The light and the tunnel

1. Geopolitical implications in the Middle East and energy markets
2. Consequences of the war in Iran and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz
3. Variables that depend on Iran
4. Scenarios à court terme

Even today, we have no choice but to turn our gaze towards the Middle East. Once again, l’administration Trump announces a new “agreement in principle”. And as always, we immediately notice that both parties hurry to temper expectations or qualify their comments.

The question revêt a gravity and a major importance, because as has already been emphasized on several occasions, each day that passes with the Strait of Hormuz closed brings us closer to a precipice with disastrous consequences. It is important to remember here that only four months ago we were paying per liter of fuel (diesel) between 1.20 and 1.40 euros. Since March 2, the price has not fallen below 1.60 euros. And this fact, which then impressed and frightened us, now seems normal to us. But if the situation does not change, we will be forced to get used to other figures.Â

Geopolitical implications in the Middle East and energy markets

The geopolitical order in Middle East and global energy markets are at a critical turning point since the start of the attacks against Iran. Launched in late February as part of the joint US-Israeli campaign known as« Operation Epic Fury »the hostilities have deeply upset l’architecture de sécurité régionale. The death of Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei and a large part of the political-religious and military elite, as well as the asymmetric response of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), characterized by the de facto blockade and mining of the Strait of Hormuz, transformed a military confrontation into a global economic and security crisis. And it is obvious that the evolution of events has placed the conflict exactly where Tehran wants it.

Despite the fragile military truce, consolidated at the beginning of May under the mediation of Pakistan and Omanthe Strait of Hormuz remains subject to a no-go zone regime imposed by Iran, which paralyzes nearly 20% of traffic world of oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG). The ongoing diplomatic negotiations in Islamabad revolve around a main axis: the total reopening of the sea route in exchange for the lifting of the American naval counter-blockade, the relaxation of economic sanctions and the redefinition of the limits of the Iranian nuclear program.

Consequences of the war in Iran and the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz

To understand the seriousness of the current situation, it is imperative to analyze the chain of events which shattered the fragile balance that existed after the definitive collapse of the vestiges of the nuclear agreement fin 2025.

On February 28, 2026, the combined forces of the United States and Israel launched a campaign of high-intensity airstrikes that totaled nearly 900 incursions during the first 12 hours. The primary objective of the operation was neutralization of centers Iranian command and control facilities, their nuclear enrichment facilities and the ballistic missile bases of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The most serious political impact of this offensive was the death of Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei, an event which plunged the regime into a state of emergency and triggered all response plans, including asymmetric retaliatory actions.

Unable to challenge the domination of airspace, and knowing that a land attack was and remains unfeasible, Iran shifted the conflict to the sea by implementing a strategy of guerre côtière and denial of access, what we call in the military world “Anti-Access/Area Denial” (A2/AD). On March 4, 2026, the IRGC officially declared the closure of the Strait of Hormuz to ships of nations allied to the United States and Israel, implementing a series of measures including:

• The massive deployment de mines marines. 
• Harassment and boarding of commercial oil tankers using speedboats.Â
• The use of kamikaze drones and anti-ship missiles hidden on the rugged coast of la province d’Hormozgan.

The consequences of the announcement of the closure of the strait and the confirmation of Iran’s firm intention to carry out its threats immediately reduced commercial traffic in Hormuz by more than 70%, driving up maritime insurance costs to prohibitive levels and destabilizing not only the energy supply in Europe and especially in Asia-Pacific, but also the transit of fertilizers and other essential resources.

After five weeks of fighting, a ceasefire negotiated by Pakistan was concluded between April 7 and 8, then consolidated at the beginning of May. However, the military truce did not put an end to commercial paralysis. The government in Washington, under the administration of Donald Trump, maintains a rigorous naval counter-blockade aimed at strangling remaining Iranian oil exports (particularly from the Khark Island terminal), while Iran uses physical and legal control of the strait as a main means of pressure on the international negotiating table.

In this context, we see that the conflict has evolved from an open armed confrontation towards a hybrid warwhere the legal, macroeconomic and military components intertwine in an inseparable manner.

Currently, the waters of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman harbor a density of forces navales sans précédent. The U.S. Fifth Fleet operates under aggressive interdiction guidelines, with explicit orders to destroy any IRGC vessels that attempt to lay new mines or pose a threat to commercial shipping.

However, and despite the ceasefire, the IRGC has put in place a system that could be described as « naval guerrilla ». From camouflaged bases on islands such as Qeshm, Hormuz and Abu Musa, Iranian forces maintain missile and drone systems that represent a latent but deadly threat. The situation is further complicated by the extremely high risk of a calculation error or local provocation on the part of radical factions of the IRGC (who act with a certain autonomy following the decentralization of command after the death of Khamenei).

A critical aspect of the current situation is the dispute over the applicable legal regime at the Strait of Hormuz. Traditionally, it is governed by the principle of “passage en transit” in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which guarantees freedom of navigation to commercial and military vessels. However, in response to the aggression, Iran attempted to unilaterally redefine the rules of the game.

Tehran argues that due to the state of armed conflict resulting from the February US aggression, it has the right to exercise full police jurisdiction on its territorial waters within the strait. The IRGC has sought to impose payment of tolls, prior notification requirements for foreign warships, and a veto on the transit of nations considered hostile. This position is categorically rejected by both the United States and the countries of the region and the international community in general, which describes Iranian actions as state piracy and violations flagrantes of international maritime law. Furthermore, this Iranian position could create a very dangerous precedent for other similar crossing points around the world.

According to numerous international organizations, the entire situation described and its persistence provoke a systemic global economic slowdown. To cite just one figure, the flow of crude oil has decreased by 60 to 70%, already causing a serious shortage in refineries d’Asie. 

The forced diversion of oil tankers and cargo ships to longer alternative routes (such as bypassing Africa via the Cape of Good Hope) has saturated global supply chains, sending prices soaringr les coûts de fret and cargo insurance prices. The ILO has warned that if the strait crisis continues, sustained increases in energy costs will destroy millions of jobs globally due to contraction in consumption and manufacturing production.Â

Variables that depend on Iran

Variables that depend on Iran

This is why the outcome of the current talks is so crucial for the near-term future, not only of the region, but of the entire world. The evolution of the conflict is in the hands of Iran and will depend on three fundamental strategic variables:

• The internal cohesion du régime iranien :Â

The political transition in Tehran after the loss of its highest spiritual and political leader will determine whether the pragmatic wing of the government (anxious to ease sanctions) manages to assert itself against the commanders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), who see the blockade of the Strait as their latest and most effective line defense, and they’re not wrong.

• The pressure of the actors from the Asia-Pacific region (China and India):

As major customers of Persian Gulf crude oil, Beijing and New Delhi are exerting quiet but fierce diplomatic pressure on Tehran to normalizes maritime traffic, while demanding that Washington moderate its attacks in order to avoid the collapse of emerging economies. There is a lot of talk about China’s role, which is key because of its traditional support for Tehran, but India is also a major player in the consequences of the closure of Hormuz.Â

• The electoral motivations and strategies of Washington:

With the midterm elections scheduled for the end of the year in the United States, the current administration finds itself faced with a dilemma: force an irreversible capitulation of Iran at the risk of keeping gasoline prices high, or accept a partial agreement that stabilizes markets. The big problem is that it seems that whatever he does, the result will not be positive for Trump or, in other words, his opponents will be able to use it against him. If he manages to reach an agreement, questions about the usefulness of this war will rain down on the White House, because it is clear that the regime of the ayatollahs will continue to direct the destinies of Iran, and that its military capabilities will continue to represent a threat to the countries of the region. But if we choose to resume clashes to try to force the regime to bend, the costs of war will explode. We do not know with certainty how long this could last; there will be more casualties and the strait will remain closed for a long time, with the impact on oil prices that an intensification of hostilities would bring.

Scenarios à court terme

Taking as a central point the outcome of the Islamabad negotiations concerning the agreement on the opening of the Strait of Hormuz, we can envisage two possible scenarios in the short term.

• Consolidation of the agreement diplomatic and regulated opening of the strait (détente scenario)

The combined pressures from China and regional mediators are leading Washington et Téhéran à signer an “emergency coexistence compromise”. This agreement is not intended to resolve substantive ideological or structural differences, but would serve to establish a technical protocol to restore the security of the seaway.

In this hypothesis, Iran would undertake to cease all mining operations, to withdraw its special forces from the disputed islets and to suspend unilateral inspections of merchant ships. For their part, the United States and Israel would temporarily freeze all operations against Iranian territory and lift the counter-blockade of the Khark terminal.

Under this agreement, a mechanism would be put in place under the supervision of the UN or a coalition of neutral nations (including Pakistan and Oman) to certify that commercial ships transiting the strait are not carrying war materiel intended to disrupt the regional balance.

And the most problematic point: Iran could agree to strictly limit its uranium enrichment levels (by setting a temporary cap of 20%) and agree to export its surplus fissile materials to a neutral third country. In return, Washington authorizes the conditional release of funds frozen abroad so that Iran can acquire humanitarian and food goods, thus relieving the country’s economic strangulation.

This agreement would temporarily weaken the influence of the most radical and warlike sectors within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), allowing the consolidation of a more pragmatic civil-military transition council in Tehran. A fundamental element would be to consolidate the truce with the Hezbollah group, thus reducing attacks on Israel’s northern border.

The announcement of the safe reopening of the Strait would immediately cause the geopolitical risk premium oil. Oil prices would return to manageable levels and global inflationary pressures would be defused. The flow of LNG to Asia and Europe could normalize by the end of autumn, thereby stabilizing prices. industrial production costs.

This is undoubtedly the most favorable scenario, but it nonetheless remains, in a certain way, “wishful thinking”, because it is essentially based on concessions on the part of Iran in nuclear matters, which constitutes the main obstacle, not to mention the position declared by Iran to levy a toll on ships transiting the waters of the strait.Â

â— Breakdown of negotiations, prolonged blockade and regional escalation (total conflict scenario)

In this hypothesis, we must assume that the Islamabad talks failed due to mutual intransigence. Iran categorically refuses to end uranium enrichment or cede control of the strait, while the United States insists on demands for total surrender that the Tehran regime considers unacceptable for its political survival. What would this scenario entail?

A return to hostilities. Faced with the impasse in negotiations and the persistent economic crisis, the American administration would relaunch air operations against Iran, but in this case, it would be massive attacks aimed at destroying all of the infrastructures d’exportation pétrolière of Iran on the island of Khark and the industrial refining complexes in order to bend the regime.

These actions would undoubtedly provoke a full response from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which would not only target Western commercial shipping, but would seek to attack service infrastructure bases and oilfields of neighboring countries, launching its missiles and drones against the water desalination plants and strategic oil refineries of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.Â

The Strait of Hormuz would become a naval battlefield, making transit impossible

Obviously, this scenario depends on the capabilities that Iran still has and how long it could maintain them. However, it is certain that with relatively limited means, and as long as it remained an IRGC stronghold, the situation would be very complicated.

The repercussions in the region would be unpredictable because, to a greater or lesser extent, all the fronts where the pro-Iranian militias operate would be reactivated, once again plunging the region into instability and increasing, for example, the risk of a invasion à grande échelle of Lebanon by Israel.Â

In this hypothesis, the price of a barrel of crude oil would reach historic peaks, and the consequences for the global economy would be disastrous and lasting for years.

It is very difficult to guess which of the two scenarios is more likely; however, given the positions of the main actors, everything suggests that we are closer to the second than to the first. There will probably not be a complete break in hostilities, as this does not suit either side, and due to the external pressures mentioned. However, we can assume that one way or another there will not be a return to the situation before February 28 with regard to transit through Hormuz. Iran has identified its strengths and, more importantly, its adversary’s weaknesses, and it knows that the United States has more to lose than to gain by returning to open war.

The fate of to international security for the second half of 2026 will be decided in the offices where the fate of the Strait of Hormuz is being negotiated. The economic interdependence of the 21st century means that a conflict geographically centered on the shores of the Persian Gulf has the power to disrupt the economic stability of households and industries thousands of miles away. As diplomacy attempts to build bridges across a minefield, global actors must prepare to withstand the effects of a protracted confrontation that has already rewritten the rules of geopolitics contemporaneously