Since the first American and Israeli strikes on Iran on February 28, the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and many leaders of the Tehran regime, and a few hours before the announced end of the ceasefire that President Donald Trump finally announced the extension on Tuesday, April 21, we struggle to understand who is governing the country. Historian of international relations and specialist of the Islamic Republic, Clément Therme enlightens us on the workings of “this fragmented power”. Teaching at the Paul-Valéry University of Montpellier, associated researcher at the International Institute of Iranian Studies (Rasanah) and at the French Institute of International Relations (Ifri), he has just published with publishers Tallandier “Iran-Israel: the ideological war”, which analyzes over fifty years of conflict that has reached an unprecedented intensity and now affects the entire planet.
Do we really know who is leading Iran today? According to what principles?
Clément Therme – This question refers to the nature of the Iranian regime, which can be defined as a fragmented authoritarianism. Several centers of power coexist. Certainly, there is a central authority, the office of the Supreme Leader. But since the elimination, on February 28, of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the question of his succession arises. Formally, [his son] Mojtaba Khamenei took over, but for security and possibly health reasons, he has not appeared and we do not know exactly his cognitive state. We must therefore focus on his entourage.
We can mention the head of the Revolutionary Guards, Ahmad Vahidi, known to be one of the officials behind the attack on the Jewish community in Buenos Aires in 1994 [which killed 85 people and wounded hundreds]. In the 1990s, he was in charge of the Al-Qods force – which means the holy and designates Jerusalem – of the Revolutionary Guards, before Qassem Soleimani [general who was in charge of this elite unit responsible for foreign operations and the architect of Iranian expansionism in the Middle East, before being killed in 2020 by an American strike in Iraq]. He is an ideological activist, one of the promoters of the transnational ideology of the Islamic Republic.
The logic is that of the survival of the system in its current ideological form, but with a pragmatic application of principles: the hatred of the United States, the destruction of Israel, and the priority given to Muslim and non-aligned countries… All of this is enshrined in the Iranian Constitution. Based on the Constitution, one can understand decision-making in foreign policy.
This certainly implies a difficulty in making compromises – as we can see with the decision, which is delayed, to negotiate with the United States, in Islamabad, probably this Wednesday, April 21. There is a very strong debate within the factions of the Islamic Republic, as there is an escalation in the face of the American enemy. For some, even negotiating indirectly is already a compromise. And thus, institutional fragmentation strengthens the power of the ideology of the Islamic Republic.
There is then the question of the “Iranian Gorbachev”. Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, the Speaker of Parliament, is he an “Iranian Gorbachev”? This question has been raised since the 1990s, initiated at the time by opponents of President Mohammad Khatami [1997-2005], who designated him as such. Since then, there has been talk of Hassan Rohani [president from 2013 to 2021], then Massoud Pezeshkian [the current president] and now Qalibaf. Because in the West, there is a desire to have a diplomatic interlocutor. In fact, this is the illusion of reformism – a facade that fuels the discourse of dialogue supporters compared to war supporters. It is a strategy of manipulation by the West, and an internal regime survival strategy. This is why there is a debate on tactics: how to manage hostility towards the West? Should the ceasefire be extended for two weeks? Or, on the contrary, should we return to war to achieve gains and ensure the survival of the regime?
Qalibaf, who is negotiating with Westerners today, is not a strong man. There has been no regime change in the Islamic Republic. The deep state – the office of the Supreme Leader – holds the power. In summary, you have the visible State, which speaks to the enemy and holds a discourse allowing to maintain negotiations – and perhaps to avoid returning to war – without reaching an agreement; and you have the revolutionary superstructure, hidden behind, which does not speak to the enemy, and makes decisions.
War in the Middle East: Can Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf be Trump’s man within the Iranian regime? Is this hardcore group around the Supreme Leader the real decision-maker?
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