For decades, the balance of the Cold War rested on a paradox: avoiding a nuclear war while carefully preparing for its outbreak. Through the declassification of archives, historians are uncovering the extent of the plans developed by the major powers to strike the opponent. These documents show how close the world has sometimes come to a global conflict.
The logic of nuclear deterrence
After World War II, the United States and the Soviet Union entered an unprecedented strategic confrontation. The possession of nuclear weapons profoundly transformed military strategy. The objective was no longer just to win a war, but to prevent the adversary from initiating one. This logic of deterrence is based on a certainty: any nuclear attack would trigger an immediate and devastating response. To make this threat credible, both sides developed extremely detailed plans that outlined the targets, means, and schedule of a massive strike. These plans were regularly updated according to the evolution of arsenals and the military capabilities of adversaries.
Plans of staggering magnitude
Among the declassified documents are programs that illustrate the scale of this planning. In the United States, the plan known as the Single Integrated Operational Plan, or SIOP, envisaged simultaneous strikes against thousands of targets in the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc countries as early as the 1960s. Strategic bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles, and nuclear submarines were to act in a coordinated manner to destroy industrial centers, military bases, and strategic infrastructure of the adversaries. Meanwhile, Soviet strategists developed similar scenarios targeting American bases and major Western cities. These plans were based on the idea that a nuclear war, if it were to break out, would be total and extremely rapid.
A world on the brink several times over
The examination of these archives also reveals how some episodes of the Cold War were perilous. The Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 remains the most famous example of a confrontation on the brink of escalating into nuclear war. But other lesser-known incidents, such as false alarms in detection systems or radar misinterpretations, also came close to triggering an uncontrolled escalation. In several cases, the decision of an officer or the caution of a political leader prevented the worst. In hindsight, historians emphasize that the stability of nuclear deterrence relied as much on strategic mechanisms as on a measure of composure and luck.
