At least the terms of the contradiction are clear. The leader of the Lebanese Hezbollah, Naïm Kassem, and the President of the Republic of Lebanon, Joseph Aoun, clashed radically yesterday, showing how deeply divided Lebanon is while the war with Israel has never really stopped.
The leader of Hezbollah described the government’s decision to negotiate directly with Israel as “a free, humiliating, and unnecessary concession, the only justification being unconditional submission.” The Lebanese president sharply responded two hours later that “the real betrayal is committed by those who lead their country into war to serve external interests.” It is clear that he was referring to Iran, the sponsor of Hezbollah.
The Lebanese internal dimension
This deep division complicates any resolution of the Lebanese crisis, which has its own elements compared to the one unfolding in the Gulf with Iran. The Lebanese internal dimension is crucial, with the specter of civil war constantly looming, over thirty years after the one that tore the country apart for years.
Why these brutal exchanges? Lebanon was included at the last minute on April 17 in the ceasefire concluded with Iran by the United States. Israel wanted to continue its war with Hezbollah despite the truce on the Iranian front, but Donald Trump finally imposed the ceasefire. Yesterday, the leader of Hezbollah thanked Iran for this truce, but in Paris, they claim a share of the responsibility for convincing Trump to impose it on its Israeli ally.
But the ceasefire has not settled anything. Fighting continues in the south, although Israelis and Lebanese met in Washington under the auspices of the United States. There is still a long way from any agreement for a simple reason: the Lebanese state does not have the means to disarm Hezbollah as required by the 2024 ceasefire agreement and the terms of the current negotiation.
Double intransigence
Friends of Lebanon, starting with France, suggest giving the Lebanese state, and thus its national army, the means to enforce the decisions taken by the government to disarm Hezbollah. At the same time, Israel would evacuate the territories it occupies in the south, which it is transforming into a buffer zone.
However, this scenario encounters a double intransigence: Israel, which does not trust the Lebanese government to carry out this task; and Hezbollah, engaged in a larger battle in the name of Iran. Faced with these two uncompromising positions, there is the weakness of the state. An example: when the government declared the Iranian ambassador to Beirut persona non grata a month ago, he did not comply with the expulsion order: he is still in Beirut. Some Lebanese dream of seeing the state regain its composure and act against Hezbollah.
How to prevent the logic of war from prevailing again? Once again, the fate of the Lebanese is not really in their hands.
