
Nevertheless, the likely absence of a consensus document at the end of this RevCon does not mean a definitive failure of the NPT and loss of its value. The normative weight of the treaty, along with the mobilization of NGOs and NNWS, enables it to retain an undeniable role in the fight against nuclear proliferation—as evidenced by the absence of proliferation since 2003—and to provide a framework for discussion accepted by all. It is essential to combat excessive politicization and find common ground while openly criticizing the irresponsible nuclear behaviors of certain states, allies, or adversaries.
