Hundreds of thousands of Russian fighters have been taken out of action since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, but the army still has significant resources, mainly due to the massive financial effort made by the state to attract many men from poor regions.
In mid-March, Russia launched its spring offensive in Ukraine, initiating a major assault on the “fortress belt” of heavily defended cities in the eastern Donetsk region. Over a 24-hour period, nearly 1,000 drones and missiles targeted civilian, energy, and transportation infrastructure over a vast area of the territory to overwhelm Ukrainian air defenses.
Throughout the past year, Ukraine’s technological know-how has enabled them to kill and injure more Russian soldiers than they had recruited. However, according to the Ukrainian chief of armed forces Oleksandr Syrskyi, the Kremlin plans to incorporate over 400,000 new recruits in 2026, continuing its strategy known as the “meat grinder” by overwhelming Ukraine with sheer numbers while undermining national morale by destroying energy infrastructure.
The “meat grinder” strategy results in high levels of Russian casualties, leading some Western observers to suggest that Vladimir Putin might be forced to come to the negotiating table simply because his army cannot recruit sufficient troops to continue. This idea is supported by the analysis of past Russian wars where mistreatment of soldiers and veterans led to significant failures.
The presence of inmates serving prison sentences and troops from allies like North Korea and Serbia is highlighted in Western media coverage, indicating the challenges Russia faces in recruitment and retention of soldiers.
In response to this, Russian authorities are engaging in extensive communication campaigns, portraying the soldier profession as a “real job for real men” in a somewhat unconvincing attempt to make military service more appealing.
The fact that soldiers seem to fight only for money or because they are forced suggests weak real support for the war. The mutiny attempt by Yevgeny Prigozhin in 2023 exemplified the potential risks of the militarization of the country.
However, the current war differs from previous conflicts in several key aspects. Putin is determined to prevent any rupture in relations between society and the army, undertaking efforts since the 2000s to redefine the relationship between the army, the state, and Russian society to avoid such a rupture.
The collapse of the social contract between soldiers and the state during the Afghan and Chechen wars led to profound changes in Russia’s approach. Efforts have been made to rebuild military patriotism and redefine the relationship between the army, the state, and society.
While these material and symbolic forms of recognition may not appeal to all Russian men, many still view military service as a viable social advancement opportunity, especially due to new benefits provided to soldiers in recent years.
Challenges remain regarding soldiers’ conditions, social protections, and the legitimacy of the war in Ukraine. The relationship between the state and society, particularly with its men, remains problematic, characterized by tensions that Putin seeks to address or conceal.
High military salaries and recruitment bonuses continue to attract a steady flow of enlistees, questioning the idea that relations between the army and society will deteriorate and force Russia to negotiate. With the economic boost from the current war in the Middle East, the West should focus on how to assist Ukraine on the battlefield.
