The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) at the heart of the conflict
The escalation of terrorist attacks by Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) – a movement opposed to the Islamabad government – on Pakistani territory undoubtedly constitutes the primary factor explaining the worsening tensions between Islamabad and the Taliban regime. The TTP is a terrorist group that gathers Pakistani Pashtuns from tribal areas and historically close to Afghan Taliban. In addition to ethnic ties, their proximity to Afghan Taliban is ideological and reflected in their strict interpretation of Islam (Deobandi school), yet with a greater openness to international jihadism embodied by Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. The goal of the TTP is to establish an Islamic emirate in Pakistan modeled after the Afghan Taliban regime.
The TTP carried out numerous deadly attacks in Pakistan, especially between 2008 and 2011, and in 2014. However, the group eventually lost ground due to anti-terrorism operations by the Pakistani army and U.S. drone strikes campaigns, which resulted in the elimination of its three successive leaders (Baitullah Mehsud in 2009, Hakimullah Mehsud in 2013, and Mullah Fazlullah in 2018). During the second half of the 2010s, many TTP members retreated to Afghanistan, where they found refuge with the Taliban and even fought alongside them against the NATO forces.
Regional Environment of Pakistan and Afghanistan
In the months following the return of the Taliban to power in Afghanistan, the TTP resumed its attacks on Pakistan. Several hundred TTP fighters were released from Afghan prisons in early 2021 and returned to join the group, which gained organizational coherence under its new leader, Noor Wali Mehsud. Pakistan initially relied on its historical affinity with the Taliban and asked for their help in managing the TTP resurgence. In 2022, the government of Prime Minister Imran Khan initiated negotiations with the TTP, mediated by Afghanistan. However, this mediation failed by the end of 2022 as the TTP intensified its attacks, prompting Islamabad to turn against the Taliban regime, accusing it of protecting the group and even facilitating its cross-border incursions. By 2025, over 660 Pakistani military and paramilitary personnel, as well as 580 civilians, were killed in attacks mostly attributed to the TTP.
Pakistani Pressure on Kabul
Due to lack of cooperation, Pakistan now aims to compel Kabul to combat the TTP on its territory and is increasing pressure mechanisms to achieve this goal. Islamabad targeted Afghan refugees in Pakistan, estimated at over 4 million, and deported nearly a million of them to Afghanistan. It also closed the border, cutting off Afghanistan’s main transit routes to the world. These measures led to a rise in violence along the border, with heavy artillery exchanges, followed by an escalation in the aerial domain, where the Pakistani Air Force struck TTP training camps and even Taliban army units starting from February 2026. On February 27, 2026, the Pakistani Defense Minister declared “an open war with Afghanistan.”
However, the Afghan Taliban did not turn against TTP fighters. Not only do they view them as brothers in arms, but they also see them as a useful bargaining chip in their asymmetrical relationship with Pakistan. Furthermore, they fear that attacking TTP members might drive them towards the Islamic State in Khorasan (ISK), their main rival. The Taliban oppose ISK’s global ambitions and have fiercely battled them. Historically, TTP fighters’ defections led to the formation of ISK in 2014-2015 in eastern Afghanistan. These factors suggest that the Taliban are unlikely to yield much to Pakistani pressure, and bilateral tensions will likely continue with deadly consequences.
Mediation and Opportunism of Major Regional Players
Following Pakistani airstrikes in October 2025, Qatar and Turkey urged Pakistan and the Taliban to negotiate a ceasefire, which was quickly violated. Saudi Arabia joined the efforts, but negotiations collapsed in late November 2025. After the peak of violence in February-March 2026, the three states managed to secure a five-day truce between Kabul and Islamabad on the occasion of the end of Ramadan celebrations. China has been discreetly mediating since 2025, without significant results. It is likely to continue its efforts, concerned about destabilization in the “Af-Pak” region, bordering China’s Xinjiang region historically exposed to jihadist ideologies, and fearing Afghanistan becoming a rear base for hostile terrorist groups.
India, on the other hand, is not mediating, with its relationship with Pakistan at an all-time low since their four-day armed conflict in May 2025. Despite having a negative view of the Taliban, the Indian government made a surprising rapprochement to regain influence in Afghanistan. Demonstrating progress, India hosted a significant Taliban delegation led by the Afghan Foreign Minister, Amir Muttaqi, in October 2025, announcing the reopening of its embassy in Kabul and increased financial and humanitarian aid. Nothing worries Pakistan more than the prospect of India and Afghanistan aligning, as it would sandwich the country between two neighbors with unresolved border conflicts. Pakistani authorities view any Indian influence in Afghanistan as a critical threat, necessitating firm opposition.
The Trump administration generally supported Pakistan’s military campaign against Afghanistan, citing the “right to self-defense.” This support was part of the warming ties between Washington and Islamabad since May 2025, upsetting New Delhi. With Trump’s relative approval, Pakistan felt emboldened to intensify strikes against Afghanistan starting from February 2026.
War in the Middle East: Escalating Risks for Afghanistan and Pakistan
The war in the Middle East presents several challenges for Pakistan and Afghanistan. For Pakistan, it hampers hydrocarbon supplies and exacerbates economic difficulties. In Afghanistan, the impact is mainly humanitarian. To compensate for the closure of the Pakistan border, Kabul shifted towards Iran, becoming its top trading partner in 2025. However, access to the Bandar Abbas and Chabahar ports has become increasingly uncertain, hindering essential imports. Additionally, the war forced thousands of Afghan refugees in Iran to return home, worsening food insecurity in the country.
Prolonged destabilization in Iran could further undermine security along its borders with Afghanistan and Pakistan, facilitating insurgent and terrorist activities. It could also affect Pakistan’s significant Shiite minority (15% of the population), leading to tensions with the Sunni majority. Moreover, Pakistan may face pressure to intervene in the war because of its strategic mutual defense agreement with Saudi Arabia signed in September 2025. However, Islamabad seeks to avoid being drawn into a conflict that would strain its relations with Iran. As a result, Pakistan skillfully proposed to facilitate negotiations between Iran and the U.S. If confirmed as a mediator, Pakistan could maintain functional ties with Tehran and Riyadh, enhance its strategic utility for the U.S., and gain leverage in its own war against Afghanistan.
