CHRONICLE. If he decides to act, Donald Trump has a strike group centered around the USS Tripoli. The timing of the attack depends on logistical decisions made by the American president.
The capture of Kharg Island is a significant objective, but seizing it is not urgent unless the goal is to win the war very quickly – and, at worst, its narrow siege could possibly be enough to achieve the desired strategic effects. However, the situation is different for the Strait of Hormuz, where the blockade threatens the global economy. It is likely that any potential operation to capture a point or area will first take place in this area to take control, remove this means of pressure from the hands of the Islamic regime, and allow at least 3,000 ships stranded in the Arabian Gulf to depart.
Constrained in their resources and ambitions by a Donald Trump who did not want this to be labeled a “new war in the Middle East,” American planners had not considered this possibility at all and must now organize it on the fly. An Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) centered around the USS Tripoli was urgently deployed from the Sea of Japan. It is now stationed in the Sea of Oman, while a second group, with the USS Boxer, will join in mid-April. For comparison, the Americans deployed six ARGs before their 1991 offensive against Iraq and three in 2003.
These amphibious assault groups each carry a significant Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), with an squadron of heavy and hybrid MV-22 Osprey transport helicopters on the helicopter carrier – with a capacity of 300 men per wave – escorted by AH-1 attack helicopters and supported by an F-35B aircraft squadron for vertical takeoff. The other two ships carry the means to “stage” three waves of 200 to 300 Marines in amphibious assault vehicles, then, once the beachhead is secured, in landing craft and finally in hovercraft for the heaviest equipment.
The command can act with both ARGs and may also use the 82nd Airborne Division brigade currently being deployed, likely with at least one Ranger battalion, all of which can be used in a helicopter-borne mode from a temporary base in the Omani peninsula of Musandam or the United Arab Emirates.
Rules in sight
The area to be conquered in the Strait of Hormuz is a string of islands. The most important by far, with 1,300 km2 and nearly 150,000 inhabitants, is Qeshm Island, about ten kilometers from the coast and about twenty from the Bandar Abbas naval base. It is defended by the 112th Naval Brigade of the Revolutionary Guards, in the city and the naval base of Qeshm, as well as probably by a reinforced regular brigade in the center of the island. Three secondary and arid islands border Qeshm from south to north: Hengam, Larak, and Ormuz. The only truly militarized one, with a battalion and coastal batteries, and the most important, is Larak, a volcanic island of 49 km2 that truly controls the passage.
Taking control of the Strait of Hormuz thus involves capturing Qeshm and Larak, and further to the west in the Gulf, taking the small islets of Greater and Lesser Tunbs, with observation posts, and Abou Musa, more heavily fortified, with, like Larak, a mixed battalion of anti-air and anti-ship defenses.
The assault will inevitably be preceded by several hundred air sorties aimed at neutralizing the Iranian naval bases of Jask, Bandar Sirik, Bandar Abbas, and Bandar Lengeh, and, of course, the access defenses of the targeted islands. This may take a week or two, to prepare for the arrival of the 11th MEU and the Boxer group, as well as reinforcement of airborne troops.
What human cost?
Once the defenses are neutralized, an amphibious assault can be imagined along two protected corridors through the usual navigation routes, towards Larak for example for the reduced 11th MEU, and on available beaches northeast of Qeshm Island for the 31st MEU from the Tripoli, combining helicopter-borne and amphibious operations. The airborne brigade and the Rangers could also be used to take the airstrip northwest of Qeshm. Once the passage is cleared, it will be possible to launch the other part of the 11th MEU towards the Tunbs and Abou Musa islands.
The next phase is the conquest of the two main islands, likely a long process for Qeshm – as large as Okinawa, with painful memories for the Marines – where it will probably be necessary to airlift all available reinforcements from the US Army.
Securing the conquest against constant harassment of rocket fire, and possibly drones, with potential landing attempts or attacks by fast boats will be necessary. For the Marines, this will mean transitioning from the Okinawa landing in 1945 to the siege of Khe Sanh in Vietnam in 1968, where the trap was mainly set for the besiegers, inevitably crushed by American firepower. Perhaps it will be the same here. In any case, the Americans will have achieved a victory and a coup, by freeing navigation in the strait. If they so desire, they will obtain it. The only question is: at what human cost?
