Dimitri Minic is a researcher at the French Institute for International Relations and author of “Russian Strategic Thought and Culture” (Maison des sciences de l’homme, 2023). In an interview with Le Monde, he analyzes the roots and evolution of the conflict in Ukraine, four years after the start of the large-scale Russian invasion on February 24, 2022.
What is the current balance of power between Ukraine and Russia? It has changed, but still favors Russia, which has potentially more reserves than Ukraine. So far, Moscow has been able to compensate for losses, but they are increasing exponentially each year. Today, the Russians control around 20% of Ukrainian territory. However, most of this was gained in the initial phase of the war in 2022. In 2024 and 2025, they only managed to conquer about 1% of the territory. This is extremely costly and deadly.
The war in Ukraine has also led to Russia being downgraded. The country has proven unable to defend its partners around the world, such as Venezuela, Syria, or Iran. Moreover, Moscow is unable to challenge the actions of Donald Trump, who embodies American interventionism and unilateralism despised by Russia. In one year, the American president has ordered more strikes than Joe Biden in four years, while also creating a substitute for the United Nations, the Board of Peace, which he intends to preside over permanently.
Russia and Ukraine each have their own allies. How much influence do these allies have in the balance of power? Russia has privileged and relatively stable partners, like China, whose contribution is fundamental despite its neutral facade. The partnership with China is both enduring and ideological, based on confrontation with the West. North Korea and, to a lesser extent, Iran, who played a significant role at the beginning of the war, are also partners. These alliances allow the Russian defense industry to operate smoothly and provide military aid to the Russian army.
Ukraine currently depends mainly on Europe, which has done a lot to compensate for the end of American military assistance. However, elections will be held in several countries within a year or two, potentially altering the regional geopolitics. This is true for France, where the National Rally could win the presidential election in 2027. What policy would they adopt? A benevolent neutrality towards Ukraine would not be sufficient for France and Europe.
What impact does Donald Trump’s return to the White House have on the conflict? The American president tried to push Ukraine, Europe, and Russia to conclude a peace agreement, but it failed. The conflict will not be resolved transactionally, but through military, economic, social, and/or financial exhaustion of one of the belligerents. For the Kremlin, Trump represents a potential boon. Their hope is that he will completely abandon Ukraine and sever ties with the West. The biggest threat from the American president, in addition to the suspension of military aid, would be directly striking an economic deal with Vladimir Putin behind Ukraine’s back, significantly strengthening Russia.
Russia believed it could quickly take Kiev. How do you explain this miscalculation? In 2021, Moscow seemed convinced of the weakness of the West. Joe Biden was seen as a senile old man, and the withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan [in August 2021] was seen as a pivotal moment, signaling the collapse of the West and the emergence of a new world. This belief proved to be a mistake, as NATO strengthened, and Western countries showed solidarity with each other and Ukraine.
Russian national security strategy, published in 2021, reflects the idea that the international order is changing, and Moscow must seize the opportunity. Russia sees itself as a unique great power with a special historical mission. This belief is widely shared among Russian political and military elites.
What are the other beliefs? One is that the world is hostile to Russia and conspiring against it. This leads to huge resources being used to defend against imaginary enemies and to constantly wage a preventive and largely unilateral war. The second idea is that, essentially, the West is all-powerful and all-knowing but, at the same time, ontologically weak, feeble, and decaying, allowing Moscow to hope to change the status quo. These cognitive frameworks significantly influence Russian foreign policy.
Since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, military elites have developed a concept of warfare based on bypassing direct interstate armed conflict, with indirect confrontation playing a major role. If direct use of armed force is deemed necessary and possible, it is seen as a last resort, a brief, limited, largely demonstrative operation intended to quickly bring about the collapse of the targeted state. The 2022 operation in Ukraine aligns directly with this strategic thinking, which explains both its design and practical failure.
Is Ukraine’s defeat not inevitable despite its struggles? One should not write off Ukraine too quickly—the outcome of this conflict is far from certain. Since November 2022, Russia has been carrying out massive missile and drone strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure. Three years later, Ukraine is still surviving. While suffering on all fronts, it has managed to adapt to the conflict and partially self-sustain militarily.
[…] Read the full article on Le Monde’s website.
