In their form, the military operations in Ukraine that began on February 24, 2022, are reminiscent of the “late industrial” era. The armies are similar, in their organization and methods, to the peak of the end of the Second World War – with fewer forces and some innovations that do not necessarily signify a revolution. By mastering the industrial art of war less than expected, the Russian forces have not been able to fully utilize their potential, unlike the forces in Ukraine who are supported by a powerful coalition.
After a dynamic phase where the Russians initially benefited from the advantage of power and surprise, the operations have now stabilized into a rigid front, similar to the battles in Belgium and France in 1914. Just like back then, the resources used quickly displayed diminishing operational returns, which is the definition of a Schumpeterian crisis. To break free from this stalemate, the only solution is to disrupt the balance of power through massive engagement of new resources, particularly through innovation.
A Russian operational model that is too ambitious, based on insufficient foundations
An army is always a combination of men and equipment, within specific structures and a unique culture. The combination of these four elements determines what an army is truly capable of facing the enemy.
In terms of equipment, Vladimir Putin’s army seemed to emerge from the post-Cold War crisis starting in 2010, and especially 2015, with a new generation of highly advanced equipment, such as the S-400 anti-aircraft system, fifth-generation Su-57 fighters, hypersonic Kinzhal missiles, and T-14 Armata battle tanks – a range sometimes unmatched in the rest of the world.
Not to mention the internal corruption in the Russian military-industrial complex, this technical modernization was, however, fragile. The budgetary resources and knowledge capital were insufficient to simultaneously support the modernization of all military components – a vast nuclear arsenal, a large aerospace force, navy, massive land force – of a power that aspires to be global. This modernization also heavily relied on imported Western technology, a resource that suddenly dried up after the 2014 sanctions related to the annexation of Crimea. […]
PLAN – A Russian operational model that is too ambitious, based on insufficient foundations – Facing the Russian threat – Confrontation in depth – The initial Russian air-land offensive and its failure – A Schumpeterian military crisis
Michel Goya is a former colonel in the Army and a military historian. He recently published “Le Temps des Guépards. La guerre mondiale de la France de 1961 à nos jours, Paris, Tallandier, 2022.”
