lediplomate.media – printed on 05/27/2026
By Alain Rodier
Espionage, diplomacy, technical intelligence, hybrid warfare: behind the official facades of embassies a discreet but permanent war between states is playing out.
Through several recent examples involving Russia, Austria and even Georgia, Alain Rodier deciphers the little-known mechanisms of intelligence under diplomatic cover. Between handling officers, human networks, clandestine operations, electronic surveillance and parallel diplomacy, this investigation sheds light on the strategic role of embassies in contemporary international rivalries. An essential article to understand behind the scenes of global espionage at the heart of the geopolitical tensions of 2026.Â
Vienna, world capital of espionage? Embassies at the heart of the intelligence war
In May, the Austrian government expelled three Russian embassy employees suspected of espionage. According to information published by the public audiovisual group ORF, Russian installations in Vienna could be used to spy on international organizations present in Austria such as the UN, OPEC or the OSCE. Foreign Minister Beate Meinl-Reisinger said: “Regarding the antenna forest of the Russian representation, it is unacceptable that diplomatic immunity is used to carry out espionage activities. »
The Austrian capital, Vienna, is regularly described as a “nest of Russian spies”, notably due to a lax legislative framework and the some 220 employees who are accredited to the Russian embassy: a figure disproportionate to the geopolitical importance of Austria.
That said, almost all major metropolises boast of being “nests of spies” because, ultimately, it is rewarding for the host country which thus claims its “importance” on the international level: London, New York, Istanbul, St Petersburg, Tangier, etc. (1)Â
Another concrete case in Georgia: after the arrest on May 5 of Giorgi Udzilauri, a former press manager of the Cartu group owned by ex-president Bidzina Ivanishvili, (the second richest person in the country), the Georgian Deputy Prime Minister, Mamuka Mdinaradze, publicly demanded that several European states (unnamed) withdraw their intelligence officers from Georgia or make revelations about their networks. According to the news outlet News.az (Azerbaijan), Mdinaradze declared that the Georgian services had “much more information than these countries assume.” At the time of writing, nothing new had come out in the press.
These recent cases are not a new thing, all the diplomatic representations of major countries doing “intelligence.”
Of course, there are big nuances.
As a famous journalist says: “How does it work?”
Also read: ANALYSIS – United States: Africa erased from the State Department’s maps?
The advantage of diplomatic status is that it allows Intelligence Officers (Treating Officers in French – OT -) acting under this cover to carry out their activities in complete security. If they are caught with their hand in the jam pot, in most civilized countries, they only risk expulsion becoming “persona non grata.” Note that 600 members of Russian diplomatic missions have been expelled from Europe since the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The reciprocal measures – as is customary – were taken by Moscow…
Diplomatic enclaves are protected by international conventions (Vienna Convention of 1961) which allows all existing electronic devices to be installed there to carry out technical intelligence. To do this, you just need to find out about the roofs of almost all the American embassies deployed on the planet (including in Paris)…
Finally, it should be noted that in an embassy, everyone does intelligence, from the head of mission to the bottom line. The difference from Attending Officers is that true diplomats must not engage in illegal activities in the host country.
The nuance is important for the country represented by its embassy.
An example: when a country takes “sanctions” (always “exemplary” sanctions) against a third state also represented in the host country, the diplomats of this country “are deprived of petit fours” since they can no longer go to receptions in the sanctioned state and vice versa. Diplomats from “sanctioning” countries can no longer meet their counterparts of the said offender. This rule does not apply to OTs who can continue to see who they want – of course not officially -. This process makes it possible to maintain open communication channels which can prove very useful for sending messages through the gang (the “parallel diplomacy”) and even more so at the time when sanctions are being imposed. The specificity of OTs is to frequent the “unfrequentable”, whether they are state or individual.
Most importantly: only OTs are authorized to recruit human sources by paying them (2) using specific funds to which official Foreign Affairs treasurers do not have access.
That said, legal diplomats also have means (gifts, internships in universities, care in the country of origin, etc.) but do not pay their sources directly. For diplomats, they can only link to “open sources” even if they are in the local political opposition, which sometimes poses relational problems with the host government when the latter is a little finicky about protocol.
In addition, the special services “follow” and “protect” their sources whose files (which never close – the great power of the services is their “memory” -) are kept well protected at the central office. Theoretically, Even the political authorities cannot have access to these files – and therefore to the identity of the sources – of course, except in exceptions which confirm the rule, generally when an affair becomes a public scandal.
Another particularity is that the members of these services are grouped together in a separate entity – which has a front diplomatic cover – which, depending on the country, is called the “residence” (Russia and assimilated), the “station” for the Americans or the “post” for France -. These entities communicate with their hierarchies by their own means and even the ambassador does not have access to this correspondence.
The question arises of defense attachés who, for example for Russia, have the same status as “residents” because, all belonging to the GRU (renamed GU in 2010), they answer for their activities to the Ministry of Defense and not to Business. foreigners. Its members are also allowed to engage in illegal activities.
Note a specificity of communist (China, North Korea, Vietnam, etc.) or authoritarian (Russia, Iran, etc.) countries, which is that the treating Officers monitor each other – hello paranoia -.
Some OTs are officially declared to local authorities ensuring the link with local counterpart services.
These connections may or may not be successful. It depends on the geostrategy of the moment and the orders received from the respective political authorities. Joint operations are sometimes even organized, particularly in the areas of counter-terrorism and the fight against organized crime. But for economic intelligence, it’s always “every man for himself.”
Also read: Exclusive interview with Nigara Mirdad: Status and responsibilities of the diplomatic missions of the former Republic of Afghanistan
Russia, China, NATO: parallel diplomacy and new methods of global intelligence
But make no mistake, even OTs which are not officially declared end up being known to local services who do their best to detect them (to better monitor them) and even to representatives of other embassies. A big game in this business is “who’s who?”
As a security measure, clandestine OTs never have relations with their counterparts under diplomatic cover.
Finally, each country has its preferences. For example, the Chinese favor technical research because they are less confident in human intelligence (Humint).
The Russians, faithful to a long “kgébiste” tradition that they have forged particularly in Great Britain, favor the Humint.
A popular adage says that prostitution is the “oldest profession in the world.” In fact, the second is espionage which made it possible to know the addresses of brothels…
It has always existed and will always exist, only the means – especially technical – change because we have to keep up with the times. For the Humint it’s a little different. What is almost certain is that a diplomat who is not friendly, open to others, ready to be of service, etc. is not an OT. Indeed, any Intelligence Officer must present these characteristics.
- Important cities are often economic and not political capitals. Large countries generally have a consulate general which has the same advantages as the embassy.
- A source is only truly considered “recruited” when he or she has signed a receipt for compensation. Even if she cooperates out of ideology, it is appropriate to “lock” her with this document, you never know… The case of Giorgi Udzilauri cited in this paper made it possible to film the source receiving money from a supposed foreign OT whose nationality does not have was revealed by the authorities.
Also read: ANALYSIS – China and its “iron embassies”: A new frontier of diplomacy
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