In the report submitted by Luis Vassy last December, the committee concluded that “Sciences Po is not well-equipped to provide a meaningful and effective response to this geopolitical moment.” How can we define this moment we are experiencing? What makes it unique?
Although singular, this moment is part of a historical trajectory. The war in Ukraine cannot be detached from the history of the Cold War. But there is something unprecedented about it. Some observers have used expressions that are quite apt in capturing the moment: “strategic rupture,” “new conflictualities,” “the era of predators” (Giuliano da Empoli). All these expressions capture a part of the phenomenon. I would describe it, for my part, as a tipping point. Terms that do not signify a simple change of position, but a loss of balance, sometimes a change in nature, which could lead to a fall.
We are witnessing this tipping point at several levels, especially in historical alliances. For a long time, NATO provided a stability that Europeans took for granted. No one can say what its political weight will be in a few years. Furthermore, another sign of this tipping point is seen in all the initiatives aimed at undermining the institutional architecture of global governance. It is through this lens that we must interpret the creation of parallel international institutions, outside the UN system. China has been using this for years, and now the United States is also getting involved with the launch of the Board of Peace by Donald Trump.
We are also witnessing a spectacular remilitarization of military discourse and practices, a return of the question of resource extraction by force, something that was thought to belong to colonial and empire wars… Finally, the resurgence of the arms race and the acceleration of the use of AI in the major sectors of defense, security, and diplomacy are disrupting not only the tools, but also the norms that underpin these practices.
In the face of this strategic tipping point, what is Sciences Po currently lacking to understand and analyze it?
The committee was very surprised by the extent of the scientific lag of Sciences Po, not only compared to our international competitors, but also compared to national institutions. Scientific production in International Relations is not very visible; the quality of individuals can no longer mask the institution’s capabilities. This is mainly due to a second factor: a critical mass that is far too low in the field. For example, less than 2% of the permanent faculty are in international security and/or defense positions. In short, our contribution to research efforts in these areas is limited.
Finally, the third element that alerted the committee is a disconnection between fundamental research on these issues and the world of practice. Even though Sciences Po hosts many teaching practitioners, they interact very little with the research world. These two universes succeed each other in front of students, but they hardly communicate with each other and learn little from each other.
Are other institutions, in France or internationally, better equipped? Business schools, such as ESCP, are also creating geopolitical institutes… What models could Sciences Po draw inspiration from?
You are right; the situation of Sciences Po becomes even more untenable as other institutions have invested heavily and continue to do so. For example, Leiden University in the Netherlands established a school on security and global affairs in 2016. In just 10 years of existence, the permanent faculty has grown to around fifty people.
It is quite difficult to choose a model, as the functioning of Sciences Po is peculiar, as research starts from centers: they are the basic units of the intellectual life of the institution. In most other developed countries where International Relations are recognized as a full-fledged discipline, the operation is rather centered around schools or departments, with an extensive permanent faculty.
Several models have proven their worth, and we could draw inspiration from them without imitating them. For example, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School, which is a model of fundamental research in contact with practitioners, within the university’s scientific parameters. In Europe, King’s College has a security school with a permanent faculty of over 100 teacher-researchers – certainly the highest concentration of researchers, professors, and students in the world. In Singapore or Canada, other schools have established themselves as leading centers for research and teaching in International Relations, security, and defense.
What are the main recommendations of the committee?
In order for Sciences Po to quickly position itself and regain an upward trajectory in these areas, the committee’s essential recommendation is the creation of a distinct, clearly identifiable, attractive, and internationally visible structure that is agile and offers room for growth. The committee believes that it should build on existing strengths, especially PSIA, but also on all our strengths in terms of training – and there are many! The final form of the structure is obviously left to Sciences Po’s evaluation, but I note that for all members, the creation of an autonomous research center appears as the minimum scenario, the core from which a satisfactory offering for Sciences Po can be built.
