The world is awaiting the end of the new ultimatum issued by the tenant of the White House. Geopolitics expert Frédéric Encel analyzes the international situation in the context of legal aspects and the erratic behavior of the American president on “Quid Juris, le podcast du Club des Juristes.”
What can France do in the face of the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz? Does the UN still have a role to play in this conflict? Could the war in Iran signal the end of NATO? Can Donald Trump escape the trap of Tehran? The latest episode of the podcast Quid Juris, le podcast du Club des Juristes attempts to answer all these questions. Laurent Neumann hosts Frédéric Encel, a geopolitics doctor, lecturer at Sciences-Po, founder of the Rencontres Geopolitiques de Trouville, and author of a recent book, “La guerre mondiale n’aura pas lieu.”
Laurent Neumann: To build on the title of your book, at what point can we say that a war is global? Frédéric Encel: This is a central question. There is no love, only proofs of love. There is no world war, only proofs of world wars. Among these parameters is an empirical one, seen in the two major wars of the 20th century, which was the existence of two opposing blocks of military alliances.
Today, this doesn’t exist. There is a coalition of two states, America and Israel, facing a third country, Iran. In this conflict, you have the prefix “con” in Latin with conflictuality. A form of hostility, in a sense. That is conflictuality. In reality, the Arab states, it hasn’t escaped you, are not reacting. So, they are not forming an alliance.
LN: Iran considers all Gulf countries as belligerents, because they support, in a way, the US and Israel, just like European countries. Are they not co-belligerents, or at least enemies? FE: Tehran’s propaganda does not reflect reality. You mention states that host American or Western bases. Oman has none on its soil, nor does Saudi Arabia. The same goes for Azerbaijan, none.
As for European states, they are officially, very concretely, not belligerents. Indeed, they stated this from the start, and most European states, in fact almost all, do not have military bases in the region. Except the UK in Jordan and France in the United Arab Emirates. To honor its mutual defense contract with the UAE, France flies its Rafales, but solely for defensive purposes.
Just because a state, dominated by an extraordinarily fanatical regime and outright critics of international law, designates enemies does not correspond to a geopolitical or legal reality.
LN: What interests the French is what is happening at the Strait of Hormuz. Before the war, 120 ships passed through it, now it’s between 0 and 5. However, freedom of navigation is a fundamental principle of international law that Iran does not respect… FE: Freedom of maritime navigation, as you pointed out, is fundamental. It is in the 1982 Montego Bay Convention. From this standpoint, the Iranians do not respect it today. Iran violates the sovereignty of Gulf states in the air, sea, and ultimately on land.
LN: We don’t know how this war will end, or when it will end. But one of the potential consequences is that Iran may privatize the Strait of Hormuz by demanding $2 million per ship. FE: Of course. This is how rogue states behave. They are beyond the law. To be intellectually honest, I would say that the American-Israeli attack, strictly following international law and the UN Charter, does not correspond to a right recognized by the UN since Iran is a sovereign state and has every right to retaliate. But beware, to retaliate against belligerents, against attackers, certainly not against the Sultanate of Oman.
LN: The blockade of the Strait of Hormuz can have incalculable consequences. Donald Trump once said that once the war is over, it will be the countries that need to use this strait that will organize its security. The UK and France are planning to gather a coalition of around thirty countries to secure this strait… FE: But for that, there would need to be at least a mandate from the UN. In principle, one would even have to go through the UN executive. This is obviously the Security Council. Now, I will not remind you that the Security Council includes Russia and China. So, what do we do?
The French and the British, rightfully, could jointly submit resolutions, as they have been doing regularly since March 15, 2011, that is, since the Libyan affair. We were in the Arab Spring era at the time, but since then, Paris and London almost systematically submit resolutions to the Security Council.
I formally approve of this, both as a European and as a geopolitician. But that’s not enough because if one of the three other permanent members vetoes it, it obviously amounts to nothing. And this is where we come, in my opinion, to the fundamental question of international law as it has existed since 1945 and which I believe is outdated. We may regret it perfectly and we can certainly remain, as I do, very attached to a form of international law allowing at least minimal multilateralism. But it is outdated. Not since Donald Trump in the Middle East, but at least since Vladimir Putin in Ukraine.
LN: Since the beginning of this conflict, the UN seems remarkably absent. It is supposed to be a place of multilateralism and diplomacy… FE: Yes, it is supposed to be, but since 1945, it hasn’t escaped anyone that the major powers on the Security Council, the permanent members with the right to veto, impose their views. The UN was built at a particular moment and on an extremely particular balance of power. And today, things have changed.
LN: Why do you think Donald Trump keeps postponing his ultimatum? FE: Because negotiations are ongoing. And also because it’s Trump. Politically and militarily, he is almost totally unpredictable. He is not economically. He is an absolute mercantilist. He is so unpredictable that I am not even sure to what extent he himself knows what decision he will make the next day.
And I’m not kidding. Rarely in the long history of international relations have we come across this kind of scenario. If he orchestrated his own unpredictability to deceive his enemies, it might not be a bad idea. But I’m not at all convinced that the majority, the critical mass of his erratic statements and actions, falls under this “strategy.”
I think there is also a significant element of randomness in Mr. Trump. One can say that he is not primarily seeking to overthrow the regime in Tehran, but he seeks to pacify, I say pacify – not certain he will succeed – the region for the benefit obviously of the United States, but also of Gulf countries that he does not consider allies but as clients.
LN: Just weakening Iran would be enough… FE: Weakening Iran and its geopolitical toxicity. And from that perspective, look to what extent the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, all affected by Iran, have bought protection means worth hundreds of billions of dollars over the past decades from the United States and other countries, including France. For the US, the American economy, Mr. Trump’s family’s economy and his own as well, this is extremely important.
LN: What about the Iranian people in all of this? FE: In an extraordinarily cynical manner, Donald Trump called on Iranians to continue revolting by promising immediate support, which took several weeks to materialize, to say the least. I will be extremely frank with you, Mr. Trump doesn’t care at all about the Iranian population. He doesn’t care about democracy, on which he is also undermining in the US.
But was it any different for Obama with Syria? Or for Clinton in Rwanda? I agree that Trump is demonized, but in reality, he fits into a kind of cold realpolitik that unfortunately has almost always prevailed. And, no, nothing will be done for the unfortunate Iranian population.
