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There is no official ideology in post-Soviet Russia – Article 13 of the Constitution even expressly prohibits it. However, a collective “Putinism” has been constituted in layers since the arrival of Vladimir Putin in the Kremlin: sovereignty, sovereign democracy, greatness, Russianness, conservatism, Eurasianism, Russian world, Byzantium, memory of the Great Patriotic War.
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This doctrinal syncretism crystallized from 2010, in a context of demonstrations against the Duma, Franco-British intervention in Libya and the execution of Gaddafi: Russia then left the posture of the imitating student to don the “manly toga” of the master.
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Marlène Laruelle describes a state that is increasingly authoritarian but not totalitarian, where the nation has replaced ideology as the main cement – and where the formula “everything that does not contradict me is with me” has succeeded the old “those who are not with me are against me “.
About Marlène Laruelle, The political ideas of Putin’s RussiaPUF, 2026.
For around twenty years, Marlène Laruelle has been working on the doctrinal dynamics at work in Russia, Europe and the United States. In this latest work, she analyzes in depth, in clear language devoid of any pedantry, the ideological reorganization which has continued to take place. develop in Russia from 1991 to today.
There is no official ideology in post-Soviet Russia
This is moreover a reaction to the ideology of the Soviet Union, which was an ideocracy, that is to say a social and political formation based on a set of dogmas and immutable and teleological principles – because it led mechanically towards a radiant future: real socialism, then the communism Today, article 13 of the constitutional text prohibits such errors.
But little by little, a few months after Putin’s arrival in the Kremlin, a doctrinal syncretism was constituted by successive layers, more in reaction to the strategic environment and the evolution of the balance of power than as an ideological design fixed in advance. The originality of Vladimir Putin and his inner circle lies in the creation of a collective “Putinism”, based on sovereignty, sovereign democracy, the aura of the Kremlin, the greatness of Russia, Russianness, conservatism, traditional values, Eurasianism – of which Alexander Dugin is became the high priest –, the Russian world, Russkyi Mirwhich has a dedicated foundation; Byzantium; the memory of the Great Patriotic War, which must permeate every corner of the collective consciousness.
The author subjects all these elements to intelligent criticism. They form what we can call a state-civilization. It is not a purely political, religious or cultural concept; it is a major geopolitical lever that the regime can use at any time and anywhere. He first brandishes it in front of the “collective West”, proclaiming itself as the true West, that of promises that are not depraved and not subject to woke or LGBT ideologies. This also allows Moscow to rally the global South to its banner, by denouncing the imperialism of the former colonial powers. Thus, the repertoire of traditional values, on which the master of the Kremlin constantly insists, is found within two discursive lines. We have just seen that an aspect of the Russian state constitutes a phenomenon of soft power with regard to the South.
It was from 2010 that this new national ideology was formalized, that is to say before the return of Vladimir Putin to the Kremlin, after the interim of Dmitri Medvedev (2008-2012). Pivotal period, with the massive demonstrations of December 2011 against the manipulated elections in the Duma, the Franco-British intervention in Libya and the execution of Gaddafi. Russia has shed its student’s, imitator’s apron, to put on the virile master’s toga which, according to many observers, belongs to its DNA.
Also read: Alexandre Duguine or the architecture of a recomposed thought
An amalgam that is not without tensions
Such an amalgamation of notions accumulated over the years is certainly not without tension.
Between Eurasianism and the Russian world, first of all. Because if the first notion emphasizes diversity, the second appears ethnocentric. The debate is not limited to theory; it concerns the increasingly assertive rejection of Central Asian immigration (certain fringes of which are Islamist), and the increasingly acute competition which is developing in Central Asia, where China and Turkey compete with Russia. We also note a contradiction between the desire to appear as authentic Europe and the fact of representing a separate civilization. An old debate which continues to resurface between Slavophiles and Westerners.
Another growing tension concerns the desired objective, namely a multipolar world, and the desire to preserve the bipolar structure of the world – that of the Cold War. But this time, it is no longer the United States/USSR pair that takes center stage, but China plus Russia (the “unfailing friendship”) against the United States, with Europe seeing itself relegated to the backstage The last tension, perhaps the deepest – in any case the one which will determine the future of the. Putin’s regime – is that which opposes the Soviet golden age, that of the end of the 1970s, of the dying Brezhnevism of cacochymous old men, and the future of Russia, from which, with the enormous drain of the current war economy, we hardly see emerging the contours.
Also read: Russia: Slavophilism and Eurasianism in the 19th centurye century
Caractériser la nature précise du régime
It remains difficult to characterize the precise nature of Russia’s political regime. Is he imperialist in the traditional sense of the term? Because, in the eyes of Russia, it is not a question of conquering new territories, but of reconstituting what historical Russia was, when Great Russia, Little Russia (Ukraine) and White Russia (Belarus) formed an organic whole. An idea defended, among others, by Alexander Solzhenitsyn since 1991. Is it nationalist? Perhaps, under the guise of religious and ethnic plurality, it is the Russian element and Orthodoxy that are.
Russia, argues Marlène Laruelle, is an increasingly authoritarian, but not totalitarian, regime. But the developments of recent months increasingly accentuate its nationalist nature. At the start of the war, the authorities were content to require the consent of the population; today he is gradually demanding her active support. The author describes this national-conservative movement as representing a stable proportion of the population, between 58% and 73%, leaving only 10% to 15% to the extremes. The latter are made up of ultranationalists, xenophobes and anti-Semites, while the liberals – those who have not left the country – can do nothing but hole up, hoping for better days.
At the time of the Soviet Union, it was said:
“Those who are not with me are against me.”
Today, we say instead:
“Everything that does not contradict me is with me.”
Also read: Is Russia expansionist?
A Russia bruised by the collapse of the USSR
Russia was and remains devastated by the collapse of the USSR. Vladimir Putin has several times described this phenomenon as “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20the siècle».
What will the future hold, asks Marlène Laruelle? The time when Russian society will reflect on the guilt of the war in Ukraine is still far from having come. What is certain is that Russia was constantly tempted to move from the position of the periphery of the Western world to that of the new center: that of the “true” Europe, of the true faith of Byzantine origin, of Eurasia with which it shares a community of destiny. That of the Russian world. That of the anticolonial pole in a multipolar world.
Unlike many other countries – but can we compare them (United States, European countries, Russia)? – this one really needs an ideology, because its regime cannot rely only on a material or repressive mechanism. But this composite ideology certainly constitutes an important element of the regime; it nevertheless occupies a secondary place. The implicit social contract between state and society is constantly renegotiated. The main thing is to “make a nation”. This is not a simple instrument for maintaining the political status quo.
Forming a nation was initially based on the combination of the notions of eternal Russia, its Orthodox faith, its power, its state. Over the years, this ideology has concentrated, solidified, it has become dominant, repressive. In this sense, Russia appears as a magnifying mirror of the contradictions of the contemporary world.
