Mali seems to be entering a new phase of turmoil. On Saturday, unprecedented coordinated attacks hit several strategic positions of the regime in Bamako, Kati, and other cities in the country. These operations were carried out by the Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), affiliated with Al-Qaeda, and by the Azawad Liberation Front (FLA), a coalition of primarily Tuareg armed groups. A fragile calm seemed to return to Bamako and Kati on Monday, but the situation remains tense after the announcement of the death of General Sadio Camara, the Malian Minister of Defense, who was killed on Saturday in an attack on his residence in Kati, as reported by France 24.
The official toll remains unclear. Malian authorities reported 16 injuries, both civilian and military, as well as “limited material damage.” However, the intensity of the fighting raises concerns about a higher toll. Gunfire was also reported on Monday in Douentza, between Mopti and Gao, leading to the displacement of around sixty civilians, according to France 24. In the north, the setback is even more symbolic for the regime: Kidal is now under the control of Tuareg rebels and jihadist groups. The Russian soldiers of the Africa Corps, a paramilitary organization controlled by Moscow, have withdrawn after an “agreement” announced by the rebels. The national flag has reportedly been removed, and civilian authorities have left the city.
The limited response of the junta following these attacks continues to cause concern. The head of the regime, Assimi Goïta, has remained invisible and silent since Saturday, after being secured. Prime Minister Abdoulaye Maïga addressed the press on Monday, April 27. He paid tribute to Sadio Camara and attempted to reassure the population, without providing further explanation for the junta leader’s silence.
An alliance of circumstance against Bamako
The alliance between JNIM and FLA recalls 2012, when jihadists and Tuareg independence fighters together took control of northern Mali before being repelled by the French military intervention. However, the two groups differ significantly. JNIM, led by Iyad Ag Ghali, a former Tuareg independence fighter, advocates for the implementation of Sharia in Mali, as well as in Niger and Burkina Faso. FLA, on the other hand, claims independence for Azawad on behalf of Tuareg movements that have long denounced their marginalization. Their common ground lies elsewhere: hostility towards Assimi Goïta’s junta and its Russian allies.
This cooperation remains fragile but has taken on a concrete form. Agreements reached over a year ago reportedly enabled exchanges of expertise in explosives, heavy weapons, logistics, and mobility. The simultaneity of the attacks demonstrates an unprecedented level of coordination. According to France 24, the objective was not necessarily to immediately overthrow Bamako, but rather to disperse Malian forces, to fix them in the capital and in the central region of the country in order to regain the initiative in the North.
Cooperation with Russia put to the test
Since the coups d’état in 2020 and 2021, Mali has distanced itself from France and moved closer to Russia, initially through Wagner, then through Africa Corps, under the direct control of the Russian Ministry of Defense. This support had allowed the Malian army to retake several strongholds in the North, including Kidal, Ber, and Anéfis. However, the latest attacks also highlight the limitations of this strategy. The estimated 1,000 to 2,000 Russian mercenaries cannot replace the forces once deployed by MINUSMA and France, which at the peak of international presence represented up to 15,000 to 17,000 soldiers.
