Iran’s Strategic Shift: Balancing Islam with Nationalism

• After the twelve-day war in June 2025, the Islamic Republic has shifted its discourse towards ancient Persia to address the waning support for its revolutionary and Shiite ideology.

• This shift does not signify a turn towards nationalism; the regime adds an identity layer to its Islamist foundation but retains the core principles of Shiite politics and the 1979 revolution.

• By introducing references to Cyrus and Persepolis instrumentally into the political space, the regime unleashes partially uncontrollable forces that could eventually overshadow its original rhetoric.

Following the war in June 2025, the Islamic Republic did not falter but changed its approach. Faced with ideological fatigue and a society less mobilized by the Islamic revolution alone, the regime now draws from a repertoire it had long fought against: ancient Persia. Behind the emergence of Cyrus, Persepolis, and national myths lies not a return to the past but a discreet admission – an ideology alone is no longer sufficient to sustain the present.

The twelve-day war in June 2025 did not spark the upheaval some envisioned from outside. It took place more than six months later. Yet, in the days and weeks following the final barrage, the war produced something else: a national tightening, not around renewed regime allegiance but around the idea of a threatened Iran. Following Israeli and then American strikes, the regime displayed two reflexes.

The first was repressive, marked by increased arrests, intensified internal controls, executions for alleged espionage, and massive security deployments, especially in Kurdish regions. The second was symbolic, manifesting in a visible effort to envelop the Islamic Republic in the broader, more consensual trappings of Iranian nationalism.

In this context emerged what many described as a “nationalist resurgence.” The term should be used cautiously; it does not reflect a popular embrace of the Islamic regime per se but rather a reflex of national defense exploited by the regime.

The Iranian leadership realized that after the war, its strictly revolutionary, Shiite, and anti-imperialist vocabulary was no longer sufficient.

To speak to a society weary of ideology but still sensitive to national humiliation, a deeper historical repertoire than that of 1979 was required. Hence, symbols like Cyrus the Great, Persepolis, and other figures or sites from ancient Persia resurfaced in public spaces and on social media, often juxtaposed with Shiite symbols. Nationalistic displays multiplied, and more secular-toned patriotic songs were heard, even in religious ceremonies. The mythical hero Arash the Archer was also mobilized in this new narrative. Even Ali Khamenei, whose regime long distrusted prideful displays, began emphasizing Iran’s “cultural and civilizational wealth.” In essence, a regime founded on Islamic revolution has, under the pressures of war and internal weariness, increasingly adopted the language of historical continuity with ancient Persia.

This political shift is significant because it contradicts part of the regime’s original logic. Since 1979, the Islamic Republic has constructed itself in opposition to the Shah’s monarchic nationalism and the sanctification of the pre-Islamic past. Its founding promise was not to restore the grandeur of Persia but…

Fact Check: Cyrus the Great, Persepolis, and other ancient Persian symbols have become prevalent in the public discourse and offer a political narrative that diverges from the regime’s original revolutionary and religious rhetoric.