Israel – Lebanon: towards a historic rapprochement? – Jean-Jaurès Foundation

How can we understand the issues at stake in the war between Israel and Hezbollah? Orna Mizrahi, researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) in Tel Aviv and former deputy advisor for foreign policy at the Israeli National Security Council, with recognized expertise on Lebanon, Hezbollah and security issues regional, deciphers for the Foundation this conflict, its repercussions on Lebanon, Israeli strategy and the evolution of the situation on the northern front.

Orna Mizrahi is a researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) in Tel Aviv, which she joined in 2018 after a long career in the Israeli security apparatus. A lieutenant colonel in the reserve, she served twenty-six years in the Israel Defense Forces, first as an analyst in the Military Intelligence Research Division (1979-1991; 2000-2003), then as a senior officer in the Strategic Planning Division (1991-2000). She then held several positions at the National Security Council in the Prime Minister’s Office, including that of deputy advisor for foreign policy (2015-2018). Holder of a master’s degree in Middle Eastern history from Tel Aviv University, her research areas include Israeli national security policy, political-military strategic planning, Lebanon, Hezbollah and regional dynamics. She is also active within the Dvorah Forum, which promotes the participation of women in political and security institutions.
She is questioned by Rachel Nakacheproject manager at the Jean Jaurès Foundation.

Rachel Nakache : On October 8, 2023, Hezbollah opened a second front against Israel in support of Hamas. In March 2026, the Shiite movement relaunched hostilities following the escalation of the Israeli-Iranian conflict. A few months later, on June 7, 2026, Iran directly struck Israel after attacks targeting Hezbollah in Lebanon. To what extent does this succession of events reveal a transformation in relations between Iran and its main regional relay, Lebanese Hezbollah?

Orna Mizrahi : One of the major changes in Hezbollah’s positioning after the severe blows it suffered from the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) during the war in support of Hamas (2023–2024) was the significant increase in Iran’s involvement in Lebanon and its influence over the Hezbollah. These events have significantly weakened its military capabilities, eliminated its veteran leadership and eroded its internal position in Lebanon.

This change was also made possible by the absence of Nasrallah, who was a charismatic and esteemed leader, highly respected by Iranians themselves, and who influenced Iran’s decision-making processes through his direct connection with the Iranian leadership, notably the Guide supreme Khamenei. Since his disappearance, his successor, Naïm Qassem, has had a more limited ability to influence the Iranians, who have intervened to expand their involvement in Lebanon in order to rebuild and rehabilitate the organization.

In June 2025, Hezbollah did not join the war against Iran due to its weakness. If he chose to join the current war, it is because he had in the meantime managed to rehabilitate himself, but also because of the seriousness of the attacks suffered by the Iranian leadership from the first days (including the assassination of Khamenei) and the scale of the threat which now weighs on Iran. In the current war, we have ample evidence of the widespread presence of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) personnel in Lebanon and their involvement in the war. For Iran, Hezbollah’s fight serves its interests: it forces Israel to open an additional front, and it exploits recent developments to establish its status as a regional power, in a context where the outcome of the war remains uncertain. In conclusion, Hezbollah’s dependence on Iran has increased, and Iran is trying to exploit this to its advantage.

While the Israeli government considered Hezbollah weakened after the elimination of its staff and that of Hassan Nasrallah, the pro-Iranian militia continues to impose attrition on the Israeli army, notably through the use of fiber optic drones which have caused losses in the ranks of the Israeli army. Did Israel underestimate the resilience capabilities of the Shiite militia?

Hezbollah was indeed considerably weakened following the “war of support” for Hamas (2023–2024). According to Israeli assessments, it lost around 80% of its firepower, and its infrastructure and headquarters were seriously damaged. damaged. Its weakening has also weakened its political position in Lebanon, favoring the emergence and consolidation of a new leadership which is opposed to it. At the same time, we cannot ignore the capacities which remain to it, as well as those which it succeeded in rehabilitating during the period of ceasefire with Iranian help.

Furthermore, we must also take into account the asymmetric nature of the conflict between the IDF, as a conventional army, and Hezbollah, as a small and agile terrorist organization. It is true that the Israeli leadership has, for political reasons, tended to overplay the victory over Hezbollah. Professional voices within theestablishment Israeli defense officials wanted to qualify this story: Hezbollah has certainly been weakened, but it has not disappeared, and still constitutes a threat. The IDF has also considered launching a new pre-emptive strike against Hezbollah at the beginning of 2026.

In conclusion, theestablishment military did not underestimate Hezbollah, but it was indeed surprised by the use of FPV drones, due to the priority given to responses to more significant threats. For several weeks, this tactical threat took on a strategic dimension. Today, the adaptations and solutions put in place have made it possible to significantly reduce the threat posed by FPV drones.

Direct Israeli-Lebanese negotiations opened in Washington under American mediation. The parties converge on the need to disarm Hezbollah and agree on the recovery of full sovereignty of the Lebanese state over the country of cedar. However, Hezbollah categorically refuses to do so, while Israel does not intend to loosen its grip on the ground. Therefore, are these negotiations not doomed to failure?

It is true that the main obstacle to direct talks between Israel and Lebanon is Hezbollah, as these talks completely contradict its concept of “resistance” and its vision of the destruction of the State of Israel.

The Lebanese government showed real courage in agreeing to these talks, which was also made possible by the relative weakening of Hezbollah. I believe that the convergence of interests between the current Lebanese leadership and Israel in the face of Hezbollah and Iran constitutes a rare opportunity to transform the relationship between the two countries, and that everything must be done to fully seize it.

The objective should be to rebalance the balance of power between the weakened Lebanese government and Hezbollah, that is to say continue to weaken the latter on the military, economic and political levels, while doing everything possible to strengthen the Lebanese government. Israel cannot achieve this alone. It must maintain its military pressure on Hezbollah, but with discernment, so as not to weaken the Lebanese state, while continuing direct talks with Lebanon. The international community and regional states have a crucial role to play here, mainly by providing economic support to the Lebanese government and supporting reforms and capacity building of the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF).

Paris is trying to regain a capacity to influence the Lebanese issue, where its diplomatic weight seems to have weakened in the face of the United States. The Trump administration seems to deliberately want to marginalize the European side and treats the Lebanese question as a bilateral American-Israeli affair. In this context, can Paris nevertheless play a beneficial role in the negotiations, and if so, which one?

It is true that the United States is currently the main player in mediation between Israel and Lebanon. I believe that the main reason for this is, on the one hand, Israel’s trust in the Americans and, on the other, the American willingness to assume costs for its involvement. At the same time, in my opinion, European countries, and France in particular, still have an important role to play, both in weakening Hezbollah and in strengthening the Lebanese leadership. To weaken Hezbollah, several levers are possible: imposing targeted sanctions against its senior officials, like those already applied by the United States; drying up the financial flows that reach it from abroad; sever all ties with its political branch; and provide public support to its opponents.

To strengthen the Lebanese leadership, more ambitious measures are needed. These include the consolidation of its military apparatus and the rehabilitation of its economy as well as aid for the reconstruction of Shiite populations affected by the war, channeled through the Lebanese government.

Crédit photo : Israel defense forces in Beaufort Castle Lebanon 31.05.2026, Wikimedia.