Who pays, who decides, who protects?
When the security of Europe still largely depends on Washington, a simple question arises: how long can this model hold? This is the central issue of the debate surrounding a more integrated European defense, designed to act more quickly and be less dependent on the United States.
The subject is not new. But it has taken on a new dimension since the return of high-intensity warfare to the continent, the pressure on military budgets, and doubts about the long-term reliability of the American umbrella. Brussels has outlined a more precise framework with the European defense industrial strategy, followed by a roadmap towards 2030 that sets concrete steps on ammunition, drones, air defense, and joint procurement.
An Europe of 27, but not only
The heart of the debate is this: should we move forward with all 27 members, or build a core group of willing countries? The European Union, in its conclusions of March 6, 2025, chose to strengthen its defense sovereignty “in full coherence with NATO”, with a priority list of weapons and capabilities: air defense and anti-missile systems, artillery, missiles, drones, cybersecurity, electronic warfare, military mobility.
On the other hand, France has long defended a more flexible approach: bilateral and plurilateral cooperation among “willing and capable” states, within the Union as well as outside. This approach allows for faster progress without waiting for the agreement of all member states. However, it also poses a clear risk: a two-speed Europe in defense, where smaller states remain on the sidelines of major decisions.
What a core group would change
The concept of a Europe of 6 or 8 is not just a slogan. In practice, it aims to concentrate efforts on a few prepared states to invest together in future technologies and urgent military capabilities. Brussels is already moving in this direction with “capability coalitions” and a goal of 40% common procurement by the end of 2027. The logic is simple: buying separately costs more, extends timelines, and divides European armies.
This approach can benefit the strongest industrial players, ensuring volumes, visibility for factories, and accelerating projects. It can also assist exposed armies on the eastern flank, requiring rapid deliveries in the face of the Russian threat. The Franco-Polish declaration of April 20, 2026, emphasizes strengthening the European pillar of NATO, air defense, space, communications, and anti-drone systems.
The real issue: money, deadlines, and dependence
The debate is not just about institutional architecture, but about means. The European timeline is tight. The Commission aims to launch projects in the first half of 2026, secure funding, and achieve operational capabilities on multiple fronts between late 2026 and 2030. In other words, Europe does not have ten years ahead. It must produce more, faster, and closer to the front.
At this point, dependence on the United States becomes a concrete political issue. Many European armies still rely on equipment, software, ammunition, or logistical chains closely tied to the American market. As long as this dependency exists, European autonomy remains incomplete, regardless of changes in the White House. This is precisely summarized by several European leaders: building own capabilities is crucial as a step forward is no longer guaranteed.
Between political unity and targeted coalitions
The friction point is known. On one hand, the Union wants to keep the 27 for economic, budgetary, and industrial matters. On the other hand, several capitals push for smaller formats for defense, space, digital, or artificial intelligence. This combination is not contradictory per se. It rather illustrates a pragmatic Europe, advancing in concentric circles when unanimity slows down everything.
Supporters of a core group see it as the only way to fill timely capacity gaps. Critics fear a fragmented Union among decision-makers, financiers, and executors. Between these two visions, European institutions have already decided on one point: defense can no longer wait. The 2030 roadmap, industrial programs, and common projects show that the urgency is now acknowledged at the European level.
What to watch out for
The coming weeks will determine whether European defense remains a political horizon or becomes a concrete mechanism. It will be crucial to monitor the establishment of capability coalitions, the initial project launches in 2026, decisions on funding, and the capacity of major states to lead others without fracturing the Union. If a core group emerges, it will quickly affect budgets, industries, and power dynamics within the EU.
