Suspended at the last minute. Such was the fate of the large-scale military strike that Donald Trump had planned to launch on Iran on Tuesday. On Monday, the American president reversed his decision at the last minute, at the request of the leaders of Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, who, according to him, believe that an agreement is possible.
In the aftermath, he told journalists that an agreement with the Islamic Republic remained “very likely.” He further stated that he would prefer to achieve such a result without resorting to attacks, expressing satisfaction with what he described as “encouraging signals” in the discussions with Tehran, without specifying the details.
In a message published separately on his Truth Social platform, he nonetheless maintained pressure by emphasizing that the United States remained ready to launch a “total and large-scale attack on Iran at any time” in case negotiations failed.
This once again highlights the usual political mechanism of Mr. Trump, now well identified, almost ritualized, where maximum pressure is always accompanied by a slightly open door to negotiations.
The Gulf, real mediator or political pretext?
Given the recent developments, the role of the Gulf countries is questioned. Presented as actors who influenced the American decision, they appear as diplomatic intermediaries capable of influencing the course of war. A perspective that deserves to be nuanced, as emphasized by General Dominique Trinquand, former chief of the French military mission to the UN and specialist in international relations.
Interviewed by Ici Beyrouth, he believes that the suspension of the strike does not result from decisive pressure exerted by the Gulf monarchies, but rather from an American political positioning. “The demand from the Gulf countries is a pretext,” he explained, emphasizing that Donald Trump would be, above all, “at an impasse” and seeking a way out by all means.
According to the expert, the American president knows that strikes would not lead to an agreement with Iran. “He is seeking to maintain an open negotiation space,” he noted. In this logic, the reference to the Gulf countries would mainly serve an internal political function, showing that he takes external opinions into account while actually seeking to avoid resorting to attacks.
General Trinquand goes further by relativizing the actual weight of these states in American decision-making. “We cannot speak of a real diplomatic weight at this level.” According to him, the Gulf monarchies share an objective interest in avoiding escalation, but their capacity to influence an American military decision remains limited.
He also recalls that in previous episodes of regional tensions, these same countries had already expressed reservations without necessarily being followed by Washington, illustrating the limits of their actual influence on American strategic choices.
A strategy of pressure with no clear outcome?
In the absence of tangible progress on the Iranian nuclear issue, American statements suggesting progress do not rely on any verifiable element, according to General Trinquand. Especially since Tehran does not show any significant concessions, reinforcing the impression of a blocked dialogue despite public statements.
In this context, the current dynamics could lead not to a structuring agreement, but to a form of unstable status quo. “It would probably end in a bad deal,” our interlocutor believes, mentioning a scenario where Iran would retain its negotiation capabilities and strategic leverage, especially around the Strait of Hormuz, without a real resolution to the nuclear issue.
In any case, whether it is a cancellation, a postponement, or a simple strategic reassessment, each signal sent in the Iranian dossier reactivates a fundamental question. Is Trump seeking to avoid war, or to better prepare for it if negotiations fail?
