While the term “Defense Europe”, that is to say the rapprochement of European countries around a common defense, is becoming popular until it becomes an element of language of European chancelleries, the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared in February 2025 that “any defense Europe that excluded Turkey would be unrealistic”. What Hakan Fidan means by this is that his country’s military-industrial complex has consolidated to the point that it now naturally imposes itself as an essential partner of Europe, at a time when the latter seeks to diversify its suppliers.
This declaration highlights broader issues which today affect the perspectives of European defense. How to build a common project between sovereign states on legal issues? How can we think about industrial interdependence with partners between whom there are both convergences and deep divergences? Can European capitals really afford to do without a rising player in the arms industry, and moreover an official candidate for membership in the European Union (EU)? Finally, what lessons can we draw from the evolution of the Turkish military-industrial complex to shed light on the issues of European strategic autonomy?
This article offers a study resituating the trajectory of Turkey’s military-industrial complex, which went from almost total dependence on foreign suppliers to an indigenization rate reaching nearly 80% according to the Turkish authorities. In addition, 1.9% of the Turkish domestic product (GDP) is devoted to the army budget for the year 2025. This study thus addresses the state of cooperation between the Turkish authorities and certain European players in the defense, and draws up a picture of possible prospects for further integration of Turkey into European defense industries.
War of Independence and Wars Against Dependence
To understand the state of the Turkish military-industrial complex, we must first take a leap into history. Indeed, already in the 19th centuryeCentury, the “sick man of Europe”, like other centuries-old and declining empires such as China, became aware of the industrial backwardness which separated it from its competitors. It was then that, in the second half of the century, cooperation was established in the supply of arms with the German Empire, which would culminate during the Great War.
During the Turkish War of Independence (1919-1922), behind the scenes of the victorious epic of a solitary but heroic people widely disseminated by nationalist historiography, agreements between Mustafa Kemal and the Soviet elites of the time. The supplies of rifles, automatic weapons and shells to Turkey were such that many historians believe that without them, the outcome of this war of national liberation would not have been in favor of the Kemalist forces.
In the interwar period, the moribund state of the Turkish economy did not allow the emergence of an army sufficiently prepared and equipped to face the geopolitical upheavals of the 1930s and 1940s. This is partly for this reason that Ankara opted for an attitude described as neutral during almost the entirety of the Second World War. We thus see how a defense policy conditions a foreign policy: in the absence of effective defensive capabilities, a country will tend to favor neutrality or, at the very least, extreme caution in the conduct of its foreign policy.
Subsequently, the threat that Moscow posed to Turkish sovereignty over the Bosphorus and Dardanelles straits brought Turkey under the American umbrella until it joined the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in February 1952. It was then that Turkey became intensely dependent on the West, and in particular the United States of America, in terms of armaments. via the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. Once again, it is relevant to note how a strong dependence in terms of armaments has conditioned Turkish foreign policy, largely aligned with that of the United States of America (participation in the Korean War against communist forces, signing of the Treaty of Baghdad, etc.). Turkey then realizes the problems posed by such a level of dependence.
Indeed, when unrest broke out on the island of Cyprus between the Hellenic and Turkish communities, and a Turkish intervention was considered, Ankara received a letter from Lyndon B. Johnson (1964) in which the American president threatened to cut off all military aid if such a decision was made. was taken by Turkey. Johnson’s threat came to fruition 10 years later. In 1974, following the coup d’état led by the National Organization of Cypriot Fighters (EOKA-B) militia, supported by the dictatorship of the colonels in Greece, Turkey intervened to protect the Turkish Cypriots. Operation “Attila” provokes the anger of the American Congress, which decides to apply an embargo on the export of arms to Turkey.
We thus see that the problem with which many European states are confronted today – that of a dependence on the American hegemon, which does not hesitate to use the means of this dependence to influence the foreign policy of its allies – was imposed on Turkey more than half a century ago. The embargo decreed following the 1974 intervention constituted a major trauma for Ankara in this respect, since it revealed the political and strategic costs of excessive dependence on arms. It was from this moment that Turkey decided to reduce its reliance on the United States as much as possible. Notably, in 1985, the Defense Industries Secretariat was created so that this impulse was first translated into an institutional framework. One of the major achievements of this secretariat is the co-production program for F-16 fighter planes, through which Ankara was able to condition its orders with the American giant General Dynamics on technology transfers and participation of Turkish industry in production – which allowed the companies that make it up to acquire industrial know-how determinants.
The progressive indigenization of the Turkish military-industrial complex
It is therefore on this base, built over two decades, that the Justice and Development Party (AKP), co-founded by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and coming to power in 2002, will rely to bring about a rise in the power of the military-industrial complex. However, although the party boasted a foreign policy based on peace and prosperity (supported by the doctrine of “zero problems with neighbors” theorized by Ahmet Davutolu, Minister of Foreign Affairs foreigners from 2009), he already announced an indigenization of the Turkish military-industrial complex.
In this context, returning to anthropologist Marshall Sahlins’ definition of indigenization may prove useful. Against the idea that modernization would lead to the erasure of the cultural specificities of non-Western societies, he emphasizes that the local appropriation of exogenous elements (notably technological and economic) leads on the contrary to their domestication. In the Turkish case, this perspective makes it possible to analyze the indigenization of the defense industry as a desire for technological and strategic empowerment. It should be remembered that at this time, Turkey, thanks to major economic reforms, managed to build a robust and competitive economy (Turkish GDP increased, for example, from 250 billion euros in 2002 to 600 billion in 2011).
Furthermore, if the first decade of our century could demonstrate a preference for soft power in the conduct of its foreign policy, from the 2010s onwards, Turkey finds itself systematically confronted with security issues which endanger its vital interests: Syrian civil war, embryo of Kurdish autonomy in Northern Syria, resumption of the conflict armed against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), regional competition, etc.
We are then witnessing an acceleration in the rise of the Turkish military-industrial complex. Furthermore, Turkey knows that on certain political subjects, its interests diverge from those of its allies, notably on the Kurdish question. It is therefore from this moment that we can understand one of the greatest achievements of the Turkish defense industry: the manufacturing of drones. In fact, in the 2000s, the country acquired around ten Israeli Heron drones, but major tensions between Ankara and Tel Aviv slowed down acquisitions and, in 2012, the American Congress, suspicious of the reliability of the Turkish government, blocked the sale of drones. Predator which was intended for him. Turkey had in fact been accused by certain sources of having revealed the cover-up of ten Iranian intelligence agents working with Israel. From then on, it was the companies Baykar and Turkish Aerospace Industries, the first being private, the second public, which developed the drones whose success we are now experiencing, thus showing the country’s capacity to implement a hybrid industrial model.
Turkish drones have therefore acquired international fame due to their effectiveness in different theaters of war: against the PKK, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), Islamist terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq, but also in Libya against the forces of Marshal Haftar supported by the Wagner militia in 2020, against the independence forces of Nagorno-Karabakh during the resumption of the conflict in 2020 between Azerbaijan and Armenia, and, even more recently, by Ukraine at the start of the large-scale invasion of its territory by Russian forces in 2022.
Drones have also overshadowed Turkey’s other developments in terms of armaments, since the national defense industry has experienced multidimensional growth. In particular, and according to the authorities, it went from an indigenization rate of barely 20% in 2002 to almost 80% in 2025. During the same period, it rose from the rank of 4e largest importer at that of 11e arms exporter in the world. Finally, five Turkish defense companies joined the “top 100” of the world’s largest companies (MKE, ROKETSAN, ASELSAN, TAI, ASFAT) according to the American newspaper Defense News in 2024.
It is also notable that Turkey allowed the emergence of such an industry based on technonationalism, explicitly put forward in the official discourse, with symbolic and political representations of this doctrine as shown by Teknofest. This orientation is based on the idea that mastery of defense technologies constitutes a central element of national sovereignty, military power and economic development. In this perspective, the Turkish state has supported the structuring of a technological ecosystem through public investment policies, research and development (R&D) programs and the promotion of defense companies.
Agreements and partnerships between Turkey and certain EU member countries
Thus, with an intense production of defense equipment, Turkey has become an exporting country. However, these sales are mainly aimed at non-Western and non-European countries, with Turkey remaining a customer of European defense industries. For example, Turkey agreed with the United Kingdom to purchase 20 Eurofighter fighter planes in October 2025. It is true that Turkey’s exclusion from the F-35 program in 2019, following the purchase of Russian S-400 anti-aircraft defense systems, had forced Ankara to diversify its partnerships in combat aviation, paving the way for the purchase of Eurofighters. The Turkish-European rapprochement is thus partly dependent on American-Turkish frictions. If the meeting between Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Donald J. Trump in Washington in September 2025 may have contributed to an atmosphere of cooperation, obstacles remain and this status quo therefore strengthens the conditions for deepening Turkish-European cooperation.
In fact, Turkey is one of the most attractive markets for Spanish arms manufacturers, with Spain having authorized exports of military equipment worth 6.11 billion between 2013 and 2022, including 1.18 billion in 2022 alone. For example, Spanish defense companies, such as Navantia, have worked closely with Turkish companies on naval projects, including the construction of the Anadolu aircraft carrier operated by the Turkish Navy. But the situation is gradually tending to rebalance: in December 2025, Madrid confirmed the order for 30 Hürjet training aircraft from TAI for an amount of 2.6 billion euros, a first for a Turkish-designed military aircraft sold to a member of NATO and the EU.
Turkey is also one of the largest markets for Italy. Sales mainly concerned four types of equipment: helicopters, naval guns and even military satellites. Italian industry has also supplied subsystems for Turkish systems, such as Leonardo’s Osprey 30 radars for Bayraktar TB2 drones. If the political situation between Rome and Ankara is in good shape, their chancelleries converging on certain issues, notably on the recognition of the Government of National Accord in Libya, this has not always been the case. A diplomatic crisis affected the two countries between 1998 and 1999, when Abdullah Calan, the leader of the PKK, had stayed in Italy and that the latter had refused to extradite him. However, this did not put an end to ongoing partnerships. Which proves two things: on the one hand, if Turkey can be a difficult partner, it is capable of compromise and, on the other hand, because of its status as a middle power whose successes in terms of armaments have structural limits, in particular in terms of high technologies and limits in the R&D budget, cooperation with its allies, if it does not does not necessarily arise from an ideological convergence, remains at the very least a material necessity. Thus, needs persist in terms of arms acquisition.
Consequently, increasing partnerships will reduce the risk of seeing Turkey turn to non-European suppliers, as it did in 2019 by acquiring the Russian S-400 anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense system. This choice was justified by invoking national strategic autonomy and as a response to American hesitation regarding the sale of its PATRIOT system.
In addition to the Italian and Spanish cases, Turkey has also concluded significant agreements with Poland and Romania. In 2021, Baykar signed a contract for the supply of 24 Bayraktar TB2 drones to Poland, 18 to Romania, in addition to 1,000 light armored vehicles. These two countries, which seek to gradually get rid of their aging arsenal of Soviet origin, traditionally turn to non-European suppliers, such as the United States or South Korea, citing in particular the slow production capacities of their partners on the Old Continent. In this context, Turkey appears to be a partner capable of partially filling these gaps. However, the Turkish company Otokar, in charge of delivering the COBRA II armored vehicles to Romania, was forced in January 2026 to pay compensation of 40 million euros to Bucharest due to delivery delays. Consequently, this current event calls for caution and not to exaggerate Turkish production capacities.
Beyond just the technical performance of this equipment, the choices of Warsaw and Bucharest are also driven by political considerations. Keeping Turkey “anchored” in the European flank appears to be a way of avoiding its possible tilt towards Russia, especially since if the war went beyond Ukraine’s borders, it is very likely that these two countries would be on the front line.
A risky partnership?
Finally, many commentators have noted that, for at least a decade, Turkey has been taking a power trajectory sometimes considered contrary to NATO interests. Consequently, associating it with a project to empower European defense could give it a lever of pressure in the event of differences on the way of conducting its foreign policy. The examples most often cited are its reluctance to the accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO following the massive invasion of Ukraine, or the attitude considered ambiguous by Ankara towards Russia. The Turkish veto against Sweden and Finland was presented as a way for Ankara to reaffirm the importance of its membership in NATO and to force Stockholm and Helsinki to expel Kurdish dissidents. It was following these expulsions that Turkey validated their membership.
Concerning Turkey’s so-called “troubled” attitude towards Russia, it would be more judicious to describe it as cautious and pragmatic, especially since it does not begin with the AKP, but at least with the fall of the Soviet Union, from which Moscow and Ankara established strong economic ties without this translating necessarily by deep political convergences. Furthermore, in the majority of external theaters where Russians and Turks are involved, the latter defend opposing positions. For example, the fact that Turkey is the last NATO member to have shot down a Russian fighter plane on November 24, 2015 at the Turkish-Syrian border demonstrates the persistence of tensions between Ankara and Moscow.
In this regard, we have seen that Turkey has sold weapons to Ukraine (drones, in particular) without its economic ties to Russia dissuading it. This precedent is enlightening for considering a scenario of direct conflict between Russia and EU member countries which would have deepened their defensive cooperation with Ankara. In this case, Turkey would undoubtedly refrain from any direct involvement, but it is likely that it will maintain its arms deliveries, for a very simple reason. The Turkish economy is in a very difficult situation, hit by inflation. It therefore has every interest in exporting its weapons for economic profit: exports of manufactured goods from its defense industry would have reached $10 billion in 2025.
Another reluctance on the part of certain European decision-makers comes from the fear that political differences with Turkey will make defense cooperation a lever of pressure used by the latter for blackmail purposes. That said, even if tensions could arise, this would not affect Turkish-European cooperation. In fact, the suspension of arms exports decided by European countries such as France or Germany in 2019 following Turkey’s military intervention in northern Syria could lend credence to the theory of cooperation vulnerable to political tensions. However, this precedent must be qualified in the light of recent developments. For example, in 2025, Germany briefly suspended its green light for the sale of Eurofighters to Turkey to protest the arrest of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem Imamolu on March 19, 2025, before lifting its veto a few months later. This therefore suggests that political tensions constitute more of a slowing factor than a lasting obstacle to defense cooperation.
Finally, in order to show the resilience of commercial partnerships despite political disagreements, the case of relations between the United Arab Emirates and Turkey is enlightening in this regard. For a decade, Ankara and Abu Dhabi clashed by proxy in several geopolitical theaters, notably in Libya and Syria. If the agreement on the sale of Turkish arms to the Gulf monarchy in 2022 was situated in a context of détente between the two states, it did not put an end to their rivalry. Notably, with the return of civil war to Sudan in 2023, Abu Dhabi is an active supporter of the Rapid Support Forces where Ankara asserts its support for the Transitional Sovereignty Council. However, this indirect conflict has not only not put an end to trade agreements, but the United Arab Emirates remain among the three largest buyers of Turkish arms, without their rivalry having any repercussions on commercial relations between Ankara and Abu Dhabi. This illustrates a constant in Turkish foreign policy: the ability to dissociate geopolitical rivalry and commercial cooperation, including in terms of armaments. It is therefore likely that increased interdependence between the states of the European Union and Turkey will resist their disagreements.
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Thus, the trajectory of the Turkish military-industrial complex highlights the gradual transition from structural dependence on its Western allies to an assumed strategy of indigenization. This transformation, initiated in the context linked to embargoes and changes in regional security, has accelerated over the last two decades under the effect of technonationalism, regional security imperatives and a desire for regional military projection. From this perspective, Turkey is both a potential partner and a factor of uncertainty for Europeans. However, as highlighted in this study, the question is perhaps no longer whether Turkey should be associated with European defense but rather what form this association could take. The recent takeover of the Italian company Piaggio Aerospace by Baykar has thus shown Turkey’s full capacity to establish its legitimacy in the European defense industry.
Crédits photo : sevenkingdom
/2026/06/11/6a2a4ee24803c565853794.jpg "REPORTING. “On the front, the sky is literally teeming with drones”: how the Ukrainian army trains to face the threat")
