War in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia no longer wants to blindly follow Washington and turns to Beijing

As Donald Trump hints at a possible resumption of negotiations with Iran, Saudi Arabia reassesses its alliances and fears an extension of the conflict to major global trade routes.

Published on April 15, 2026 at 08:16, updated on April 15, 2026 at 11:22 – Reading time: 5 minutes

Discussions between Iran and the United States could resume in a few days, following indications from Donald Trump on Wednesday, April 15. Among countries urging the United States to lift its blockade of the Strait of Hormuz are Gulf oil producers, including the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia, in particular, is finding it increasingly difficult to follow the decisions of its American ally. This has led to a pragmatic distancing in the face of President Trump being seen as both unpredictable and indifferent. Saudi Arabia, like its Gulf neighbors, was targeted by Iranian missiles and drones for 40 days. Even during the ceasefire, a strategic oil pipeline leading to the Red Sea was damaged by a strike. Each time, the Trump administration allowed it to happen.

Today, with the emerging dialogue between Washington and Tehran, Saudi Arabia finds itself relegated to the role of a spectator. There is no place for it, nor for Qatar or Oman, who are historical mediators in the region.

Saudi Arabia is not “abandoning” the United States. But it aims to balance and diversify its alliances, as recently explained by its Foreign Minister. “To my knowledge, no Arab country formulates its policies based on the interests of others,” assures Prince Faisal bin Farhan bin Abdullah. “We too will defend our interests and continue to formulate policies based on our interests. Our interests lie in the West, but we find them also in the East.”

The diplomatic language is subtle, but the message is clear: Saudi Arabia will no longer automatically align with Washington when Beijing emerges as a new heavyweight ally.

Twenty years ago, China was simply a customer of Saudi oil, uninvolved in politics. Today, as Saudi Arabia’s top trading partner, China invests tens of billions of dollars in the country. It has also gained a foothold as a key player in regional geopolitics (Beijing notably contributed to negotiating the ceasefire with Iran), all to reassure Riyadh.

Saudi Arabia especially fears that this war, triggered by the United States and Israel, could spread to the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, another strategic gateway of global trade. Today, it is a vital export route for Riyadh.

Geographically, the strait separates the Arabian Peninsula from Africa: one must head south through the desert, cross the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Yemen before reaching this narrow chokepoint of less than 30 kilometers wide. On the other side: Djibouti and Eritrea (according to an Arab legend, the name Bab el-Mandeb comes from the laments of those drowned by the earthquake that separated Asia from Africa).

Bab el-Mandeb connects the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. It is essential for the route linking Europe to Asia via the Suez Canal – and vice versa. Since the Strait of Hormuz is blocked, Riyadh routes most of its oil through this passage, allowing it to maintain exports at nearly pre-war levels (7 million barrels/day). The kingdom has no other option.

However, the security of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait is fragile: the Houthi rebels, Iranian allies, control a long stretch of the coastline. In November 2023, during Israel’s war in Gaza, they had fired missiles and drones at ships: within three months, about forty boats had been targeted, and traffic in the Red Sea and the Suez Canal had halved.

So far, the Houthi militants have largely stayed out of the conflict between Iran, the United States, and Israel; a request from Tehran could make them more aggressive. Saudi Arabia had already been at war with the Houthis from 2015 to 2022 and does not want a new confrontation. If the war persists, it poses a risk, for which it would hold the United States responsible.