In military matters, “the Japanese authorities have made historic decisions since 2022”

Mediapart: What is the historical importance of Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan, for the identity of the country and its defense policy?

Céline Pajon : Article 9 of the 1947 Constitution contains two fundamental provisions: Japan will not launch itself into any war, and it will not maintain conventional military capabilities. This article was included at the suggestion of the United States at the end of the Second World War, when they were administering the defeated country.

From the start, a significant section of the Japanese political class wanted to revise the Constitution and in particular this article. Since its birth in 1955, the Liberal Democratic Party [le parti de gouvernement prédominant au Japon – ndlr] included in its founding documents that one of its objectives was to revise this Constitution, with a view to reconquering Japanese sovereignty. 


Article 9, extremely symbolic, has however been preserved. In the context of the Cold War between the Western bloc and the Soviet bloc, the Japanese authorities even invoked it as protection against repeated demands from the American ally for the country to rearm. Their goal was to invest in economic reconstruction rather than defense.

Until the 1960s, a whole series of political and legal norms were even produced, which were derived from this article 9: the three non-nuclear principles (non-manufacture, non-possession and non-introduction of atomic weapons on the national territory); the principle of non-export of technology and military equipment; and the commitment that the defense budget remains at or below 1% of GDP.

What remains concretely of this article and these standards, while Japan seems to be “normalizing” more and more on a strategic level?

It must first be remembered that self-defense forces (FAD) were set up in 1954. Not only have they expanded over the years, but a series of ad-hoc laws have been adopted to develop their missions. The dynamic was clear from the 1990s, which also saw the country’s military capabilities strengthened.

A notable step was notably taken in 2015, when Prime Minister Shinzo Abe obtained a political reinterpretation of Article 9 in order to allow the SAF to intervene, in certain cases where the survival of Japan would be threatened, in support and protection of allied forces, the United States in first intention, then Australia.Â

The standards derived from Article 9 have also been shaken up. At the end of 2022, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida announced the doubling of the defense budget, which recently reached 2% of GDP and is intended to reach 3%. And since the end of April, arms export rules have been further relaxed, allowing the supply of lethal weapons abroad.

It is often said that Article 9 has been emptied of substance. But it still retains its function as a safeguard when it comes to protecting itself from certain requests, particularly American ones, to intervene abroad in risky areas. For example, during her visit to Washington in March, Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi explained to Trump that it was not possible for Japan to become militarily involved in restoring freedom of movement in the Strait of Hormuz without a return to calm.

However, Takaichi is pushing for a revision of article 9, but rather a minimalist one. This revision would not affect the basis of the article but would add a line to recognize the proper existence of the self-defense forces. In fact, they increasingly resemble regular armed forces, theoretically prohibited.

At the end of 2022, you suggested that Japan would accomplish the equivalent of the German “Zeitenwende”, that is to say an “epochal change” in matters of defense and security. What started it?

The war in Ukraine, like in Germany. The invasion of February 2022 was a real shock in the archipelago, used by the Japanese authorities to make a number of historic decisions.

Prime Minister Kishida spoke of fears that “East Asia [se retrouve] in the same situation as Europe, implied following an invasion of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China. It was his government which broke the taboo of the defense budget, which exceeded 1% of GDP, and which announced that Japan would equip itself with counter-attack capabilities. This decision reflected a new analysis of threats, with certain offensive capabilities now considered essential for Japan to protect itself from a possible strike by China or North Korea.

Since then, North Korea has supplied troops to Vladimir Putin’s Russia, which went to fight in Ukraine. But this also has consequences for Asian theater…

In recent years, Pyongyang’s rhetoric has been toughened towards South Korea and its other neighbors. The security alliance formed with Putin is of particular concern, because it has enabled the North Korean regime to acquire a certain number of technologies and know-how likely to accelerate its nuclear and ballistic program. However, Japan is on the front line of its missiles.

As for the North Korean soldiers sent to Ukraine, the risk is to see a certain number of them return seasoned and trained in the new practices of asymmetric warfare.

What are Japan’s specific concerns regarding China?

The situation has deteriorated around the Senkaku Islands claimed by China, with daily passages of Chinese boats in the contiguous waters and even the territorial waters around these islands. In addition to the increased frequency of these incursions, these are increasingly larger and more threatening boats. We are also observing increasingly frequent passages of Chinese aircraft carriers near Japanese waters, when they transit to the Pacific. And finally aerial incursions in the skies of Japan.

This intensification of Chinese military activities is taking place increasingly in coordination with Russian forces, which is a very important point, and evident since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine. Japan had tried, in the second half of the 2010s, to get closer to Russia, but there is no longer any question of it.

Since last November, diplomatic relations with China have seriously deteriorated, due to remarks by Prime Minister Takaichi in Parliament, affirming that a naval blockade with the use of force in the Taiwan Strait would constitute a “threat to the survival of Japan” and could therefore justify sending the SAF in support of American forces in intervention. Takaichi only stated what was already accepted in strategic circles: the southernmost Japanese island is only about a hundred kilometers from Taiwan and any blockade of the strait would seriously affect Japan’s economy and security. Beijing used this declaration as a pretext to impose economic and political sanctions.

There is no equivalent of an Asian NATO, but you mention “a network of Indo-Pacific partners” in which Japan is included. What is it about?

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