Home World The fall of Iran would not announce spring, but the longest winter

The fall of Iran would not announce spring, but the longest winter

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In the Middle East, there is a war going on. In this sixth part of our series of analyzes, Younes Abouyoub, a doctor in political sociology and diplomat, describes the current conflict as a geopolitical schism whose shockwaves could deeply impact the Arab world.

LCDL: What future does this war foretell for the Arab world? Younes Abouyoub: This war is not just another conflict in a region saturated with violence; it is a geopolitical schism whose aftershocks will be felt for decades. The cards are being reshuffled with a brutality that forces every capital to rethink its alliances, enmities, and, even more fundamentally, its very reason for existence.

The Arab world after the war will not resemble the one before. Formerly unthinkable alliances are now possible, while once solid alliances are fracturing. Ultimately, this process could lead to a profound reconfiguration of the regional landscape, marked by more instability than clarity.

The current conflict acts like an acid that dissolves old loyalties and forges new, often counterintuitive ones.

Here, history weighs heavily. The year 1919 remains an open wound in the memory of the Arab world: the fall of the Ottoman Empire was not a liberation but the opening of a void where colonial powers reshaped the region to serve their interests, sowing the seeds of a century of conflicts and fractures.

Today, as bombs rain down on Tehran, the potential fall of the Iranian state could produce a shock of comparable magnitude. Not a calming but the opening of a strategic void where regional and international powers would rush in.

Why is Iran a central player in the regional balance? Although not Arab, Iran has established itself over the decades as a structuring pillar of the Middle East balance.

Through political, military, and ideological alliances – from the Levant to the Gulf – the Islamic Republic has contributed to shaping a de facto regional order based on stabilized power dynamics enforced by deterrence. This balance is neither peaceful nor consensual, but it imposes limits on the ambitions of each actor.

The sudden disappearance of this pole would not create a space for freedom, but a major strategic vacuum; a scenario whose violent history and lasting effects the region has already shown. Iran, twice the size of France, with a population of nearly 90 million, rich in hydrocarbons, would become a territory arousing the appetites of competing powers.

In this vacuum, regional and international rivalries would intensify. Turkey, under Erdogan’s neo-Ottoman ambition, would see an opportunity to expand its influence in northern Iraq and Syria, but also towards Iranian Azerbaijan.

Israel, which considers weakening Iran a major strategic objective, would find itself in a position of regional dominance without a real counterweight. What currently holds by an unstable balance could then shift to an open logic of confrontation and power projection.

What upheavals would such a collapse entail? The effects would be immediately felt in the most fragile states, where Iranian influence currently acts as a balancing factor, even if contested.

In Iraq, the loss of Iranian support would disrupt the ecosystem of Shiite militias, depriving them of coordination and resources. Their fragmentation could lead to internal conflicts or direct confrontation with the central government, paving the way for an unprecedented civil war.

In Lebanon, the deterrent balance enforced by Hezbollah would collapse. Tensions between factions – Christians, Sunnis, Druze – could then erupt brutally in a country already weakened, with the risk of a generalized civil war.

The illusion that the disappearance of a central power would liberate the people has been tragically proven wrong time and again in the region’s history. The fall of Iran would act as a brutal shock on an already fragile Arab world.

And if Iran emerged as the victor of this conflict? If Tehran were to win this war, it would not be a conventional military triumph, but rather a demonstration of its resilience. This outcome would solidify its position as an indispensable actor, leading to a reshuffling of strategic balances in Western Asia, especially in the Gulf monarchies.

Washington’s inability to effectively protect its allies would raise structural doubts about the reliability of its security umbrella, prompting these states to diversify towards China and Russia and strengthen their regional military cooperation.

Despite this mistrust, a pragmatic coexistence would be necessary. Monarchies aware of their vulnerability would prefer a weakened but stable Iran over a collapse with catastrophic consequences. The “axis of resistance,” especially in Lebanon, would see its ideological legitimacy reinforced nationally.

Such a victory could potentially open an era of cold stability marked by latent antagonism. It would necessitate the initiation of a regional dialogue aimed at reframing the security order in the Muslim Western Asia without external military presence.

Building on the Iran-Saudi Arabia rapprochement orchestrated by Oman and China since 2023, one could ideally consider the creation of a new regional security architecture based on sovereignty, non-interference, and collective security.

This would establish a non-aggression pact and mechanisms for collective security, hinting at the hope of a “Pax Islamica”: a new regional balance no longer based on confrontation but on concerted tension management and political dialogue. And perhaps the beginning of economic integration among sovereign Muslim nations.